THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF SOCIOLOGY

A STUDY OF THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

BY

HERBERT NEWHARD SHENTON

Sometime University Fellow and
Instructor in Sociology at
Columbia University

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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TO MY
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PREFACE

The development of the physical sciences during the past century has not only added vastly to our cultural accumulations—it has almost revolutionized them. In consequence, there have been continuous social adjustments to a world better understood. The practical application of the physical sciences has given rise to an artificial and highly mechanized, almost machinized, material basis for our social life. There is a widespread opinion to the effect that our human relations and social activities are being increasingly determined by these results of the persistent application of the physical sciences to the achievement of material changes.

There has been no commensurate application of the social sciences, for the achievement of social change or even for the facilitation of social adjustments to the better understood or artificially modified material order. If our social adjustment is to be more than a mere fumbling around for comfort in the dim light of social empiricisms we need a more adequate applied social science. If we should ever essay to place the achievement of our visualized social concepts as a primary objective and make the application of all science subservient to this end, then we need an adequate sociology—one that will lend itself to societal telesis (the visualization of social objectives) and one that will provide a scientific basis for the arts of achievement. For the determination of objectives we need a comprehensive general sociology: for the discovery of ways and means of achievement, we need an applied sociology.

The development of an applied sociology may be the most certain and direct route to the development of general sociology.

Certain it is, that the physical sciences entered new epochs whenever they revealed new possibilities of practical application. When astronomy was found to be useful for world navigation, when physics and chemistry made possible the release and control of energy, when biology was proved to be of value for breeding and for the practice of medicine,—in short, when each science was found to be practically useful, it entered a new and more significant epoch in its development.

Practical usefulness adds to the survival chances of anything from pins to philosophies. Sociology emerging from a century of comprehensive positive sociology is about to take its chances as a specific science of what Herbert Spencer once styled "super-organic" relations of human beings. If as such a specific social science, sociology should become practically useful for establishing control and effecting economy in the realm of business as well as in professional enterprises, and all other social projects, its chances for survival and development will be increased.

The biggest traffic in the world is in the exchange of human experiences. It is continuous and universal and results in changes of human relationships that affect all social and economic processes and transform the social order. The fear of social taboo and the love of social acclaim, the desire for recognition, the struggle for status and prestige are persistent factors in all this business of human give and take. They are important determinants in every field of trade and exchange—social and economic.

Every human being has human relationships which he is anxious or willing to exchange for other relationships. Time, effort and material goods are given in exchange for social preferment—even life is risked. To this end, soup and nut courses are served a la Emily Post at dinner, French accents are attempted, exclusive real estate developments are sought, and distinctive sartorial creations are worn.

All of these processes are in accord with natural laws. Sociology should reveal the underlying laws and principles of this human give and take.

General sociology as the result of comprehensive observation has given us many generalizations concerning the process of *beneficium et commendatio*. It remains for an applied sociology to make these generalizations practically available for use in definite specific social transactions, to provide a science of economy and control in the business of social adjustment.

It was with these considerations in mind that I have examined the trends in sociology, especially those which have seemed most indica-

tive of its possibilities as a science of practical objectives and of ways and means of achievement.

This study has strengthened my previous belief that an applied sociology will not be an invention devised by one mind but that it will gradually evolve from persistent cooperation between practically minded sociologists and scientifically minded social artists and social engineers. Such cooperation should produce a depictive science the perceptions of which would be very detailed and drawn from every kind of human associations; it should produce also a conceptual science with resolutions and abstractions in terms that are easily translated into perceived practical problems.

From the studies it appears that the development of applied sociology will be hastened (1) by making a clearer distinction between general sociology, social arts (including social work) social economy, social arts technology and applied sociology; (2) by an effort to rectify and integrate the social empiricisms of business practice; (3) by the introduction of observational sociology wherever men are endeavoring to influence the behavior of their fellowmen; (4) by the development of a "counting technique"—the statistical study of multi-individual behavior; (5) and by the development of a "pattern technique" or "relation technique" for the study of co-individual behavior.

If there be in this volume anything of sociological virtue, it has grown out of many years of association with my friend and teacher, Franklin H. Giddings. Credit is due also to those students, colleagues and other friends who have generously read and criticized the manuscript. To no other am I more indebted than to my wife and companion, Edna Logan Shenton, not only for her supporting faith but also for generous and invaluable assistance in the preparation of the manuscript.

Columbia University, June, 1927. H. N. S.

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PART I

THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

Applicable Sociology

Sociological understanding is social power. This modification of the old aphorism "Wissenchaft ist Macht" is symbolic of that which has inspired the practically minded to the scientific study of society. To them sociology is a science of social control and thereby of social achievement. They expect it to reveal new sources of social power and to provide ways and means of using them. These practically minded folk are hoping that a sociology will arise which will be practically applicable as the natural sciences have been during the last century. They believe that this will be concomitant with the intensive development of sociology as a special social science.

There are, on the other hand, those who seek truth and understanding by the route of sociology because of interests of a more philosophical sort. They desire a more accurate and comprehensive description of society, of human relations and of social behavior. Their desideratum is a more perfect knowledge of the relation of the immediate to the more remote social conditions and phenomena. Usually they have at least secondary interest in orientation and adaptation. Their quest, in so far as it finds its satisfaction in sociology, finds it in one that is primarily a positive social philosophy. These searchers are content if sociology adds to their general understanding. In fact some of these more or less "pure" sociologists look askance at any sociology rooted in empiricisms and validated by pragmatic tests.

But even this positive social philosophy is, itself, of practical value for the construction of a sounder ethics, for the determination of practical social objectives and for the formulating of comprehensive and far-sighted policies. Until a few years ago these were considered as not only the most important but as about all of the practical values of sociology. They are practical values of *general*

sociology and the normal development of general sociology will doubtless increase its practical value in each of these fields. But the practical values of sociology as a positive social philosophy are not necessarily the same as those of sociology as a special social science.

Without in any way discounting the practical values of the social philosophy, attention must be drawn to the other group of practical values which cluster around the intensive development of sociology as a special science of social relations and behavior. Those who are actively employed in effecting immediate, specific and concrete social change, and those who are actually exerting and directing social control desire to know whether sociology is or may be of any practical value to them. They want to know whether the theories of the sociologists will work. They urge pragmatic tests. Men who are face to face with social problems demanding immediate action are constantly realizing the inadequacy of their empiricisms. They are anxious to find a sound method of substituting science for empiricism. Will sociology stand pragmatic tests and will it offer superior substitutes for empiricisms? Of what value is it to the practically minded who want a science of social control and of social economy? What has it to offer to those who seek to replace sporadic and sentimental reforms with preventive and constructive social or societal engineering?

Social Empiricists. Among the practical minded are many social empiricists, experimenters in social practice who are without adequate knowledge of sociological principles. Their activities are sometimes much more effective than scientific. Occasionally they are, metaphorically speaking, social alchemists leaving a wake of wrecked hopes in the trail of their unwarranted and expensive experiments. Many social empiricists are conscientious and high-minded and their sin is not so much in motive as in method. For over-ambitious attempts to control or change society based upon inadequate empirical formulæ are quite as likely to precipitate social catastrophe, whether they are projected by charlatans or by self-sacrificing missionaries of social idealism.

An empirical socialization is futile[1], but on the other hand there is a field for empirical generalization. Spencer calls attention to the fact that the empirical generalization that guides the farmer in his rotation of crops, serves to bring his actions into concord with certain of the actions going on in plants and soil.[2] The fact is that when men are confronted with the necessity of making a social change or with interfering with one in process, they use such knowledge as they have. When they do not have formulæ supported by established laws or theories they resort to action based upon empiricisms. As specific observations within fields of narrow range some of these empiricisms become very useful. They uncover ways that work in specific conditions and circumstances. Thus there have arisen various empirical procedures for relief, correction, rehabilitation, public health, recreation and other welfare work. Similarly empirical methods have been developed by sporadic and limited experimenting in personnel management and administration, in propaganda, campaigning and the molding of public opinion, in conciliation, arbitration and various forms of mediation, and in an incredible number of other practical social arts some of which will be discussed later in a chapter devoted to social art.

For milleniums men have been learning ways and means of influencing their fellow men and also methods of developing group adaptation and social self-control. There exists, as a result, a wealth of *ways which work* garnered from the experiments of untold generations. A practical selection is ever marking some of these ways as *sound* and others as *unsound*. The former tend to survive, the latter to perish. These *sound ways and means* are raw material for sociology.

The fortunes of social empiricists depend upon the validity of their empiricisms. Their future hopes rest in the improvement of their empirical formulæ. Many of the empiricists realizing the limitations

1. *Cf.* N. M. Butler, *The Meaning of Education*, p. 8 *et seq.*, "an empirical education is futile."

2. Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, sec. 28. *Cf.* also *The Study of Sociology*. P. 357.

of the empiricisms with which they are now forced to operate are willing to substitute scientific methods for empirical methods whenever and wherever this is feasible. The scientific scrutiny of social empiricism and the testing, refinement and coordination of these empirical theories by competent sociologists should enrich sociology, increase its practical values and be an aid to the social empiricists who would become social engineers.

Social Pragmatists. Every business has social phases, and societal factors enter into the determining circumstances and conditions of every business. Far-sighted business men are recently becoming aware of this fact. They are not as yet convinced, however, that sociology either explicitly or even inherently has anything of serious value for dealing with these social phases and societal factors. Some business men admit that the ends for which business exists are human, social and societal. But when they attempt to reorganize their business so as to make it a superior social venture, they are baffled by the indefiniteness and the impracticability of sociological abstractions and generalizations.

There are not a few business men who desire to experiment in making their mines, mills, factories and market places more democratic and who are willing to extend participation in control and profits within the institutions under their direction. They do not feel that they have a right, either in the best interests of their own institution or of industry in general, to base such revolutionary programs on vague, ephemeral and inadequate sociological abstractions with little or no pragmatically established validity. Nor do they feel justified in turning the task over to sentimental experimenters. They are waiting for social engineers who can demonstrate their competency for the task. Here it is quite significant to note that no single group of social pragmatists have shown a more intelligent interest in and a more serious appraisal of the potential practical values of sociology than the professional engineers. Perhaps the social engineers will be recruited in large numbers from the ranks of the present professional engineers. The fact is that the idealists and social missionaries in the realm of industry are

causing sociologists and social economists to face an "open door" which they are not ready to enter. Needs and possibilities lie before them, to meet which they have shown no adequate preparation. Are there in sociology the practical values which these pragmatists need, and if so, how can they be developed and made explicit? Is it not possible to develop a practically useful sociological knowledge of human participation and of shared experience? Using as working hypotheses those generalizations that have been abstracted from the observation of milleniums of the efforts of human beings to participate effectively in group enterprises, is it not possible to set up a program of scientific scrutiny of practices in vogue and of sociologically supervised experimentation such as will furnish the man of affairs with a sound and at the same time a practically useful sociology of participation? Is it not possible in this way to accomplish two ends by the same procedure—(1) to refine the general theories of participation and shared experience in the interest of human understanding and (2) to organize systematically a concrete body of sociological knowledge in such terms as to make it available for practical application (including further experiment) wherever men are working on specific problems of human participation in shared experiences?

A mere sociology of "general understanding" however valuable it may be for other purposes is not sufficient for the concrete and specific needs of business. The social pragmatists of the business world desire a sociology fitted in form and terminology to the needs and possibilities of work to be done. They have social "orders" on their hands. They are pressed for "deliveries." They dare not risk using untested sociological devices when they know that empirical devices will enable them to do business. They want and are willing to pay well for superior productive processes, but in most cases they have neither time nor ability to discover, to devise or to invent them. They are primarily producers and controllers who look to sociologists for superior ways and means and who look to social engineers and social artists to effectively set up and direct the superior social mechanisms. They are much interested in any sociology that will stand the pragmatic test.

Value of Pragmatic Tests. Without discussing the relation in proportion or kind which pragmatic tests may have in determining the ultimate value of a theory, it is reasonable to claim that pragmatic sanctions are evidence of validity. Social theories which can be demonstrated as workable have a value, other things being equal, over and above those theories which have not been so tested and proved. Moreover, the pragmatic tests not infrequently bring correctives to the theory which might not be found in any other way.

The demand for a workable sociology makes it easier to develop pragmatic tests than to develop some of the other checks on validity. It is easier to get financial backing for research in pragmatic verification than for any other type of verification. If the criticisms of pragmatists be collected and organized and the contributions of pragmatists be given their correct and proportionate place in revising and developing social theory, it would seem that the result must needs be both a refinement of theory and an extension of the value of sociology. The development of sound sociological theory depends in the last analysis on research, and men must to a considerable extent take their research where they can find it. What matters whence the *drive,* provided the *drive* produces the resources and opportunities for bona fide scientific research. Perchance the motive of those who make the research possible may be sentimental, selfish or egotistic. Mayhap, even the ideo-emotionalist or the dogmatic-emotionalist will occasionally agree to make some concessions to practical rationalism if they find it profitable. In fact, most sciences have been enriched by researches sponsored by pragmatists and empiricists and by the capitalization of men's desires to achieve, more or less regardless of the *drive* or *motive* back of the desire.

The practical values of sociology are just commencing to appear in faint silhouette on the horizon. The practical value of the natural sciences was revealed more than a century ago and the practical value of psychology has been heralded widely during the early years of the twentieth century. These must need come first. The inevitable sequence is practicable sociology. It is not necessary to make a plea for a practically useful sociology. The *makings* and

the *need*, the *possibilities* and the *desire* will determine the outcome. If there are practical values of sociology they will inevitably be developed and that right early. The questions which are of primary concern are therefore: (1) is there a felt need for an applicable sociology, (2) are any attempts being made to develop such a sociology, (3) what are the practical possibilities of sociology and (4) how may the needs and the possibilities be met in the best interests both of sound theory and sound practice? All of these questions will be considered in detail in appropriate places in subsequent chapters. The more immediate inquiry is concerning the general nature of the gap between theory and practice and the probable procedure for bridging it.

Applicable Sociology. Between general sociological theory and an infinite variety of social practices there is at present a wide gap which needs to be spanned if theory and practice are to contribute to each other. The approach from the side of the sociologists will doubtless be a projection of pragmatically tested theory. The approach from the side of the practitioners will be constructive generalization of empiricisms. When the two are effectively brought together there will be an effective liaison between theory and practice —an applicable sociology and a sociological practice. Sociology subjected to the most rigorous of pragmatic tests will be no less truly sociology, but rather sociology very specifically verified. Practice, shifted from empirical reforms to scientific social engineering, will be no less a social betterment, but rather more of an economy and a superior benefit. The liaison will be brought about through cooperation between practically minded sociologists and sociologically minded human engineers.

The structural result of this cooperative project will be a body (or bodies) of usable sociology—an organization of applicable sociology within the field of general sociology. It will be used in order to make possible the engineering of social changes by formulæ based upon sound sociological theory. It will also have an interpretative and a clearing function between social theory and social practice. Such a body of knowledge should logically be called

applicable sociology. In accord with custom it will almost undoubtedly be called *applied sociology*. Since the latter name or caption seems inevitable, and since it is in accord with common usage as regards other applicable science, applicable sociology will hereinafter in this volume be designated as *applied sociology*.

Applied Sociology and Other Applications of Sociology. The term *applied sociology* as used in this treatise refers to a systematically organized body of sociological knowledge which is practically useful for human, social and societal engineering. It is regarded as a sub-division of sociology. It is not a new science but a development and exploitation of the practical possibilities of objective and quantitative observational sociology. Since the term *applied sociology* has been otherwise defined, it seems desirable at this point to state the differences between the other current interpretations of the term and the ones here defended. Since sociology has been extensively drawn upon for the formulation of social ethics and of social polity some sociologists regard the domain of applied sociology as being identical with either or both that of social ethics and social polity. To thus name those parts of the domains of social ethics and social polity which overlap on that of sociology is illogical and confusing. Although there most certainly are sociological bases for social ethics and social polity, the latter are more than applied sociology and they do not begin to represent all of the possible applications of sociology. Sociology has also been used in various ways by social workers and, in fact, so much so, that social work is not infrequently described as being applied sociology. But social work is dependent upon other social sciences than sociology, and there are applications of sociology other than its application to social work. Thus although social work does make use of sociology and although it will undoubtedly make use of *applied sociology* it is not identical with the latter. The differences between applied sociology and social ethics, social polity and social work are set forth in this chapter. The relation of *applied sociology* to social ethics, social polity, social work and to other applications of general sociology are the subject of the second part of this dissertation.

Applied Sociology and Social Ethics. Hitherto the most evident usefulness of sociology was to be found in its contribution to social ethics and to social polity. This has gone so far that many sociologists are accustomed to assume that the functions of applied sociology and of social ethics are much the same and that the fields of the two are almost, if not quite, mutually inclusive. An applied sociology which will fill in the gap between theory and practice in construction and control as just indicated, must need be very different from the form or type of sociology which is essential to the development of superior social ethics. As to the intimate relation of sociology and ethics there can be no doubt. As Professor Hayes has put it, sociology "cannot escape those very questions which are problems of ethics."[3] This is certainly true of sociology as a positive social philosophy and is probably true even of the special science. But however valuable sociology may be for transforming empirical social ethics into scientific social ethics, it has practical values which are equally important and which are in no way related to ethics. As sociology becomes more and more a science of relationships and behavior, of probability and of control, its possibilities will lend themselves to the unscrupulous quite as readily as to the ethically or socially minded. Sociology as a special science may have no more control over the ethical ends of its application than has chemistry. The following illustration suggests the variety of social, unsocial or anti-social applications which may be made of one of the findings of chemistry. Today a man may go to war and fight under a flag dyed with picric acid, may be wounded or burned by an explosive containing picric acid and may have his burn dressed and healed with picric acid. Applied sociology may be available for anabolic or katabolic changes, it will be as available for social warfare as for social welfare, it may be used for exploitation or for service and cooperation. The same practicable sociology may be used for making wars or for bringing peace, for conspiracy and revolt or for arbitration and conciliation. There is no way of developing a science which will prevent its being equally available

3. Edward Carey Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*, pp. 31, 33.

for constructive and for destructive social projects. As a science of practical social control any applicable sociology can be used for good or evil according to the desire of those who use it. A more extended exposition of this idea together with an appreciation of the increased need for a scientifically established social ethics proportioned to the new demands which come with the development of dynamic positive social philosophy and of practically useful sociology will be presented in the first chapter of second part of this treatise.

Applied Sociology and Social Polity. Sociology is of practical value to those who are endeavoring to work out social policies. The superior value of pragmatic positive social philosophy over metaphysical and speculative philosophy for the determining of social polity has long since been recognized. Evolutionary sociology is *prima facie* valuable for choosing lines of conduct in terms of the way in which they will fit into other and ofttimes larger lines and trends of social evolution. Since the practical value of sociology as a basis of social polity has been discussed by Comte and Spencer, and since their day by almost every practically minded sociologist of every country, it is difficult to write much that will add to an appreciation of it. Professor Harry Elmer Barnes[4] has recently published a volume which is a comprehensive appreciation of practical values of sociology in the field of politics. In the presidential address before the American Sociological Society (1910), Professor Giddings has contributed a summary appreciation of the service which sociology may render in this field.[5] The actual number of trained sociologists called into active participation in the determining of policies is perhaps a fact more eloquent than any statement ever made concerning the practical usefulness of sociology for purposes of polity.

Sociology, therefore, is of practical value both for the development of ethics and for the formulation of social polity. In the former, it is useful for converting empirical social ethics into scientific social ethics, in so far as that is possible. In the latter, it aids

4. Harry Elmer Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory.*

5. Proceedings of American Sociological Society, vol. v. Also with slight revisions in ch. xiii of his *Studies in the Theory of Human Society* (1922).

in shifting the basis for the formation of social policies from speculative and metaphysical philosophy to pragmatic positive philosophy. These practical values are naturally inherent in general sociology as a positive social philosophy. They may be drawn directly from general sociology and do not require any special organization of sociological knowledge such as is an essential requisite for deriving specific ways and means of achieving proximate social ends. Any activities for the attainment of ethically approved objectives or to carry out the details of social polity will of course be dependent upon *applied sociology*.

Applied Sociology and Social Arts. Applied sociology is a science and is distinctly different from social practice which is an art. Those who actually apply sociology to the solution of social problems and the effecting of social change, are professional social workers and social artists. Each social art and social profession will undoubtedly develop its own scientific technique. *Applied sociology, as herein conceived, is a body of sociological knowledge especially selected, presented, interpreted and organized for those who are endeavoring to use sociology effectively for the achievement of proximate social ends.* There may be a general applied sociology and a specialized applied sociology. The former should include such sociology as is generally useful for the solution of all social problems, and the latter will be more intensive and elaborate statements of sociology which are especially applicable to a limited number of specific problems.

A distinction must be made between the development of an *applied sociology* as an organized body of knowledge and the application of sociology as a practice. The former may grow out of the latter and the latter may increasingly depend upon the former but there is need for careful discrimination in the interest of clear and constructive thinking. Both the scientist and the practitioner, under certain circumstances, may lay good claim to the title *sociologist;* and functions of research and of practice are often performed by the same person. This, however, in no way invalidates the contention that they are two distinct processes. Much harm

has resulted from the confusion of the subject and of its practical use. It is hoped that the suggestions offered in the second part of this treatise will be a substantial contribution to clearer thinking and less confusion in the discussion of these closely related processes. More specifically, it is desirable to learn (1) how each may contribute to the other, (2) how each is dependent upon the other and (3) how in the future the needs and opportunities of the practice are likely to determine the organization and development of the science.

Applied Sociology and General Sociology. The development of an applied sociology should create a larger and keener appreciation of general sociology. There have been various objections by general sociologists to the development of an applied sociology. Some of the objections have been of a temporary sort and based upon the fact that sociology was not sufficiently developed for this purpose; or that it was not wise to speed up knowledge of social control before we were better informed as to the end to which such control should be directed. Some of the objections have been more permanent and based on a general philosophy of social *laissez faire* which of course would be opposed to a science that should facilitate the achievement of social control, and others are due to fear of the biases natural to utilitarian sociology and to the possibility that a utilitarian sociology would tend to swamp or smother general sociology. There is some truth in each and all these objections, but the fact remains that applied sociology already exists and that it is developing rapidly. The main business before sociologists is, therefore, not to form an opinion as to whether applied sociology should or should not exist, but rather to make up their minds as to what trend they should give the rapidly growing offspring, and what relation it should bear to general sociology on the one hand and to social arts on the other.

The Beginnings of an Applied Sociology. "You certainly do not intend deliberately to wish upon sociology all the evils from which the other sciences have suffered from the terrible dichotomy, pure and applied." This was the immediate reply of a colleague long

experienced in the technical and administrative problems of pure science when he heard the title of this proposed study. The tone of the chemist was portentous. Fortunately the responsibility for this grave catastrophe, if such it be, will not rest upon a work of this sort. The genetic act long since took place. On the one hand we have sociologists who are talking about *pure sociology, general sociology, theory of society,* and in various other ways describing general theoretical sociology. On the other hand Lester Ward long since introduced us to distinctions of *applied sociology and dynamic sociology.* Charles R. Henderson and Carroll D. Wright ushered in *social technology* and *practical sociology;* Simon N. Patten and Edward T. Devine accepted and used the term *social economy* which Professor Giddings had suggested. For several years sociological literature has been accumulating around these foci as well as around the term *social problems.* The fact is that in teaching, quite generally, and in research to a considerable extent there is in practice a rapidly developing distinction between the field of pure or general sociology and the field of practical or applied sociology.

Perhaps it is our pure and natural scientist friends who are most responsible for the necessity of thinking in terms of the dichotomy. For almost every special science, abstract and concrete, has yielded to the pressure and has become the basis of one or of many useful applications of the science. Many, but not all of them, are called *applied science.* Geography offers a *commercial geography* and economics has *business* as a chief outlet of its application. Recently psychology has given way to the movement which seems to have started with the pure sciences and gone to the more concrete sciences, and the field of *applied psychology* is rapidly gaining recognition. If perchance there really be a field of social psychology we may soon face a distinctly recognized field of *applied social psychology.* A term such as this would certainly be intimately related to applied sociology and the fields of the two would doubtless overlap.

Specialized Applied Sociology. At the same time that there have been efforts to commence the formation of a general applied sociology, there have been many beginnings of specialized usable

sociology. These have grown up among people who were dealing with processes such as education and legislation. The one has taken on the form of an *educational sociology* and the other has developed *underlying principles of social legislation.* Occasionally they are in terms of locality groups such as *rural sociology, community sociology,* or in even higher specialization as *community leadership* and *community organization.* Often they have grown up in connection with problems in part social and in part economic, and as an integral part of social economy, principles of relief, social diagnosis, settlement work, assimilation, conciliation and other activities even more specialized. These are but typical of almost innumerable beginnings of attempts to use sociology in practical ways. New efforts of this sort are appearing on every hand and there seems to be no limit to the possibilities. One of the needs of all these practicians who are using sociology, is a means whereby the specialists in one field may more easily clear the problems which they have in common with specialists in other fields. This should be a function of a commonly accepted general applied sociology.

Possibilities of an Applied Sociology. No project for an applied sociology should be based merely upon the now generally recognized needs or be proportioned in terms of the specialized beginnings already made. An applied sociology which is to continue adequate must be organized with a view to including all the possibilities of the application of the science which can in any way be surmised. It must also be organized on a scheme so comprehensive and sociologically fundamental as to be receptive of, or easily adapted to, all the new possibilities of use that may occur. Applied sociology has possibilities wherever there is trading in terms of social values or wherever there is an attempt to effect social change, to maintain social *status quo,* to in anyway exert social control, or to make use of social processes. It seems highly probable that there will soon be (1) experts in the use of the more practicable fragments of sociology for the analysis, diagnosis and statement of social problems and for laying out social projects and (2) experts in the application of general sociological theories to particular social

processes, and (3) those who are primarily empiricists and pragmatists but who are desirous of supplementing their efforts by the use of sociology if it will in any way increase their effectiveness in social achievement. One chapter of this volume will be devoted to suggestions of the possible ramifications of applied sociology dealing especially with possibilities as yet undeveloped and in some instances probably never hitherto described.

The Function of Applied Sociology. The first impression which one receives after reviewing the beginnings that have been made in meeting the need for an applicable sociology is that the *applied sociology is a science of social control.* It is a science to be used in making what Ward calls *artificial* changes in society. It is a science either *for maintaining society as it is or for altering society* either for the advantage of the alterer or with an intent of social betterment. Some sociologists stress the fact that there should be a sociology which social workers can understand—a sociology written in terms of the problems of social workers. Applied sociology should certainly fulfill this function. To the extent that it does fulfill it, applied sociology is an *interpretative sociology.* These and other functions of applied sociology must be clarified by those who essay to give direction to its development. Some of the most frequently proposed functions are debatable and others are also probably subject to limitations. Such, for instance, is the contention that the function of applied sociology is the determination of practical objectives in the various social processes.

Reduction of the Cost of Social Control. One of the tasks of applied sociology is to discover ways and means of reducing the expenditure of human energy and of minimizing the economic costs of social control. For not only in politics have these costs mounted to dangerous heights concerning which Spencer expressed forebodings half a century ago, but in all our social practices there is a continual rising of costs of supervision, inspection, enforcement and administration. If but a very small percentage of what is now being expended annually for the maintenance of our many public and private mammoth controlled enterprises were devoted

to a scientific research for sociologically sound methods of reducing the cost of this control, we should probably not only be successful in this economy, but also we should learn how to produce a generally superior functioning of society.

With all due recognition of the value of statistical studies of social activities which involve large numbers of people, it is probably quite safe to say that an integration of sociology practically useful for reducing the costs and increasing the efficiency of social control is more likely to be derived from a multitude of relatively small practical experiments and from the observation of the myriads of attempts to effect petty control which are constantly taking place on every hand. Among the most interesting of these studies will be researches as to the possibilities of economy through the development of social self-control.

The Nature of Applied Sociology. It is impossible at this stage of the development of the theme of this monograph to state the nature of the organized applicable sociology which will (1) ultimately meet the need, (2) be somewhat in line with developments already under way and (3) be capable of evolving in fulfillment of all the possibilities of the subject. It is quite probable, however, that the nature of applied sociology will have much in common with that of all applied sciences and that the relationships that exist between pure and applied sociology will be much the same as those which generally exist between pure and applied sciences. Applied sociology will doubtless be a science of probabilities, organized for particular and immediate use, and having a terminology that will fit into the technical vocabulary of those who use it. It must also be so organized as to articulate easily with other applied sciences. Of these facts in regard to its nature we are fairly certain. Other characteristics which may enter into its nature will be set forth in a subsequent chapter.

Field and Scope of Applied Sociology. Applied sociology includes the scientific study of practical ways and means of sustaining social status or of achieving social change, especially when that change is to be achieved through association in collective efforts. Every

situation and condition which affects pluralistic human behavior in such a way as to raise practical problems of economy, ability[6] or morale or all of these is in the field of applied sociology.

Research in Applied Sociology. Applied sociology cannot be written by sociologists. It must be evolved by sociologists in cooperation with those who are working at problems either entirely or in part social. The methodology of the research in applied sociology will doubtless differ but little from that of general sociology. The motive, however, is different, and as a result there is likely to be a difference in the field of research and in research procedure and practice. Research in applied sociology will tend to be intensively concentrated on particular social relationships or behavior, either because of the need for immediate attention or because of evident immediate possibilities. Researches along various lines are likely to continue so long as it proves practically worth while. When accuracy or reduction of error in observation ceases to be of practical advantage the search will probably end. Research in applied sociology can be pursued effectively whenever there is sufficient data available for the prediction of the immediate probabilities of social response or of processes of response or of variations due to change of conditions and circumstance. Such predictions do not require all of the data necessary for complete diagnosis or description. Research in applied sociology is of practical value even if the error in prediction is considerable, provided it reduces the error in the guesses previously made.

Findings of applied sociology will be no less data of general sociology either because of the motive which prompted their discovery or known limitations in accuracy due to the incompleteness of the observation. Much of the research in applied sociology must be combined with research in applied biology, psychology and economics. There is reason to believe that sociology will enter a new era of unprecedentedly rapid development just as soon as the worthwhileness of practical sociological research has been established. In fact relatively little progress was made in any

6. See Franklin H. Giddtngs, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, ch. xvi, for definition of "ability" and of "morale."

sciences prior to the time when their findings were regarded as practically useful. Much of the progress of all the pure and natural sciences has come through the research conducted by the practically minded whose interest in science has been primarily in means to immediate ends.

General Terminology. Before proceeding with the discussion of the scope and purpose of applied sociology there should be a clarification of the terminology which it will be necessary to use. There is so much irregularity in the use of the general terminology of sociology that it may be well to state the meanings given to certain captions and phrases when they appear in this volume. This is no attempt at definition. It is simply a statement of their significance when used without qualification in this work. In so far as possible it is in line with current best usage. *General sociology* has been used to include all sociology, but it especially emphasizes the relations of the parts of sociology to each other and to sociological science as a whole.[7] *Pure sociology* has been regarded as seeking "to establish the principles of the science," by the classification of that sociological material which is "related to the origin, nature and genetic or spontaneous development of society".[8] *Applied sociology* has been used in two ways. In the first place, it has been necessary to study that which has been described by various sociologists as "applied sociology".[9] In the second place, an attempt has been made to set forth advantages in restricting this term to *an especially organized and a differentiated part of sociology which deals with how to achieve proximate ends.* It has also seemed wise to use the phrase *general applied sociology* to refer to that applied sociology which is useful in many fields of practice in contradistinction from that which is useful only under very specific conditions and circumstances. *Practical sociology* has been used to describe fragmentary (unorganized and often empirical) sociology which is useful within limits. *Social artist* is a comprehensive term used to include all social workers, all social artisans, craftsmen

7. Albion W. Small, *General Sociology* (1905), Pref. p. vi.
8. Lester F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, 2nd ed., p. 8; Pref. p. ix.
9. E. g., *ibid*, pp. 65-9; also *Applied Sociology*, p. 28.

and even artificers—in fact, all who endeavor to maintain social status or to effect social change. *Social* or *societal engineer* is limited to social artists who are endeavoring to square their actions with sociological theory and to base their projects on science rather than on empiricisms.[10] Usage will determine whether these distinctions will stand or fall, but expediency demands a statement of their meanings in connection with this argument.

Expository Applied Sociology. There is pressure on every hand for an expository statement of applicable sociology. The demand springs from a very keenly felt need, for the meeting of which it is believed that sociology has an answer. Very often some of these needs are met by courses in sociological appreciation, non technical statements of the sociological point of view which aid in orientation, in making practical choices, in deliberative reflection on folkways and thoughtways and in revision of life projects. Often they are met by a clear-cut statement of *principles of sociology,* which may lead to more positive thinking relative to social and societal problems. Occasionally courses are given in *practical applications* of the principles of sociology—usually a sort of running commentary on some of the more significant practical possibilities of the various principles. Attempts have been made under the term *practical sociology* to bring together in some orderly scheme the fragments of sociology which have been for various reasons approved as of probable greatest practical usefulness. The most common form of meeting the demand is by means of courses and texts in *social problems,* in which sociology has been used as an aid in the statement of problems in terms of their social significance. The latter type of course is often a most practical synthesis of all of the social sciences and sometimes of other knowledge permeated with positive social philosophy. Each and all of these properly presented may meet effectively various needs for sociological information as a basis for choice and action. The increasing demand for usable expositions of sociology and the many and differentiated efforts to meet it by lecture and by text reflect a realization of the need for

10. Franklin H. Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society,* pp. 165 *et seq.*

practically applicable sociology and also the increasing belief in the practical possibilities of sociology.

None of these courses, however, is a satisfactory or adequate preparation for social engineering. At best they merely prepare the way for such a course. It is at present impossible to state with assurance that there will be expository courses in general applied sociology, although there are reasons for believing this to be highly probable.[11] The problem of the exposition of practicable sociology will be worked out in due time and that will be after there is much more subject matter ready for exposition. Perhaps courses of the kind described in the previous paragraph will be developed in ways that will cause them adequately to set forth the general practical values of sociology. Perhaps these values will be set forth most frequently in conjunction with the practical values of other sciences in terms of the ends to which the various social arts are subservient.[12] But, however the problem of exposition may be solved, the fact remains that there is need for an integration of applicable sociology both in the interest of general and of applied sociology.

Summary. The objective of this work is in part an appreciation of the practical values of general sociology. It admits, but does not review, the practical worth of a specifically differentiated positive social philosophy as a basis for ethics and for the formation and the refinement of polity. It concedes that the need for and the possibilities of general comprehensive social theory as a basis of ethics and polity may prove to be the primary justification of that body of knowledge known as general sociology. The practical usefulness of sociology for these purposes has been and probably will continue to be best served by the normal development of general sociology.

11. Most of the courses at present thus labeled appear to be courses in social problems (general or specific) and their content includes not only sociology but much from the other social sciences. Their usefulness is generally conceded but they are courses in the application of all of the social sciences and could very properly be designated as courses in social economy. *Supra* p. 33, *Infra* pt. ii, ch. iii.

12. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism* (Rutledge, 12th ed.), p. 8, "rules of action, it seems most natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the ends to which they are subservient."

In addition to the practical values of general sociology or positive social philosophy, there are practical values of sociology as a special social science sometimes called *formal sociology*. These are in terms of the use which social practice can make of social theory as a means of achievement. In order to study how a more fundamental and effective liaison may be made between this theory and practice, it is well to review both the needs which practice has felt and the efforts of sociologists to meet them. Looking to the future, there is also some benefit to be derived from an attempt to evaluate the possible or probable future usefulness of the special science in terms of its present trend and of the methodology which it is developing. The pursuit of this inquiry has led the author to expect that it is quite probable that there may in time be developed within general sociology a specially organized body of applicable sociology. This applicable or "applied" sociology bids fair to be a science of specific concrete social control. It will be behavioristic in nature and will set forth its findings in terms of practical probabilities. It will deal with specific concrete conditionings of social behavior and with social phenomena as conditions of all human behavior. When it shall have developed sufficiently it may become a scientific basis for social and societal engineering.

CHAPTER II

Needs Which Sociology Should Meet

In every highly organized human activity there is need for a sociologically sound basis of action. Men of affairs are recognizing the importance of the social factors in business and the need for adequate means of dealing with them. This does not imply that they know how to analyze and describe their social needs or that they have even a remote conception of the nature and content of sociology or of its possibilities for meeting specific, concrete, proximate social needs in a serviceable way. On the contrary, their attitude toward sociology is quite likely to be akin to their attitude toward social science in general, an attitude which Walter Lippmann has described as follows:

> The man of affairs, observing that the social scientist knows only from the outside what he knows, in part at least, from the inside, recognizing that the social scientist's hypothesis is not in the nature of things susceptible of laboratory proof, and that verification is possible only in the "real" world, has developed a rather low opinion of social scientists who do not share his views of public policy.[1]

What the man of affairs needs is a sociology that can be used on "the inside," that can be applied to situations requiring action in the "real" world. He needs a sociology that can be used in the practical laboratories of office buildings, factories, and market places. The man of action needs a sociology which can be used by experts to find and to formulate social facts, and to set them forth in effective comparisons that will enable him to make intelligent decisions. Having made a decision, he needs a sociology that will enable him to experiment more effectively in ways and means of "putting over" or "carrying through" his program.

This need was disclosed more than fifty years ago by Spencer in the first chapter of *The Study of Sociology*, "Our Need of It," and

1. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, p. 372.

has been elaborated by Professor Giddings. In a recent article on "Social Work and Societal Engineering," Professor Giddings discusses the possibilities of meeting the need of the man of affairs by means of societal engineering which in turn requires sociology as a basis of practice. He describes societal engineering as follows:

> Engineering of any description, civil or military, mechanical, chemical, or electrical, ecological or societal, is an acceptance of scientific principles as the basis of practice, and a following of technical methods of applying them. It is hard and expensive work. Imagination has place in it, but wishful thinking has not. The engineer studies the situation with which he is expected to deal before he meddles with it, and the feasibility of the thing which it is proposed to do before he begins operations. He acquaints himself with the nature and potentialities of the materials and energies, activities and capabilities, to be worked on and with. With all possible precision he estimates costs, including costs of rights to be acquired, and of liabilities, claims and damages to be met. Then he determines upon a method to be followed and works out the details of operations and procedures. Finally he reduces the whole undertaking to working plans and specifications.[2]

It is evident that effective societal engineering presupposes a sociology that describes social relations and behavior, social processes and mechanisms, in accurate and, if possible, in quantitative terms, and that gives a factual basis for estimating the cost of maintaining social status or of effecting social change. The fundamental principles of this usable sociology should be applicable to the problems in every field of social activity,—industry, politics, education, religion, medicine, journalism, law, etc. Sociology of this kind would serve the needs of societal engineers, sociotechnic experts, and consulting sociologists.[3]

This chapter is an attempt to indicate a few of the places where an applicable sociology is most needed, and to call attention to situations in which sociology even in its present immature state may be

2. *The Journal of Social Forces*, vol. iii, pp. 13-4.

3. These terms have been suggested by the use which has been made in applied psychology of the terms *psychotechnic expert* and *consulting psychologist*. *Cf.* H. L. Hollingworth and A. T. Poffenberger, Jr., *Applied Psychology*, p. 329.

of practical value. It indicates that in all of the business and professional practices in which human interests are an important factor, there are problems which cannot be properly stated without sociological understanding, which cannot be solved except in terms of social probabilities. The man of affairs needs what the sociologist should be able to supply, a sociology that will serve as a practical basis for societal engineering.

The Extent of the Need. In all problems of *societal telesis*[4] and in all problems involving the adjustment of human relations or the regulation of the behavior of human groups, there is need not only for a general sociology that can serve as a basis for ethics and policy, but also for an applied sociology dealing specifically with ways and means of achievement.

The rapid increase in the number, magnitude, and complexity of social mechanisms is itself a sufficient justification for an applied sociology. In the modest enterprises of small groups any specific risk is likely to be relatively light and any unfortunate outcome may be offset by other small risks of a happier outcome. In these small enterprises men take chances; they occasionally launch ventures at random and frequently after very limited observation and experimentation. As these smaller groups and lesser enterprises become integrated and coordinated, they become extensively involved organizations. The risks that must be taken by these larger organizations are greater than those of the smaller organizations, and the consequences of hasty empiricism are proportionately greater. The activities of these larger organizations or corporations are usually directed by responsible trustees who must scientifically calculate the risks which they assume. In these organizations (really high power social mechanisms) there is a demand for much nicer adjustments and wider margins of safety. In fact the actual supplanting of multitudinous small organizations by relatively few superorganizations is due, at least in part, to the fact that the larger organizations can systematically formulate extensive and intensive

4. Franklin H. Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, pp. 140-171. Societal telesis is the conscious effort to attain visualized ends in society. It is accomplished by the use of various societal form and action patterns.

experimental programs. They can develop more refined and comprehensive methods. Many of these organizations employ scientifically trained men to direct social experiments and to search for more satisfactory ways and means of social achievement. The chief concern of these experts is to find more accurate ways (1) to estimate the influence of social factors in any situation and (2) to calculate the conditions and costs of effecting social change. They must investigate the possibilities of offsetting, transforming, or capitalizing social biases, prejudices, and customs. They must calculate with increasing nicety the probable reaction of the public, or a part of the public, to any contemplated activity of the organization which they represent or to the activities of competitive organizations. They must be prepared at any time to analyze quickly the nature and probable consequences of social crises. They must learn how to prevent social catastrophes[5] that are unprofitable to the agency by which they are employed. In short their business is the calculation of probable human behavior. The task is difficult because the unit of their investigation is that most variable of variables—the human being. It is difficult because even the simplest forms of human behavior are socially conditioned. These experts cannot proceed far in making trustworthy predictions until by observation, induction, and inference based upon experiment they have learned something about the social and societal conditioning of human behavior. They need, therefore, a sociology that will enable them to determine societal facts in specific situations[6]; a sociology that will reveal more about the nature of societal variables and of "how they evolve their products."[7]

A single illustration will show the social and societal factors of a relatively simple business decision. How shall a syndicate determine

5. Samuel H. Prince, *Catastrophe and Social Change*, ch. ix, Catastrophe functions directly and indirectly. (*a*) Directly, it prepares the groundwork for change by (1) weakening social immobility; (2) precipitating fluidity of custom; (3) forcing environal favorability for charge. (*b*) Indirectly, it sets in motion factors determining the nature of the change, such as (1) the release of spirit and morale; (2) the play of imitation; (3) the stimulus of leaders and lookers-on; (4) the socialization of institutions.

6. Franklin H. Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, p. 69.

7. *Ibid*, p. 36.

where to locate a new store? The "hit-and-miss" methods of the business gambler who depends upon intuition, impression, or surmise are unduly expensive. Rule of thumb decisions based upon the success of predecessors, upon neighborhood conditions, corner values, etc., are no longer adequate. Intelligently managed syndicates carefully calculate the probabilities. Detailed observations are made of the number of people who pass by the points under consideration, the time and condition of their passing, and their behavior habits while passing. The purchasing habits of these people are analyzed and the probability of altering them is estimated. Regularity of employment, credit habits, attitude toward innovations, social class, race, nationality, and even fraternal and religious affiliations are considered as factors. The problem is that of fitting a new unit into the social-economic institutions of a community or neighborhood. The reckonings therefore must be based not merely upon the prevailing economic condition but also upon the trends of custom in the neighborhood and the changes in the composition of the population. The methods used in the practical approach to this concrete problem are not unlike those of *observational sociology*. It seems, indeed, that in this type of problem social theory and business practice might be brought together to the profit of each. They could cooperate to their mutual advantage in the development of an observational sociology. The illustration might be carried a step further. After the shop has been scientifically located, the decorative devices for attracting the best trade are determined. These also have social implications that may be calculated with similar nicety. The stock of the store is selected, and the furnishings are installed on the basis of carefully worked out probabilities of demand. Service and salesmanship are treated as social arts and as such they are dependent upon social science for their development. In the management of "chain stores," for instance, the experts learn to recognize types of localities and communities and to discern the practical significance of their behavior. Managers are selected because of their fitness for a particular type of neighborhood or for a certain "class of trade." In fact, the shop is a

venture, the success or failure of which is quite as likely to be determined by social as by economic factors. The decisions that must be made demand an applied sociology no less than an applied economics. The need for an applied economics has long since been recognized and much has been done to meet it, but the need for an applied sociology has only recently become apparent and sociologists have not done much toward meeting it.

Business Administration. Business administration is essentially a social activity, for it deals with social relations, behavior and processes. For the most part it is a societal activity since it includes the construction and operation of social organizations. The task of the business administrator is not only to carry out certain economic trusts, but in so doing, to meet various social situations both within and without the organization which he is directing. His success in carrying out an economic trust often turns on his ability to make possible smooth and efficient cooperation within his "multi-human" organization and to adjust it to the social conditions and circumstances in which it must function. The business man has a right, in view of the scope of the field preempted by sociologists, to expect sociology to furnish him with the practical information necessary for perfecting superior types of social mechanisms. He has a right to expect sociology to be of practical value in his efforts to achieve his ends more smoothly and more economically through collective human endeavor. Sociology should furnish him, or his societal engineers, with a workable theory of *social organization.* The business man needs a theory of social organization that he can use in business administration,—one which will work and at the same time be an integral part of the general theory of social organization. At present this theory is for the most part either related to political organization or to the evolution of social institutions. The development of a practical theory of organization may be achieved through the cooperation of (1) sociologists, (2) teachers of administration in business and professional schools, and (3) administrators. The most effective work would probably be research under the supervision of sociologically trained men undertaken in

the laboratories of the business world. Research of this kind would doubtless disclose fundamental structural and functional types of organization. The scientific classification of the types of social organization may accomplish for applied sociology what Asa Gray's classification accomplished for applied botany. The basis for such a classification may be discovered in genetic studies of social organizations, or in the analysis of the functions of existing social organizations. Numerous efforts to ascertain the functional type of organization are now being made by sociologists. These include analyses both of the afferent or receptive processes and of the efferent or effective processes.

At present there are no sociologically significant classifications of the types of industrial organizations which range from despotically administered "line organizations" to ultra-democratic industrial councils. A considerable amount of experiment, however, is going on in industry which should be carefully observed by practical sociologists. Such a scrutiny of these experiments would doubtless lead to the drawing of inferences that would be contributions valuable both to theory and to practice. Some of these social experiments in industry have received considerable public attention. Such, for instance, are those of the American Cast Iron Pipe Company, Dutchess Bleachery[8], Filene's Department Store[9], the Nernst Lamp Company[10], the Columbia Conserve Company[11], the A. Nash Company[12], Proctor and Gamble, and the Rockland Finishing Company. Experiments of this sort have been unrelated and the results are not easily comparable. This has been due in part to the lack of a sociology adequate for making such a comparison. A practicable sociology of business administration would tend to make possible the coordination and comparison of such experiments.

8. James Myers, *Representative Government in Industry.*

9. Edward A. Filene, *The Way Out.*

10. *Engineering Magazine*, August, 1905, "The Higher Law in the Industrial World," by H. F. J. Porter.

11. *University Journal of Business*, vol. i, no. 1, November, 1922; no. 2, February, 1923, "A Case of Genuine Industrial Self-Government," by Paul H. Douglas.

12. Arthur Nash, *The Golden Rule in Business.*

Demand. Business has very intimate dealings with a mysterious but real something called *demand.* In current economic theory the "economic man" has become socialized. In consequence, demand is now recognized as the resultant of both social and economic factors. Within limits, demand can be created, refracted, deflected, diverted or even eliminated by means of social processes. The business man has been known to wonder if social or sociological theories of value, including studies of the social origins of value and of origins of social value, will ever foster a practical sociological theory of demand. Appreciation, which is the basis of demand, is essentially a social process and a study of appreciation and evaluation should throw light upon the social nature of demand in specific and concrete cases.[13]

The confidence of business men in the possibilities of modifying demand reveals itself in the vast increase in advertising during the past century. By means of advertising the public has been "educated" to want what the advertisers want them to want. Most of this advertising has been an appeal to the instinctive reactions of the individual. The implications of "four out of five" sealed mouths make one shudder with fear; promises of continued or restored youth and beauty are beguiling; pretty faces, startling and catchy phrases call forth universal response. These are appeals to instinctive reactions. Psychology has contributed remarkably to the effectiveness of this sort of appeal.[14] And, judging merely from actual current advertisements, one would surmise that some use has been made of social psychology.[15] Certainly the inspired "what-would-you-do-if-your-fork-dropped-on-the-floor" type of advertising might well be called social. The social appeal appears in advertising which suggests the advantage of living in exclusive communities or of behaving in ways approved by the elite. Advertising

13 *Cf.* Franklin H. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology,* bk. ii, pt. ii, ch. 2, also B. M. Anderson, *Social Value, passim.*

14. H. L. Hollingworth and A. T. Poffenberger, Jr., *Applied Psychology,* pp. 243-244; *cf.* also Harry L. Hollingworth, *Advertising and Selling, passim.* Arland D. Weeks, *The Control of the Social Mind,* and H. A. Overstreet, *Influencing Human Behavior.*

15. Floyd H. Allport, *Social Psychology,* pp. 408-9.

of this sort has been tremendously effective. The extent of the social desire to which it appeals is registered in the phenomenal sale of blue books on etiquette. Sometimes the appeal is to fad or fashion, and in such cases it has not infrequently defied long established custom and ridden rough-shod over cherished traditions. Who would have imagined twenty-five years ago that a demand could be created in mid-winter for silk hosiery and sandles, or in mid-summer for furs? Who would have predicted the passing in almost a single year of men's stiff white collars and the substitution of soft ones of every hue? These were not new economic necessities, and, while certain minor readjustments in methods of living may have favored these innovations, the changes were effected primarily through the deliberate modification of social customs to the advantage principally of the modifiers. It seems that individuals will sacrifice comfort, appearance, and even traditional prejudices to avoid social taboo and to win social approval. They desire to unload taboo and to buy approval.

The business man is dealing intimately every day with *social approval.* He will be interested in a sociology which enables him to gauge social taboo and social approval, and to control them. The present methods of advertising and of salesmanship, effective as they are, will soon pass through radical changes as the result of the development of social and societal psychology and of applied sociology. The salesman of the future will probably capitalize scientific knowledge of changes in the trend of the mores, and will deliberately divert and alter their natural trend. He also will recognize both the value of adjusting his methods to folk-thought and the cost of ignoring it. He will learn the importance of the habits of thought prevailing among the groups with which he does business—habits of thought which have developed along with other folkways and which might with propriety be called "thought ways." He must not only become acquainted with the current patterns of collective mental behavior (thought ways), but he will need to learn how to foresee the changes that are likely to take place in these "thought ways," or, better yet, how to train the "thought ways" into such social action patterns as he most desires.

The manufacturer and the salesman must learn how to adjust themselves to the fluctuations between social desire and social satiation. A concrete instance of a possible adjustment of this sort may be enlightening. It is generally known that there is a tendency for ribbons to be in style until there is a terrific overproduction in the industry, after which for a long period they pass out of style, leaving looms, capital, and labor idle. This change is not primarily due to deliberate manipulation of styles. In terms of the trade, the public is said to be "fed up" on ribbons. It is conceivable that instead of giving the consuming public variety in the way just described, manufacturers might cooperate to "run" one kind of ribbon, holding back other kinds. When the public becomes "fed up" (satiated) on one kind, the manufacturers could start another and very different kind moving, the product perhaps of the same looms, certainly of the same labor and factory. Such a studied manipulation of the fluctuation between social desire and social satiation would give the public its variety without alternately overstimulating and depressing the ribbon industry. The public would still have the sense of change which it is continually seeking, but the change would be in species rather than in genus. In a sense industry would break up and absorb this fluctuation and thereby stabilize itself. Of course such a program implies ability to bring about a far-sighted cooperation in production and distribution as well as a careful study of the nature of the fluctuation from social desire to social satiation. The latter would doubtless be accomplished by experiments in breaking up the present waves of demand into component parts and also experiments in the stimulation and retardation of the lesser or component waves in order that they may overlap in such a way as to make a steady demand on the industry. In order to achieve any such adjustments it will be necessary to develop a sociology that can be effectively applied to the tasks of stabilizing customs, of giving variety, and perhaps rhythm, to their modes.

Taboo and sanction are the most powerful social forces. A sociology of taboo and sanction applicable to current problems would

be of value not only to business men, but to all who attempt to understand or effect social control. Taboos are not products of reflective thinking. They are psychologically determined and societally conditioned. To know how to place things under taboo or to have them sanctioned is to solve the problem of social control. Occasionally attempts to taboo a book or a play have exactly the opposite effect from the one desired. Trade unionism never had a more powerful weapon than the word "scab." Properly handled, a stigma might do in a month what a prohibition could not accomplish in years. A gum-chewing taboo, effectively administered in the United States would be a severe blow to the chewing gum industry. At present by exceedingly clever advertising, gum appears, in pictures at least, in beautiful cut glass dishes as an after dinner course of the ultra elite. This is a very effective way of creating a social sanction. The statement that auto tourists need gum offsets the old idea that only factory girls would use it. The cheapest cigarettes are represented as the indispensable accompaniments of kid gloves and dinner coats. Men's clothes are labelled "collegiate" or "society" regardless of who wears most of them. The cheap automobile is often pictured as the prized possession of the stylishly dressed owner of a palatial home. To remove the "labels" which taboo, to replace them with labels of "class" and the sanction of the elite is a recognized feat of the art of salesmanship throughout all its great variety of fields.

Class of Trade. Many business concerns, for various reasons, can handle but a single class of trade. They could often operate with better advantage to themselves and to their clientele if the limitations of class were not so severe. Of course "classy" is an attribute for which people are willing to pay well. To conduct a business so that it will appeal to a particular class is indeed a social art, but to conduct a business so that it can be made to appeal to and satisfy a variety of the most desirable classes of trade is a much more difficult art. Much class trade as now conducted is flagrantly uneconomical and is socially undesirable because it is frequently attended with "idleness" and "waiting for trade," not to mention

the individualistic type of values which it engenders. The problem of class trade is by no means limited to the elite shops. It is quite as much, if not more, a problem of general markets, of department stores, chain stores and all other trade agencies that attempt to do a multi-class business. It also has its counter part in production in "class" of workers. Factories and mills become known as desirable or undesirable places to work quite as much by the type of persons employed as by the duties and compensations; and it is not at all uncommon to see employees preserve "social face" at considerable economic sacrifice.[16]

Stores operated by the same syndicate (often referred to as chain stores) are often established within a very few blocks of each other, each one catering to a different class of trade. Several branch banks of this sort have recently come to the attention of the author. "Chain stores" also increase their ability to buy in miscellaneous job lots by selling to several classes of trade. Shops with many trade outlets can afford to operate "Fifth Avenue" and "Broadway" branches at a loss in order to place a "class" premium on other shops in less pretentious but more remunerative locations. Stores which handle different classes of trade in a single establishment often have subway, street-floor and automobile entrances adjusted to their different types of patronage. They segregate quality stock for quality trade, and bargain stock for popular trade with different types of salesfolk for each class of trade. Sometimes exactly the same articles are offered in half a dozen parts of the same store in different settings. Different sales methods are used and prices are adjusted to the type of trade. Some stores endeavor to make it easy for "quality trade" to share the benefits of bargains without any social stigma by such devices as "selected" mailings of advanced notices of sales and "privileged" advance buying. These devices accompanied by appropriate obsequiousness frequently yield large economic returns. Even deliveries are a social problem. People in suburban homes object to having certain types of delivery vans stop in front of their residences, and are pleased to have others

16. *Cf.* Robert B. Wolf, *Non-Financial Incentives*, pub. by American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

stop there. To meet this situation some stores have eliminated markings from their delivery vans or use the service of a general high grade delivery company for their select suburban trade. Thus they give their patrons the economic advantage without the social disadvantage.

Nowhere in trade or commerce are class distinctions more evident than in transportation and hotel accommodations. The preference for the bus even when the fare is double that of the street car and the subway is not altogether on account of superior physical accommodations or of expediency. The difference between chairs in parlor cars or club cars on crack limited and special fare trains and through coaches on mere fast trains is not merely a matter of comfort and speed. The tremendous differences in steerage and de luxe cabin rates on multi-class ocean liners are not in terms merely of ratio of comfort, for they cannot be maintained when the vessels are for any reason run as one class service. It is true that the bus offers a seat and certain physical comforts, but it moves more slowly and has other disadvantages. Its supreme satisfaction is that a man rides "like a gentleman" among a selected group of people. For this he gladly pays an extra fare. De luxe cabins and suites afford the occupants certain comforts and services not common to all cabin suites. Some of the service is specialized and expensive, but the high payment is quite as much for social prestige as for actual comfort offered or service rendered. It is for social prestige that people live in exclusive communities, dine and travel in state, occupy expensive seats at the theatres, and do many other things that they can ill afford. Often they are aware of the economic disadvantage, but they cannot sacrifice their position in society even if it must be maintained with effort and cost.

An exceptionally choice bit of "class" appeal is contained in a beautifully inscribed and embossed announcement recently circulated by a metropolitan taxi service. The announcement was as follows:

> When you step into a taxi does it ever occur to you who occupied it before you?
>
> Perhaps an honest but sooty laborer, an inebriate anti-prohibitionist, a well meaning but decidedly aroma-spreading

foreigner, or worse, it might have been some one being rushed to the hospital with, who knows what, loathsome disease.

Did you know that we have discriminately divided our fleet of cars? Part of them for the above described "general public," BUT a sufficient number of carefully kept, clean new cars are reserved unconditionally for our exclusive clientele.

These cars are sent to none but the refined homes of our best families. So that when Madame wishes a car she may ride in serene confidence that its previous occupant could not be other than one of her own set.

This and the other examples cited are just a few of the many concrete illustrations that might be given. They will serve to make realistic the statement that "class" is a conditioning factor in trade, that business men are constantly studying the problems which it presents and experimenting in the hope of ascertaining better ways of solving them. The task of handling classes of trade so that they do not preclude or irritate one another is a social art. To handle them so that the ensemble is pleasantly stimulating to all the participating classes is a remarkably artistic achievement. This is usually more easily accomplished at times of sentimental or emotional appeal such as Christmas, but it is then attended with all the dangers that go with social achievement founded primarily on sentimental, sympathetic or emotional like-mindedness. This is another phase of business where it seems highly probable that sociology might be of practical value. Trained sociologists in sympathetic cooperation with practical experimenters should be able to cooperate in making experimentation more scientific and in comparing the experiments of various organizations. For this purpose applied sociology should aid in evolving terms that are practically significant in the world of business and are also sociologically accurate. These terms would serve as common denominators for clearing social information between theory, practice and the different phases of practice.

Public Relations. All business must sooner or later take into consideration its relations to the public, for all business continues by permission, either expressed or implied, of the general public.

This is especially true of public utilities since they usually exist by special permission of the public and are regulated by it in almost every function. But all business, art, journalism, education, religion and every other institutional activity is affected by the attitude of the public. This relationship between business, professional and political institutions and the public is so important that there has grown up for its adjustment a professional group. With press agents and publicity men as its forerunners the "public relations counsel" has attained professional dignity.[17] This new vocation is rapidly growing in esteem; its methods are becoming more scientific; and it is developing both a technique and an ethical code. The public relations counselor for organized special interest groups appears sometimes as a lobbyist presenting the claims of a particular business to the attention of the representatives of the public. Sometimes he works directly with the public. Occasionally the public relations counselor is the publicity agent of offices created by the public and endeavors to make the public appreciate the services rendered by its own representatives or agents.

The appearance of the press agent, publicity man and public relations counselor is indicative of the growth and development of the problem of inter-group adjustment. Whatever may be one's opinion of the function or of the methods of this vocation, it must be admitted that the members of the craft are multiplying in number and increasing in effectiveness. This would seem to indicate that they at least satisfy a demand and perhaps meet a real social need. The integration of special interests has been growing rapidly in almost every field of human activity. This has become the age of the national and international organization of interests. At the same time the public is becoming increasingly conscious not only of its rights but of its ability to regulate and control the special interest groups by means of lobbying and other political methods. The result is that the interpreting of themselves to the public is becoming a matter of serious concern to the organized interests. The intermediaries needed for promoting understanding and mak-

17. Edward L. Bernays, *Crystalizing Public Opinion*, pp. 11 to 88.

ing adjustments between these special interest groups and community interest groups must be more than locally minded empiricists. They must be well grounded in social and societal psychology. Their task is one of social adjustment among highly dynamic and variable social groups. They will need a practical knowledge of the social mind, its behavior, and the controls to which it is amenable. They are always experimenting with ways and means of influencing the social mind. Their offices should be laboratories for sociological observation and probably will be when sociology promises a *quid pro quo*.

Considerable likeness exists between these intermediaries and those who function between capital and labor,[18] or between nations. Each of these groups of intermediaries may work out its own technique but each will depend upon and be able to contribute to the same applied sociology. They not only need a sociology that will be useful in their several professions and that will be applicable in their laboratories, but also a sociology that will enable them by the exchange of their experiences in common terminology to develop a scientific basis for a profession. The need for a social psychology that would be recognized as practically useful by statesmen was felt and expressed by Herbert Spencer over half a century ago.[19] We are now arriving at the place where not only social psychology but also societal psychology and applied sociology are being recognized as essential to the adjustment of group relations and the conduct of public business.[20]

Journalism. The most extensive and persistent intermediary between all social groups and between both individuals and groups on the one hand and the public on the other is the press. It informs individuals, groups, and the public as to what each is doing. News would not exist if human beings were not interested in the same things, in each other, or in the groups of which they are members;

18. *Cf.* John Davison Rockefeller, *The Personal Relation in Industry.*

19. *Cf.* Herbert Spencer, *The Study of Sociology*, ch. xv.

20. *Cf.* Arland D. Weeks, *The Control of the Social Mind*, ch. viii, "The Psychology of Public Business"; W. B. Pillsbury, *The Psychology of Nationalism and Internationalism.*

and all of these interests are social and socializing. If, as Simmel has said, it is "reciprocal influencing" which transforms human beings in mere spatial and temporal juxtaposition into society, and if the object of sociology is to "investigate these reciprocal influences" then journalism performs a major social function, the sociological study of which may be of practical value to the journalist as well as of interest to the sociologist.[21] For if news does anything, it increases the reciprocal relationships between human beings. The value of news is attested by its capacity to "influence" human beings, using the word "influence" in the broad sense in which Simmel uses it, as almost synonymous with "stimulate."

Many journalists regard the "uncovering of news"[22] as their primary function. But the news value of any incident lies principally in its social implications,—the number of persons interested in the same incident or in each other. In other words the demand for news is to a considerable extent social, and it is amenable to the same controls as are demands for other satisfactions. It is possible to hunt news that will supply the existing demand or to create a demand for news that can be supplied. Interesting research into this relationship between "supply and demand" in news was commenced several years ago by Professor Tenney of Columbia University.[23] This study included the working out by means of an elaborate inductive study, news categories that were of both practical and sociological significance. These studies suggested interesting regional and temporal fluctuations both in the amount of news available and the amount and kind of news demanded. They also revealed certain tendencies not only to adjust supply to

21. *Cf.* George Simmel, *Soziologie*, translations by Albion W. Small, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. iii, pp. 667-83; vol. xv, 296-98.

22. *Cf.* John L. Given, *Making a Newspaper*, ch. v.

23. Alvan A. Tenney, "The Scientific Analysis of the Press," *"The Independent*, vol. lxxiii, no. 3333 (October 17, 1912), pp. 895-8; *Cf.* also Willard G. Bleyer, "Research Problems and Newspaper Analysis," *Journalism Bulletin*, vol. i (N. S.), no. 1, pp. 17-22. The facts mentioned in the text were but incidental findings in connection with the extensive analysis of the press made by and under the direction of Professor Tenney.

demand but to create a demand for the available supply. One cannot study this problem long before he is impressed with the importance of the conditions which determine what kind of news can be "run" and when, where and how long. One wonders at the sustained interest in the fundamentalist-modernist controversy, the vogue of cross word puzzles and limericks, the sustained interest in King Tut and the passing interest in findings of an earlier and more significant period. The news consumption of the individual is stabilized by folkways and customs which societally conditioned his mind. It is also varied whenever he is affected by the ephemeral phenomena of crowd mind. These and other complicated social processes which enter into the determination of his desire for news can be analyzed only by means of an adequate sociology.

But the journalist is facing a concrete social problem which is even more immediate and pressing. He needs to learn how to write with increasing accuracy concerning social phenomena. It is difficult to get accurate news of any event unless the event has been accurately recorded in statistics, scores, stock reports, pictures, etc. Lippmann claims that, "Unless the event is capable of being named, measured, given shape, made specific, it either fails to take on the character of news or is subject to the accidents and prejudices of observation."[24] Applied to social phenomena, this means that if they are not capable of exact representations they are not news; and if perchance they do take on the character of news they are "subject to the accidents or prejudices of observation." To the extent that Lippman is correct it is evident that the journalist needs an observational sociology that will be genuinely useful in reducing the "accidents and prejudices of observation" in the description of social phenomena. It would enable him to describe social phenomena so that they would become reliable data for further sociological generalization.

Social Factors in Medicine. Figuratively, the term "medicine" may be applied to anything that has a curative or remedial effect. It was in this sense that Huxley once said, "The only medicine for

24. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, p. 363.

suffering, crime and all other woes of mankind is wisdom."[25] In the modern practice of medicine the term is being used much more liberally than heretofore. Social diagnosis and social therapeutics are no longer unfamiliar terms to the leaders in the medical profession. A growing realization of the intimate relation between mental diseases and all other diseases together with the development of applied psychology has been responsible for the rapid development of psychiatry. Although psychiatry started as a science of mental disease or of mental disorders, the line of demarcation between normal and abnormal conduct has tended to fade away as the science developed. It has been discovered that mental disorders are not only the result of mental disease but frequently are the "final expressions of earlier hurtful experiences or habits,"[26] i. e., the final expression of previous social experiences. The diagnosis of these disorders is according to Dr. E. E. Southard, the director of the State Psychopathic Hospital at Boston, not so very different in applied pathology from what it is in social work.[27] Dr. Adolph Meyer of Johns Hopkins in speaking of psychiatric diagnosis says that "After studying in each patient all the non-mental disorders such as infections, intoxications and the like, we can now also attack the problems of life which can be understood only in terms of plain and intelligible human relations and activities." He admits that "There are in the life records of our patients certain ever-returning tendencies and situations which a psychiatry of exclusive brain speculation, autointoxications, focal infections and internal secretions could never have discovered." He even goes further and affirms the psychiatrists' need of a knowledge of social and societal conditioning in the following paragraph:

> Much is gained by the frank recognition that man is fundamentally a social being. There are reactions in us which only contacts and relations with other human beings can bring out. We must study men as mutual reagents in personal affections

25. Thomas H. Huxley, *Lay Sermons*, p. 39.

26. Ernest R. Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustment*, p. 11.

27. *Proceedings of the National Conference on Social Work*, 1918, p. 334.

> and aversions and their conflicts; in the desires and satisfactions of the simpler appetities for food and personal necessities; in the natural interplay of anticipation and fulfillment of desires and their occasional frustration; in the selection of companionship which works helpfully or otherwise,—for the moment or most lastingly through the many vicissitudes of life. All through we find situations which create a more or less personal bias and chances for success or failure, such as simpler types of existence do not produce.[28]

In an effort to make a first step toward adapting sociology to this need and also to bring to sociology the benefit of the experience of the psychiatrists, Professor Groves of Boston University has been offering courses in what he has been pleased to call socio-analysis.[29]

But medicine, through psychiatry, has not only shown a need for a special type of sociological diagnosis but also for a sociologically derived social therapeutics. The analysis of social mal-adjustments, enlightening and significant as it has been, is but the preliminary to re-education or some other type of social adjustment. The extent and ramifications of mental therapeutics is well presented by V. V. Anderson in an article entitled "The State Program for Mental Hygiene,"[30] in which he urges among other things the establishment in the medical school of a Department of Psychiatry which would include not only clinical psychiatry but also social psychiatry and mental hygiene. This department would be open to students in psychology, sociology, education and law, as well as to medical students.

Sociology has long been recognized as useful for explaining the social conditions, situations and circumstances leading to delinquency and crime. Behavior analysis and quantitative method were applied to this phase of sociology in the earliest stages of the development of the science. It is not surprising, therefore, that efforts are being made to use sociology both for the analysis of crime and delin-

28. Adolf Meyer, "Psychiatry and Life Problems," a paper read at the Bloomington Hospital Centenary and published in *A Psychiatric Milestone*, pp. 31-2.

29. *The Journal of Social Forces*, vol. I, p. 117.

30. *Ibid*, pp. 92-100.

quency as well as for working out practical methods of preventing and correcting them. Sociological study of the case records of social workers and of court procedures has made it possible to draw many practically significant inferences.

Law as Social Engineering. Roscoe Pound has on various occasions ventured an engineering interpretation of jurisprudence and politics. In an address before the Conference of the Departments of History, Sociology, Political Economy, Political Science, and Philosophy at the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the University of Chicago, 1916, he presented the matter as follows:

> In an age of engineering triumphs, then, why not an engineering interpretation of jurisprudence? Many analogies suggest themselves in this connection. Legal rules and juristic doctrines may be compared to the formulas of the engineer. They express the experience of the past in administering justice and make that experience available . . . . the legislator in convenient form just as formulas of the engineer embody the experience of the past and relieve from the necessity of making long calculations and engaging in elaborate preliminary mathematical investigations. Thus we have in each case, not limitations, but means to be employed in the conscious construction to achieve definite ends. The satisfaction of a maximum of wants with a minimum of sacrifice of other wants, the economizing of social effort, the conservation of social assets, the elimination of social waste are juristic problems which may easily be stated in terms of engineering.[31]

Several years later in an address entitled "Society and the Individual" Dr. Pound informed the national Conference of Social Work that "our problem is not one of abstract harmonizing of human wills" but it is "a great task, or rather a great series of tasks, of social engineering" in that it is one of "concrete securing or realizing of human interests."[32] And, "we may think of the legal order as a piece of social engineering; as a human attempt to conserve values and eliminate friction and preclude waste in the process

31. *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxii, pp. 721-33. Article entitled "Juristic Problems of National Progress."

32. *Proceeding of the National Conference of Social Work*. "Society and the Individual," 1919, pp. 103-7.

of satisfying human wants."[33] In other words the legal order may be regarded as a piece of social engineering in the interests of social economy and social welfare.

The relation of the domain of law to the process of social engineering and its consequent need for an applicable science of social relations and group behavior is even more explicit in the following statement. "That part of the whole process of social engineering which has to do with the ordering of human relations and of human conduct through applying to men the force of politically organized society is the domain of law."[34]

Half a century ago Herbert Spencer called attention to the need of rational legislation based on a true theory of conduct. But in speaking of the failure of the legislator of his day to appreciate this need, he remarks that "To prescribe for society on the strength of countless unclassified observations, appears to him (the legislator) a sensible course; but to colligate and systematize the observations so as to educe tendencies of human behavior displayed throughout cases of numerous kinds, to trace these tendencies to their sources in the mental natures of men, and thence to draw conclusions for guidance, appears to him a visionary course."[35] During the fifty years that have elapsed there has been a very considerable change in the attitude of many legislators, and a very definite change in the point of view of many of the leaders in the legal profession. Paul Vinogradoff asserts that there has arisen "a science of law, a jurisprudence which aims at discovering the general principles underlying legal enactments and judicial decisions. It speculates on the processes of thought which take place in the minds of legislators, judges, pleaders, and parties. This theory of law enables men to frame and use their laws deliberately and scientifically, instead of producing them more or less at random under the stress of circum-

33. *Criminal Justice in Cleveland.* Reports of the Cleveland Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Cleveland, Ohio, 1922. Directed and edited by Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter. Pt. viii, ch. i, pp. 559-66, esp. p. 563.

34. *Ibid,* p. 563.

35. *The Study of Sociology,* Amer. Ed., p. 358.

stances."[36] If Spencer is correct in his contention that the actions of many persons are "not to be affected by making their cognitions clearer but by making their higher feelings stronger" it is necessary to interpret Vinogradoff's "processes of thought" as including all the mental processes. The development of law is therefore in part dependent upon the development of an adequate psychology. But something more is required. There is need for a social psychology, a societal psychology and a sociology that can be used in the development of a science of law. The "legislators, judges and pleaders" are related both by person and office to social institutions and the laws with which they deal relate almost, if not entirely, to matters of common (shared) interest or of conflicting interests to the development of social processes and the operation of social mechanisms. They need a sociology that will enable them to deal scientifically with problems involving societal form and action patterns and societal variables. They need a sociology that can be used to help provide the proper legislation for delinquency, tendencies to lawlessness and recurrence of "crime waves." They need a sociology which will make it possible to transform much of the work of legislative drafting and research bureaus to that of scientific experiment and inference. These and innumerable other needs for an applied sociology must be satisfied if, as Jhering would say, we are to pass from the "formulated" law to the "real" law—from the letter which killeth to the spirit which giveth life.

"The futility of a self-sufficing, self-centered science of law has become apparent to jurists."[37] The problems of jurisprudence are sociological. They include (a) a definition of social justice, including a definition of social interests and a study of how these may be best served, and (b) a study of the actual social effects of legal institutions, both of legal doctrines and of specific legal enactments. The sociological nature of these problems is at once evident in Spencer's formula of justice,—"the liberty of each limited *only* by

36. *Common-Sense in Law*, p. 12.

37. Roscoe Pound, "Social Problems and the Courts," *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xviii, pp. 331-41.

the like liberties of all" and in Willoughby's statement that "Justice consists in granting, so far as possible, to each individual the opportunity for a realization of his highest ethical self, and . . . . this involves, or rather is founded upon, the general duty of all, in the pursuit of their own ends, to recognize others as individuals who are striving for, and have a right to strive for, the realization of their own ends."[38] The practical task of legislatures is scientific experimentation in "The balancing of individual demands with social demands and with other individual demands, so as to promote the general order by the equalization of opportunity, and to provide for the greatest possible self-realization consistent with the common good."[39] The main problem of jurisprudence, therefore, says Pound, "is to enable and to compel law-making and also the interpretation and application of legal rules to take more account and more intelligent account of the social facts upon which law must proceed and to which it is to be applied."[40] The solution of this problem requires a sociology with a technique that can be effectively applied to the ascertaining of these social facts. It also requires a sociology that can so arrange and classify these facts that they become practically significant of the probable consequences of any proposed legislation or legislative administration. Sociology must become adequate to the needs of the "sociological jurist."

Summary. This chapter gives the reader a few glimpses into places where a practically applicable sociology is urgently needed. It is neither an attempt to survey the extent of this need nor to note and evaluate all its varieties. It does call attention to the fact that there is a growing recognition of the importance of social factors in the realm of business and also to the fact that men of affairs are becoming aware of the need for a sociology with a content and a technique that can be used in working out practical methods of social control and social economy. Business and professional men are face to face with socio-economic problems for the

38. *Social Justice*, p. 24.

39. Eldon R. James, "Some Implications of Remedial and Preventive Legislation in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xviii, pp. 769-83, esp. 783.

40. "Legislation as a Social Function," *ibid;* vol. xviii, 755-68, esp. 756.

solution of which they recognize the existing empirical methods to be totally inadequate. In many cases they are inclined to replace the old methods with more scientific ones and are willing to undertake research and experiment to this end. They are not convinced that sociology has any scientifically established principles practically superior to the empirical bases on which they are now operating, nor are they convinced that sociology as a social science has developed a technique which has any serious value for their research and experimentation.

The man of affairs requires a sociology stated in terms that will articulate with the terminology of business practice. He requires a sociology that will readily lend itself to the analysis of the problems and procedures with which he is confronted. It must be a sociology which can be fitted into the practices of business, or at least one into which the problems of business can be clearly and effectively stated—a sociology which can be applied on "the inside" to the laboratory tasks of the "real" world. It must be a sociology which can be used together with the other social sciences (including psychology) for the diagnosis of social situations and for the evaluation of the social factors in socio-economic processes, for the alteration of these situations and processes and for the building and administration of social mechanisms. This sociology must lend itself to such experimentation as will lead to inferences that are regarded by the practically minded as "worth while." It must provide an adequate basis both for the development of social and societal engineering and for the development of practical social economy.

CHAPTER III

Possible Applications of Sociology

Sociology has practical possibilities which as yet have not been even approximately apprehended and which probably never can be completely comprehended. As an extensive positive philosophy its practical possibilities have been frequently manifested in the fields of ethics and of public policy. As an inductive and observational science sociology is recently beginning to furnish data for social diagnosis and treatment. As an intensive science of social and societal behavior it gives promise of meeting some of the needs for prediction and control suggested in the preceding chapter.

There is good reason to believe that sociology as a special science will develop rapidly as soon as its possibilities for specific and immediate control are realized. Each of the special sciences developed slowly until it became evident that it could be used for attaining control, effecting economy, or producing new satisfactions. Thereafter, additional opportunities for development came to each of these sciences whenever it proved itself valuable as a means for working out a more satisfactory or a more economic achievement of proximate ends. There is no evident reason why sociology should be an exception to the rule. This chapter deals with some of the more practical possibilities of sociology as an intensive science. To catalogue the practical possibilities of applied sociology is an impossible task. It is possible, however, to set forth some significant and diversely representative illustrations of its possibilities and especially of such as are not now generally recognized. It is hoped that in the following effort to show some of the possible practical applications of sociology, the reader will find reasons for believing (1) that sociology can become a special science, (2) that it has practical possibilities of the kind which brought new impetus to the other special sciences, and (3) that the demonstration of these possibilities will hasten the development of the science.

Dependent upon Applied Economics, Biology and Psychology.

It is almost self-evident that the possibilities of an applied sociology were very limited until applied economics, applied biology, and applied psychology had gained headway. Any sociological situation involves factors which are subject matter of each of these sciences. Until accurate evaluation of the part played by the economic, biological and psychological factors of social situations and processes can be reckoned, it is almost impossible to do much with the sociological probabilities.

The practical use of economic theory is calling forth unprecedented interest in all economic theory and stimulating extensive economic research. Faith in the possibilities of applied economics has been responsible for the rapid growth of economic research bureaus and services and also of schools of business of collegiate rank and professional tendencies. A similar faith in the possibilities of applied biology as a sound approach to horticulture, stock breeding, medical practice and the improvement of public health has given almost unlimited financial support to all biological study and research. As yet, faith in the practical possibilities of psychology is less general than that in regard to either applied economics or applied biology. But the practical possibilities of applied psychology are being demonstrated in many fields of endeavor, ranging from animal training and traffic regulation, through salesmanship and administration, to psychiatry, religious practices and educational procedure. The belief in the practical possibilities of psychology has awakened new interest and led to more extensive observation and experimentation. It is almost inevitable that there should follow in the wake of this growing faith in the possibilities of applied economics, applied biology and applied psychology a faith in the possibilities of an applied sociology. The development of applied sociology will probably follow a course not unlike that of applied biology, economics and psychology, and its immediately useful phases will doubtless awaken a more critical appreciation of the entire subject, bringing new opportunities for extensive research.

Practical Possibilities of Behavioristic Sociology. Sociology shares with all the social sciences a common aim—"the understand-

ing of human behavior," and in a sense all of them have a common aspiration "to devise ways of experimenting upon human behavior." But the development of a new method, "the quantitative analysis of behavior records," opens a new vista not only for sociology but for all of the social sciences.[1] This method may be useful in at least four ways for increasing the practical possibilities of sociology. First, it may afford a concrete and objective check on the practical applicability of social theories. Second, it may be useful for the detailed analysis of definite social problems. Third, it may be used for testing the empiricisms of social artists. Fourth, and in consequence of the other three, it may be of value in working out superior ways and means of experimenting upon human behavior. Some of the social theories may need considerable restatement to make them amenable to verification by behavioristic sociology. Many of the problems can be analyzed only when behavioristic sociology functions as an integral part of the behavioristic researches of all the social sciences. The empirical theories of the practical business man are quite as likely to need restatement as are the theories of the sociologists before they are amenable to quantitative analysis. And it is at once apparent that the behavior records of the practical man will have to undergo considerable revision. The experimentation will not be completely controlled, with specific factors isolated; it will be a scientific refinement of the crude experimentation now in vogue. Although no attempt has been made in the discussion which follows to keep these four types of usefulness separate, the reader will be able to see much more in the possibilities suggested if he keeps in mind all four approaches to the quantitative analysis of behavior records.

The statements concerning the new possibilities through the development of the quantitative method in sociology should not be interpreted as derogatory of the qualitative method. The latter has made and doubtless will continue to make valuable contributions to general sociology. In quantitative studies there must always be qualitative distinctions, and one of the chief aims of applied

1. *Cf.* Wesley C. Mitchell, *Quantitative Analysis of Economic Theory*, Presidential Address before the American Economic Association, December, 1924.

sociology is to make discriminations between practically significant structural and functional social (and societal) types.

Production, Distribution and Consumption of Social Prestige. Almost all sociologists agree that human beings seek, or at least are greatly stimulated by, prestige. This is especially evident when the prestige is within an intimate group with which they are in conscious sympathy. In fact, the "desire for recognition" [2] or for esteem, approval, honor, rank or acclaim is one of the most important of the social incentives. For prestige men will make unlimited sacrifices. They will even risk life to attain it.

In a sense, "prestige" may be considered as significant a subject matter of sociology as "wealth" is of economics. Men will actually sacrifice wealth for prestige. Much of the pursuit of material wealth is merely for the purpose of using wealth to attain recognition, commendation or acclaim. As Giddings has said from time to time, the production, distribution and consumption of social "acclaim" is as significant a social process as the production, distribution and consumption of wealth is a fundamental economic process.

Sporadic exploitations of this universal craving have been carried on for ages by politicians and clever administrators. But no extensive scientific study of social prestige has ever been made, nor has there ever been a genuinely scientific exploitation of its social possibilities. The importance of prestige is almost universally recognized. Anthropological sociology is filled with records of it; political sociology deals with it again and again; philosophers and economists have written many essays concerning it.[3] Richard T. Ely names it as one of his six motives of economic activity, describing it as "the desire to gain the esteem of ones fellows."[4] Since prestige is capable

2. Franklin H. Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 286-7. See also Charles H. Cooley, *Social Process*, ch. xi, "Fame."

3. e.g. Lewis Leopold, *Prestige; A Psychological Study of Social Estimates*, esp. pp. 14-16, 21, 22, 27-9.

4. Richard T. Ely, *Outlines of Economics* (3 ed., 1917), p. 104. For importance of "desire" as a social factor see Lester F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, vol. i, p. 602, "One great law permeates the whole sentient world, that before there can be action there must first be desire, that action can only be performed in obedience to desire." This thesis is developed vol. i, pp. 663, 668; vol. ii, pp. 90, 321, 328. *Cf.* also Edward A. Ross, *The Foundations of Sociology*, p. 169 *et seq.* for a description of *egotic* desires and *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 112-8, for *egotic association*; p. 368 for subordination.

of satisfying human wants, it is an object of human desire and possesses *utility*. The study of the production, distribution and consumption of this utility is certainly within the province of applied sociology.

Prestige is a social product. It can be produced by social processes only. Prestige has its roots in the mores. Sometimes a mere readjustment of a process to better alignment with the mores will remove stigma and add prestige. Sometimes the mores themselves can be developed so as to direct prestige where it is most desired. In some communities women who leave teaching to enter business lose prestige; and those who go from the office to the shop, and from the shop to the factory lose more prestige; and this more or less regardless of the intelligence or skill needed for the tasks or the remuneration received.[5] This presents a practical problem in prestige. Political officers must be rewarded in salaries or in prestige. The offering of large salaries tends to develop "orchards of plum trees." Low salaries in public service draw only incompetents unless dignity and recognition can be made acceptable offsets for disparity in salary.

There should be an effort to evaluate scientifically the part which prestige plays in all social phenomena, and the possibilities of substituting rewards in prestige for rewards in material goods. No scientific study has been made of the distribution of the prestige already existing, or, what may be even more important, of the possibilities of manufacturing prestige for distribution. There are many possible approaches to such a study. One that would have a practical worth almost from its very beginnings would be a determination of actual substitution values. These might include expenditures for prestige, losses which men will stand for the sake (over and above credit) of their good name, and the offsetting of unsatisfactory salaries and wages by privileges, distinctions and pride in participation.

The army is an outstanding illustration of the possibilities of combining material rewards and prestige as compensation for service

5. *Cf.* Robert B. Wolf, *Non-Financial Incentives*, pub. by American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

and the assumption of responsibility. The "uniform" is class distinction, and a uniform ceases to have social value the instant it is degrading or marked with stigma. But similarity of uniforms becomes a most effective background for setting forth the nicest distinctions in rank. The voluntary reduction of money income for the sake of rank and social position runs the whole gamut of society from the "hall room boys" who starve their way along in "white collar" jobs to those who strive for military, political, ecclesiastical, fraternal, academic or artistic honors. Titles are an important part of the currency of prestige. Decorations were its earliest stock in trade.[6]

Business administrators have already learned that braid, brass buttons and embroidery make menial and otherwise undesirable positions "classy" and dignified. "Near" dinner coats help to keep recruited the ranks of waiters, and the morning coats of department store floor walkers undoubtedly pay for themselves many times over. "Private" offices and the privilege of "official" stationery are illustrative of a host of devices to combine social with economic rewards for services rendered or responsibilities assumed.

It is interesting to note what the practical-minded sociologist, Walter Bagehot, thought of the possibilities of exploiting rank and prestige as social wealth. Over half a century ago he wrote:

> Rank probably in no other country whatever has so much "market" value as it has in England just now. . . . The possessions of the "material" distinctions of life. . . . rush to worship those who possess the immaterial distinctions. Nothing can be more politically useful than such homage, if it be skilfully used; no folly can be idler than to repel and reject it.[7]

The theme of the story of Jacob and Esau is as old and widespread as the human race. Men are everywhere dealing in prestige, buying it and selling it, either in *beneficium et commendatio* or in some other custom of exchange.

6. *Cf.* Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, 2nd ed. (1886), vol. ii, pt. iv. Ceremonial Institutions; *Education*, ch. i.

7. *The English Constitution*, pp. 101-2, 106-7, 112-13, 119-20, 127-8, include discussions of consensus and prestige as practical problems of government in England. See esp. p. 24, "Introduction to the Second Edition."

A volume on problems in prestige could be written, but the above examples will probably suffice to make clear what is meant by practical problems in social prestige. It might be well to note a somewhat more specific problem which recently arose in a button factory in New York State. The problem was to attract the better type of workers and to make them responsible for superior workmanship. None of the usual money compensations seemed adequate. Better wages, piece work schemes, bonuses, promotions and all the usual plans yielded only limited results. Consequently, certain other devices were attempted, and apparently with gratifying results. The name "factory" was removed and one with less opprobrium substituted. Employees were no longer called "hands" and were never to be designated by numbers. A system of titled offices resonant with such words as director, supervisor, chief, expert, etc., was devised. In short, the factory was given "class" in the community and the "jobs" became dignified positions. The result as reported to date is that this "social" change brought in a better class of workers and made possible a more effective establishment producing superior goods—a result which even the most liberal wage and salary adjustments had not made possible until they were supplemented by the social adjustment.

The gist of the matter is that many economic and other practical problems of living have as one of their conditioning factors this very highly dynamic social factor, prestige, recognition, acclaim, esteem or rank. Scientific research to evaluate this factor and to determine its relation to other factors should be economically profitable and socially beneficial. The immediate findings would be definitely useful and would contribute to the sociological data necessary for the development of a scientific sociology. This research might test out the various so-called laws, hypotheses and theories of sociologists in regard to prestige. It might concentrate all the available, fragmentary sociology for dealing with particular problems in which social prestige is a major factor. Or it might assemble in a useful way inferences made from successful experiments in similar problems, even when the solutions were merely

pragmatic, empirical and worked out by persons ignorant of sociological values. The findings of such researches would tend to be organized into a sociology of prestige which would be of practical worth (*a*) for evaluating elements of prestige in any social problem, (*b*) for making predictions concerning any social change in which prestige or absence of it is a factor, and (*c*) for projecting in terms of probabilities projects (wholly or in part social) in which prestige plays an active part.

If there should be objection to this type of study on the ground that it deals with desires or motives, and that the quantitative methods of behavior study are not applicable to the solution of such problems as they are now stated, the reply would be that a restatement of the problems is necessary. The study of the desire for prestige may be limited to the scientific scrutiny of the overt actions or behavior of men in order to achieve satisfactions or recognitions of the sort that are concretely distinguishable. When men surrender specific and calculable economic goods or definite social advantage, rank or position in order to obtain titles, degrees, offices and other symbols of recognition, honor or esteem, it is possible to make "price" studies of a quantitative and objective sort. These would be scientific studies of what price men will pay for glory, or, reversing the point of view, what glory can purchase. They would necessarily include the study of the variations or fluctuations in price for different types of individuals, or for the varying conditions and circumstances under which the social satisfactions were "bought" or "sold." It is highly desirable to know just what human beings will do under circumstances of choice or exchange. If motive can be reduced to a characteristically recognizable factor with a definite functional value that registers itself unmistakably in behavior, it may be studied, as are other determining factors, by the quantitative method. Motives need not be eliminated or dropped out of social calculations; but the motives should not be taken for granted or used as a single principle of explanation. Motive must not be postulated. It may be treated as a "presumption" or it may be hypothecated and subjected to test. It may be discovered by

scientific scrutiny and inference. In fact, the making of nice distinctions between types of behavior and the relating of these to nice distinctions between attendant or antecedent conditions and circumstances is likely to pave the way to an entirely new understanding of the processes of motivation. This method of analyzing the antecedents of social behavior and the social antecedents of all human behavior will considerably revise the procedure of ethics as well as contribute to the practical knowledge of motivation and its control.

This seems to be in accord with Mitchell's idea as expressed in his Presidential Address that "our whole apparatus of reasoning on the basis of utilities and disutilities, or motives, or choices, in the individual economy, will drop out of sight in the work of the quantitative analysts."[8] He also states that "The 'psychological' element in the work of these men will consist mainly of objective analysis of the economic behavior of groups." In other words, it will be a psychological study of societal behavior. As a result of these studies "Motives will not drop wholly from sight, but they will be treated as problems requiring study, instead of being taken for granted as constituting explanations."

Social Motivation. No question is asked more frequently in the business world today than, *How shall we get action?* This is what the citizen asks when he reads the records of his representatives, what the builder asks when he hopes some day to be permitted by the allied business trades to erect a house, what the unemployed, overworked, under-nourished and poorly housed ask when they want relief, what the institutionally and conventionally repressed and enslaved continually ask when they are seeking for emancipation, what the progressives in every walk of life ask when desirous of achievement.

In the practical achievement of social changes the control of motive becomes as fundamental a consideration as the control of energy in physics, and for this reason social artists desire a prac-

8. Wesley C. Mitchell, "Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory," *American Economic Review*, vol. xv., no. i, pp. 1-12.

tical "teleological sociology."[9] This sociology should serve the same general purpose for which Ward designed his *Dynamic Sociology*[10] the title of which was somewhat misinforming. Even when allowance has been made for the error due to his Lamarckian biology and gynecentric anthropology, Ward has contributed to teleological sociology abundant, substantial, and important generalizations. These may be used as working hypotheses for the development of a teleological sociology useful for the achievement of proximate ends, i. e., the generating or evoking of purposive action in specific groups under specific circumstances and for definite ends.

Concerning social motivation, social artists make inquiries such as these. What are its sources? How is it to be released? In what ways does it function? How may it be conserved? Everywhere men are endeavoring individually and collectively to get other human beings individually and collectively to do what they want them to do. To the extent that either the effort or the desired response is collective, the problems appertaining thereto are social and the science of such motivation is sociology. Motivation in this sense carries with it no necessary ethical connotation. The problem is merely how to get social action. General sociology has always been cognizant of the motivation of the world's great movements.[11]

But for every one great drive there are thousands if not tens of thousands of minor problems in social motivation. The social artist must be able to obtain collective action in specific minor groups as well as in the body politic. This is not merely a problem of stimulation and response even though it is interpreted to include interstimulation. It is a problem of *concerted volition*,[12] its genesis,

9. Franklin H. Giddings, The Scientific Study of Human Society, pp. 140-145, the beginning of the discussion of *societal telesis*.

10. Lester F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, vol. ii, p. 160, "the distinguishing mark of every practical science is the manner in which the forces within its domain admit of being controlled by artificial devices"; p. 161, "dynamic sociology consists in applying the indirect method to the control of social forces."

11. *Ibid*, v. i, p. 456, the *natural* progress or movement of society, the causes, origin and genesis of its leading institutions, and the purely spontaneous changes which it has undergone are problems of *passive* or *negative*, social *dynamics*."

12. Franklin H. Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 326-50; *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 111-174; *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, pp. 261, 262, 296.

stimulation, and direction. Concerted volition obeys laws characteristically its own,[13] but in accord with the laws of individual purposive behavior, which in turn fit into the general psychological plan of stimulus and response.[14] It is possible to develop as a part of applied sociology a practical teleological sociology. The latter must include knowledge adequate for the genesis, stimulation, release, direction and conservation of motive in concrete problems of social motivation. Here again it is reasonable to suppose that scientific scrutiny of multitudes of specific concrete efforts in social motivation will not only tend to reduce the cost of social motivation, to conserve social energy and to make available for practical purposes increasing surpluses of social energy, but it will also definitely add to the sum total of general sociological knowledge. It is assumed that the "principles," "laws," etc., of general sociology that relate to co-individual purpose will be treated as hypotheses subject to the corrections revealed in analysis and experiment.

Experiments in school rooms, communities, religious and political organizations, factories and shops have shown that it is possible to get action where hitherto it had been impossible, and to increase action in some cases to the extent of even doubling or trebling it. The reorganization of the conditions and circumstances or the additional stimulation was in many cases at a cost entirely disproportionate to the value of the activity set in motion. It would seem that in the practical motivation of these specific groups where the problems are relatively simple and the factors relatively easy to evaluate that there might be developed a body of specifically useful principles of social motivation that would also be an integral part of general sociology.

It is not necessary to have complete knowledge of all the primary and secondary stimulations[15] of a group in order to study motivation. In concrete situations where complete diagnosis has been

13. *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 175-181, Laws of concerted volition.

14. Social motivation is treated as co-individual purpose, and purpose as "tendency to reaction," "determining tendency" or "directive tendency," as described by Robert S. Woodworth, *Psychology, a Study of Mental Life*, pp. 68-78.

15. Franklin H. Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, bk. ii, pt. ii, ch. i.

impracticable, it has been found that experimentation in the elimination and injection of various factors, singly or in groups, has led to practically significant knowledge of the part played by the specific factors. A single suggestion from a teacher may affect the motive of an entire school, and it need not be more than an evident change of attitude on the teacher's part. Suggestions in periodically posted shop bulletins may produce changes in motivation that register themselves in appreciable changes in activity. A single clever cartoon and crisp comment in the "Subway Sun" may stimulate habits and mannerisms of newspaper reading less annoying to fellow passengers, or it may elicit cooperation with the company in keeping the cars free from stray papers. These illustrations suffice to show that on every hand the introduction of a new factor or the elimination of an old one may make significant changes in social motivation which register themselves in practically worthwhile changes of social behavior. A single new factor introduced into habitual social processes may by means of its effect on social motivation cause appreciable changes in social behavior. It is possible by applying the same stimulus to various social situations to determine the range of variation of reaction to it and by applying it to similar situations to establish norms of reaction. For practical purposes it is not always necessary to know all the consequences of the introduction of a new motivating factor. The practitioner is satisfied if there is a high probability of obtaining certain desired reactions and a low probability of obtaining especially undesirable reactions.

Charles H. Cooley says, "There is a trend throughout society to substitute higher motives for lower, and this is not only because the former are more agreeable, but because they are more effectual." For illustration he cites the supplanting of the rod in the school room by stimulations to emulation and the pleasure of achievement. In the church appeals to love, loyalty and service are more effective than the fear of hell fire. Speaking of motivation in industry Cooley says, "It is gratifying to find that the organizers of industry are coming to ascribe more and more value to human sympathy and the golden rule." [16] Cooley's illustrations all point to the sup-

16. Charles H. Cooley, *Social Process*, p. 132.

planting of fear motives that give rise to defense attitudes by positive social motives that lead to achievement and cooperation. H. L. Gantt whose *Organizing for Work* was written in the same vein says, "We have proved in many places that the doctrine of service which has been preached in the churches as religion is not only good economics and eminently practical, but because of the increased production of goods obtained by it, promises to lead us safely through the maze of confusion into which we seem to be headed, and to give us that industrial democracy which alone can afford a basis for industrial peace." [17] Thus Cooley, the sociologist, and Gantt, the efficiency engineer, agree on the effectiveness of social motivation.

Various men of affairs have had theories in regard to the effectiveness of particular motives. James Logan, an extensive manufacturer, wrote almost a decade ago that the aim in handling men is to bring about a "family feeling." "The best way to hold them is to know them. . . . It is important not to drive. Fear of the boss never inspired any real team work, and no good working force was ever built up without team work. The men in positions of responsibility must make the men under them really want to work with and for them." [18] Henry Ford, speaking of loyalty as a motive has said, "It is the easiest thing in the world to inspire this loyalty, but it's not to be done by any trick. It's simply a matter of honest and sincere understanding of the workman's interests, a recognition of his ambitions as a human being. If your men feel that is your attitude toward them they will do their best every hour of the day." [19]

Both these men of affairs, while they have undoubtedly oversimplified the problem of motivation, stress the importance of developing certain desirable *attitudes*[20] of men toward those men with and for whom they work. Thus the phenomena of motivation are regarded by them as social in nature and as socially conditioned.

17. H. L. Gantt, *Organising for Work*, p. 104.

18. James Logan, *System*, December, 1916. Vol. xxx, No. 6.

19. Henry Ford, *System*, November, 1916. Vol. xxx, No. 5.

20. *Cf.* Floyd H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 244-7. Charles A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society*, p. 446.

Helen Marot, of the Bureau of Educational Experiments, has endeavored to distinguish between the creative and the social motive. "The creative impulse," she writes, "is concerned with the transforming of a concept or some material into an expanded concept or a new object." Since the creative impulse finds its satisfaction in the process of completion it is not necessarily social. It may be social, however, if the concept which is transformed and expanded is itself social, or if a group of people "associate cordially and freely together with a single creative purpose." The social impulse, Miss Marot claims, is associated with the *use* of the concept or objects created. "A man who is interested in the use or application of a product, the value it has for others, possesses a social impulse as well as the creative." [21]

Social Motivation Complexes.[22] The foregoing illustrations demonstrate the fact that social motivation is a complex and not a single phenomenon. Business men, engineers, statesmen, such as W. L. Mackenzie King, and social scientists are studying it. Since the phenomena involved are social, a sociology is needed that can be practically applied to the study of personal and group competition, the effect of mutual participation in reward and in management, schemes of promotion (subordination, co-ordination and super-ordination)[23] and even the increase of "wants" or the desire for higher standards of living. Since the phenomena are complex, sociology must deal with these as socially stimulated social interactions.

The Young Women's Christian Association for instance has made some excellent studies of the motives of employed women. They realize that any satisfactory adjustment of women to their employment must take into account the motives which prompt them to seek employment. These studies have revealed the existence of typical or normal combinations of specific motives which enter into the employment motivation. The total motivation is a compound

21. Helen Marot, *The Creative Impulse in Industry*, pp. 136-7.

22. The term "complex" does not relate to "complex formations" or to any of the uses of the term "complex" by psychoanalysts to describe the results of suppressed desire.

23. *Cf.* Hugo Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, pp. 259-64.

or complex made up of more specific motivations and is worthy of the name *social motivation complex.* There are women, for instance, whose motivation for entering into employment might be something like the following: social-economic independence, 60 per cent, tired of school, 10 per cent, going with women, 20 per cent, pressure (social) at home, 10 per cent. If this were a correct analysis, it would represent something like a weighted formula of the social motivation complex which stimulated the women to enter industrial employment.

There is also the promise of some studies in motivation and motivation complexes in community life. To date, most community surveys have contributed little save demotic composition, physical environment, customs and institutions. The Institute for Social and Religious Research has been doing preliminary research looking toward the analysis of motivation which is intimately associated with the development of attitudes. Research workers in this institute are endeavoring to analyze such practical questions as what attitudes do people have toward religious institutions, why do they have them and how should they be dealt with? Their investigation shows that attitudes toward religion are associated with attitudes toward other social institutions and that all attitudes are related products of a social heritage. Their studies of social motivation in rural communities are concrete evidence that the study of attitudes is an essential part of the study of social motivation.[24]

Any sociological study of motivation must therefore take into account, concerning attitudes—their social origins, their interaction, their social and societal conditioning and their reduction and release.[25] Applied sociology will probably approach the study of social motivation by studies in the relation of attitudes to conditioning factors.

Group Morale. The problems of social motivation are some-

24. *Cf.* James Mickel Williams, *Our Rural Heritage: The Social Psychology of Rural Development,* an attempt to analyze and explain historically the attitudes and motives of a considerable part of the rural population of the United States.

25. *Cf.* Floyd H. Allport, *Social Psychology,* pp. 244-7; John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct,* p. 41; H. L. Hollingworth and A. T. Poffenberger, Jr., *Applied Psychology,* p. 229; Robert S. Woodworth, *Psychology,* p. 249.

times described as problems of group morale,[26] esprits de corps, comaraderie, team work and solidarity. In all of these the individual is inspired to action or accelerated in action by the sense of being part of a whole. He is a socius *functioning as an individual* but he is also in sympathetic accord with the plurel[27] of which he is a unit. Sociologists and psychologists have endeavored to factorize these phenomena of the so-called group, crowd or social mind. Empiricists have innumerable "rules" as to how these phenomena may be developed and how they may be used for the attainment of desired ends. Their desirability is obvious. What is needed is a scientific behavior analysis that will make it possible to produce superior "morale" at less expense. Behavioristic sociology must develop a methodology adequate for this task. Behavioristic psychology and social statistics have already made invaluable contributions to the methodology which the behavioristic sociologists are projecting for this purpose. Great care must be taken in the analysis lest these phenomena of group morale be regarded as those of merely concurrent multi-individual behavior. Very often they are modified by established human relationships properly called societal. It is possible to discover physical conditions and circumstances which contribute to, detract from, or in various ways influence group morale. We are led to believe, for instance, that certain conditions in trade inspire "confidence" and that confidence, however brought about, is in turn a motivating factor in business. Is there a calculable relationship between economic conditions and "confidence," and is there in turn a calculable effect of confidence as a stimulus to other social motivation?

Morale, used in the broad sense of the word,[28] is the result of what Georg Simmel has described as "reciprocal influencing" and "social interaction."[29] Giddings regards it as a result of "inter-

26. Franklin H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, ch. xvi.

27. *Ibid*, 92, 251, 268.

28. *Ibid*, ch. xvi.

29. Georg Simmel, *Soziologie;* see trans. by Albion Small of chapter on interaction in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol xv (1909), pp. 296-8; iii (1898), pp. 667-83. Compare this with M. P. Follette's "reciprocal conditioning" as described in *The New State*.

stimulation" [80] and as a consequence of "conditions and circumstances" that may be altered as a means of producing changes in "morale." [81] Changes in morale are frequently associated with characteristic series of interstimulation or interaction. That is, there appear to be normal and typical sequences of interstimulation which build up or undermine morale. Like a fever, once started, they must "run their course"; complications are liable to occur at certain stages; and interference with the "course" is likely to precipitate serious crises. These *interstimulation sequences,* if they may be so designated, can by the development of the proper type of sociology, be specifically identified, by recognizable symptoms, and the best treatment for the attainment of desired ends experimentally discovered.

These interstimulation sequences are more than mere "combinations" of stimulation and reaction within a group. There is an order which they tend to follow. In a sense they are *stimulation permutations* or perhaps even more accurately *interaction permutations.* We need a practically applicable sociology of interstimulation sequences or interaction permutations; a sociology that will reveal ways and means of setting off specific social processes that once started, will tend to "run their course," as well as a sociology that will endeavor to treat social processes that are running their course regardless of whether the course is or is not desired.

Emil Durkheim stressed the practical significance of social solidarity in industrial society, not only in a general way, as Le Bon had done, but as a phenomenon of specific small groups. Le Bon developed the idea of social solidarity as a phenomenon of large political groups. With this Durkheim agrees, but he also holds that the *collective or common consciousness* is an even more evident phenomenon of specific smaller groupings within the state. This common consciousness, he urges, is something else (*autre chose*) than particular consciousness although it is realized only through individuals. He says:

80. Franklin H. Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology,* bk. ii, pt. ii, ch. i.

81. *Ibid, Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* ch. xvi.

> It is the psychic type of society,—a type which has its own properties, conditions of existence, mode of development, just as individuals have, but of a different kind. By virtue of this it has a right to be designated by a special word.[32]

Durkheim's idea is that "The study of these solidarities is the special province of sociology." [33]

The use of Durkheim's theories, as hypotheses, in the observation of small groups seems to offer possibilities for the development of a specific and concrete sociology of solidarity, collective or common consciousness, and group morale. In this connection, it is interesting to note that a Durkheim revival is taking place in France for which purpose there has been organized L'Institut Français de Sociologie. The society promises to renew the regular publication of L'Année Sociologique and to revive the frequent publication of the Collection des Travaux de L'Année. Such a revival offers splendid possibilities for the development of ways and means of attaining and maintaining solidarity and morale in small and large groups, as well as for studying practical ways and means of using morale.

There is reason to believe that sociology has arrived at the place where, if it be given adequate opportunity, it can study the effect of variations in conditioning circumstances upon group morale, confidence, esprits de corps, etc., in such ways as to determine with practical accuracy the social consequences of specific change in circumstance. The World War placed a high premium on morale. The records of the war abound in experiments in building up, maintaining, and repairing the morale of the army. This was one of the most difficult and important tasks undertaken during the war. But the task is not limited to armies or to the time of war. Every aggressive social group has problems of morale. They are found on the college campus, in the political party, in the religious congregation, in the labor union, and in the business organization. In Giddings' statement of the "Further Inquiries of Sociology," five

32. Emil Durkheim, *De la Division du Travail Social*, p. 84.

33. *Ibid*, p. 69.

out of thirty concern morale. In the same article he states that a sociologist "must be technically trained in the behavioristic psychology and in statistics and he must keep in touch . . . . with the workers in religion, ethics and education who are the technicians in morale." [34] Sociologists are developing methods for making quantitative behavioristic studies of the relation between economic changes and changes in group morale.[35]

Morale is usually a complex phenomenon of social interaction resulting from a number and often from a variety of conditions and circumstances. It may be spoken of as a "resultant" of multiple stimulation. It is not a direct response to any one stimulus but is rather a resultant behavior in which the responses to the various stimuli condition one another. It may be that in practical sociology we shall be able to work out ways and means of calculating resultants of multiple stimulation of groups, especially when these eventuate in as distinct a phenomenon as morale. Pending the working out of ways and means of accomplishing this complicated and difficult task, practically minded sociologists are likely to find satisfaction in studying the consequences of adding to or subtracting from the specific stimuli which are believed to determine a particular morale. Another practical approach may be found in the working out of specific pragmatic tests of the laws of sympathy and of the theories of collective consciousness or of consciousness of kind.[36]

But morale is itself a conditioning factor, its use is quite as important a consideration as are the methods by which it is attained. Practically minded sociologists will need to know how to use morale as well as how to build it up. And although morale is a complex

34. Ibid, p. 300. *Cf.* C. Luther Fry, *Diagnosing the Rural Church, passim,* includes a study of how and to what extent church life is correlated with economic prosperity.

35. e. g. To the extent that divorce is an index of a breakdown or change in family morale, the study of "The Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain Social Conditions," by William F. Ogburn and Dorothy S. Thomas, may be regarded as an effort to analyze the effect of an economic circumstance on the morale of the family, *Amer. Journ. Statistics,* vol. xviii, no. 139.

36. Cf. Franklin H. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology,* bk. ii, pt. ii, ch. iii; *Scientific Study of Human Society,* "The Significance of Casual Groups," ch. vii, includes experiments in quantitative analysis of consciousness of kind.

phenomenon many empirical theories exist as to how it may be capitalized. These theories bear sufficient pragmatic sanction to justify the careful scrutiny of sociologists. For although it is not likely that they can be justified by methods of accurate correlation, they may have a value in terms of the probable consequences of any specific use of morale.

Conduct Levels. Whenever a group of unacquainted people come together for the first time, the members invariably feel their way toward a *conduct level.*[37] Sometimes the group needs several meetings before it can reach any effective conduct level. Finding a conduct level may be a trying out of what one "can get away with." It may be a feeling for a "tone" or a reach for a harmony or concord. It is always a mutual appreciation process and an endeavor to establish some perceived resemblances as a basis of a group consciousness. Perhaps the group is merely a club in a settlement house; perhaps it is a committee. If it happens to be a national congress or an international conference the problem is quite the same. It is the effort of the various members to find the level on which they can best do business with one another or the plane in which the process of interaction yields the greatest pleasure to each and to all. Perhaps it would be technically more correct to describe this as a plane of social equilibration. The fact is that in everything from a committee and a social club to formal dinners and conventions there is always the problem of establishing, maintaining and re-establishing conduct level. At times entire nations in some new situation have to establish or re-establish a conduct level. Any one who has to deal with continuous, cumulative or progressive sequences of interstimulation is familiar with the problems of the conduct level.

The advantages of a high conduct level are self evident, and the advantages of stability as opposed to variability in conduct levels are almost as evident. With this in mind it is significant to note that often very small incidents temporarily may completely upset and definitely lower the conduct level of groups of people. In a settlement house group a spontaneous reaction to vulgar humor may

87. An extended study of conduct levels is now being made by Mary Elizabeth Johnson.

cause a drop in the conduct level sufficient to wreck the integrity of the group. In committees, a single individual through carelessness and indifference can sometimes bring the conduct level of the committee down to his own. Everywhere in business men are seeking conduct levels. It is not uncommon for men to talk about the plane on which they do business.

A vast amount of sociological and psychological theory is now available which the sociologist may use in working out practical procedures for the maintenance and elevation of conduct levels. There is scarcely a more universal problem in practical sociology than that of the maintenance or change of conduct levels in all the multitudes of minor and major group activities. Unlimited possibilities of usefulness exist for a systematized presentation of the ways and means whereby all the various types of small groups may maintain or elevate their conduct levels.

The popularly satisfactory conduct level is one of maximum interstimulation. It may range from the turbulent conviviality of a play group to the meeting of minds in a university seminar. If the level moves from what Giddings has called the ideo-motor towards the critically-intellectual or rationalistic it can be said to rise to and become a superior conduct level.

The higher levels have greater possibilities for understanding and cooperation than the lower levels. They may be attained by adding to the "ability" of a group by increases in membership or by stimulation of the group, and especially by stimuli that affect the attitudes of the group members.

Normalcy. The normal frequency distribution of the characteristics of individuals is evident to the most casual observer and is one of the first principles with which business men must familiarize themselves. The haberdasher soon learns that he needs to carry but a light stock of shirts and collars in sizes 13½ and 17 inch, but that there is constantly a demand for size 15. A similar situation holds true in all "sized" wearing apparel. Ordinarily when a business man puts in an order for "assorted sizes" he expects these sizes to correspond to the normal distribution of demand. The retailer's

usual complaint is that he becomes overloaded with extreme sizes and is forced to sell them at a sacrifice.

Demand in the instance just cited is based upon biological characteristics. It cannot be changed except by a corresponding change of patrons. Sometimes where the patronage is small or where it includes a large number of a particular type, youths or orientals, policemen or stalwart Danes, a marked difference is observed between the demand and the normal assortment of sizes. The demand is abnormal, and if it were plotted it would be represented by a skewed curve. The business man must learn to calculate the biases of this sort which effect the demand of his patronage.

The emotional and mental characteristics of human beings also tend to be distributed symmetrically around norms. As a consequence, we get typical or modal behavior when groups of the same kind of persons are exposed to common or like stimulation. To the extent that normalcy of behavior is due to a normal frequency of distribution of physiological characteristics, it is difficult to change, and the business man must learn to adjust himself to it or to change the personnel of his patrons. If abnormality of emotional or mental behavior is present due to physiological characteristics, he must adapt himself in the same way.

In practice there are times when business profits from making abnormal demands normal, and there are other times when abnormal demand is very desirable. Within limits, behavior can be made normal or abnormal by changes in stimulation. Attempts to do this are among the most frequent experiments of business. But they need to be refined. Vague opinions must be supplanted by reasoning based on evidence. Behavior must be plotted in "arrays" or in "frequency distribution curves." "Skewness" must be analyzed and "scatter" and "deviations" carefully calculated. By such procedures it will be possible not only to discover what factors influence behavior towards or from normalcy, but also to calculate the probable effects that the application of certain stimuli will have in producing normal or abnormal social behavior.

The experiments described by Allport in Chapter XI of his *Social*

Psychology clearly illustrate the tendency of individuals working in groups to conform to type. It is one of the simplest and most prevalent characteristics of social behavior. Allport has a number of individuals respond concurrently to similar situations. Sometimes the stimulation is given when the individuals are separated or isolated from one another and sometimes in the presence of each other. In the group tests the facility of those who were slowest in individual tests increased and that of those who were highest in individual tests decreased. There was no interstimulation other than the awareness of concurrent like behavior. The more fixed the relations and the more intimate the previous associations the more apparent was the tendency to normalcy, even when proper consideration was given to the part played by rivalry. Increased interaction among the members of the group appeared to increase normalcy.

Sociology should and doubtless can provide means whereby normalcy may be studied to practical as well as theoretical advantage. It should make possible studies of the causes of normalcy, its advantages and disadvantages, and the adjustments necessary to accentuate the tendency to normalcy. Such studies should include calculations of the premium which society places on normal behavior of specific groups in particular circumstances. They should include estimates of the effect of inherent limitations of normalcy on demand, not only for material things but for educational, political, religious, and esthetic satisfactions. The practical problem of all leaders in art, music, literature and in educational, religious and every other social and esthetic activity is to adjust themselves to the demands of normalcy. There should be social and economic studies of the costs of normalcy and the value of normalcy for purposes of general distribution and consumption. A sociology is needed that will be useful for capitalizing the advantages and for minimizing the disadvantages of normalcy of demand.

In any scheme for social engineering it is necessary to calculate the pressure which inherent normalcy will bear or the resistance which it will offer to different types of stimulation.

Stimulation Ascendency. Applied sociology will deal not only with changes in human relationships and in social behavior as responses to stimulation but as stimuli to further social behavior. The social stimuli of social behavior and the responses to them become a primary consideration of both general and applied sociology. They are much more complex than mere human interactions described by Darwin, Simmel, Romanes, Dugas, Max Müller, Wundt, and Allport. Group behavior may have the effect of a single stimulus. The mere existence or the presence of a group may affect the behavior of individuals, of other groups, or even of itself (by auto-stimulation). Perhaps this type of stimulation should be called societal stimulation in order to distinguish it as a species from the genus social stimulation. We do not presume at this point to discuss the practical implications of societal stimulation. The statements just made serve to indicate another line of sociological investigation that seems to offer possibilities of practical usefulness, but they are stated at this point only to prepare the way for a few remarks concerning stimulation ascendency.

Stimulation ascendency, while it is a phenomenon common to all multi-stimulation, is of especial importance in connection with social stimulation. The attention of the reader has been called to the fact that group responses to stimulation are seldom entirely single or even easily isolated. They appear in "resultants" which are likely to follow laws akin to those of physical, chemical, biological and psychological synthesis. Attention is now called to the fact that stimuli are themselves seldom isolated and independent and that different proportions and arrangements of the very same stimuli may call forth responses of a very different sort. This is due to the fact that stimuli neutralize and reinforce one another so that combinations of stimuli may take on characteristics, not inherent in any one or in all of the particular stimuli. This is especially true in multi-social stimulations.

There is reason to believe that in the daily common practice of social control use is made of relatively involved stimulation complexes, known to empiricists by the domination or the ascendency

of a particular stimulus over the other stimuli entering into the stimulation complex. It is suggested, therefore, that a careful study of the complex stimulation entities which empiricists have found practically useful may lead to the discovery of very significant stimulation complexes which may be classified with profit in terms of the ascendent stimuli in the complexes. Some sociologists may feel that the problem of stimulation ascendency whenever it is an antecedent to social response is a problem of sociology. Certainly no sociologists would fail to admit that problems of stimulation ascendency in relation to social or societal stimulation of change in human relations or social behavior are problems of sociology. It may be that the study of stimulation complexes in terms of stimulation ascendency will prove to be an effective method for general sociology. It seems highly probable that in many cases it will be a more useful method in practical procedure than the attempt completely to analyze the value of each stimulant in a combination or complex.

Social Dynamogenesis. The psychologists use the term *dynamogenesis*[38] to describe reinforcements to reflexes and to voluntary reactions which are the result of a properly timed additional stimulus. Behavior which is the consequence of one stimulation or complex of stimulations may be greatly modified by a quite different stimulation if the latter be properly timed. The exactness of the timing in dynamogenesis is as important as is the spark (stimulation) in the explosions of a gasoline engine. Timed in one way they accelerate and timed in another way they retard the action of the engine. It has been shown, for instance, "that a reflex action, e. g., the knee jerk, which normally occurs when the knee is struck a light blow, will be more violent if a beam of light be allowed to fall on the eye or a sound to strike the ear at the proper moment." A similar quickening is noticed when a light or sound stimulus is applied at the right time to a voluntary movement of the fingers. The phenomenon just described is in no sense social for it may

38. H. L. Hollingworth and A. T. Poffenberger, *Applied Psychology*, p. 133; John B. Watson, *Psychology: From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, pp. 399-401; William James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 379.

happen to an individual in complete isolation. There is however a social phenomenon so nearly like this that it seems quite proper to call it social dynamogenesis. Accelerations and retardations of pluralistic and co-individual behavior occur which are strangely affected by very slight stimulations, provided the latter be properly timed. Any one who is familiar with the phenomena of religious revivals, political mass meetings, riots, stock markets, forums or bargain counters has often seen social dynamogenesis. A most complex and involved process of interstimulation may be diverted or almost miraculously intensified by some very minor stimulus, perhaps merely a cough or a sneeze, or perhaps even some mere mechanical phenomenon. The effects of these auxiliary stimuli may be distraction or intensification according to their timeliness. Every social artist is keenly sensitive to the fact that soft music and tinted lights are effective in proportion to their timeliness. An exclamation, a sob, a shot or the waving of the flag will change a tragedy to a comedy if there be an error of but a few seconds in the timing. Not alone in a large and philosophical sense is there a time and tide in the affairs of men. This is true in thousands of specific sequences of social interaction occurring every day. Every one who deals with audiences and congregations, who labors with committees or who handles people in physical or in mental contiguity has learned the importance of timeliness in respect to auxiliary stimulation. Highly dynamic social behavior may often be deflected, restrained or accelerated by relatively slight, if properly timed, auxiliary stimulation. The practical man of affairs who is endeavoring to control social behavior is anxious to know how to cut down the cost of social control. A study of the timing of auxiliary stimulation would doubtless be both materially profitable and sociologically illuminating. In practice, a well-timed auxiliary stimulus will accomplish in distraction or intensification, and as a fitting part of a natural social process, what could otherwise be accomplished (if at all) only by an expensive deflection of the trend.

In the case of social dynamogenesis there are two phases of the

problem. One phase relates to stimuli which have their origin in conditions and circumstances external to the functioning groups. The other relates to internal or self stimulation which may be auxiliary to an interstimulation taking place entirely within the group.

Stimulus Receptivity. A natural sequel to the study of social dynamogenesis would be a study of stimulus receptivity. Owing to the fact that individuals are variables as well as variegates, the response of any individual to any particular stimulus is variable. The variation if described in terms of the individual may be called his *variation in stimulus receptivity.* This, true of individuals, is even more true of groups of individuals. A group which is at one time completely unresponsive to a particular stimulus may at another time react sensitively, completely and perhaps permanently to it. This variability of a group toward the same stimulation might be called its *stimulus receptivity.* In practice it is common to spend days, months and sometimes years to prepare an individual properly to receive certain advices or suggestions; that is, he is made receptive for certain stimulation to which it is desired that he shall react in a particular way. Groups of people may be trained to receptivity of certain types or kinds of stimulation. By a reversion of the process, groups considered unduly receptive may be made immune to stimulation. Although this receptivity and immunity are likely to be temporary and merely phases of a group variation, they may become permanent.

A knowledge of how to diagnose the receptivity or immunity of a group for any particular stimulation would enormously reduce a vast amount of effort now futile because directed against unreceptive groups. On the other hand, the development of certain stimulation immunities might be much less expensive than the removal of undesirable stimuli. The development of immunities to manias[89] or to cheap "scare" propaganda would be much more economical and probably much more effective than any effort to regulate all the sources of stimulation. On the other hand the proper prepara-

89. Boris Sidis, *Psychology of Suggestion,* ch. xxxii, Financial Crazes; ch. xxxiii, American Mental Epidemics.

tion of the minds of estranged operators and employees to receive a suggestion of conciliation or arbitration assures the desired response to the suggestion. Brilliant examples of preparation for stimulation receptivity occur frequently in national political conventions.

Boards, Commissions, Conferences, Conventions and Committees. The number and cost of conferences, conventions and committee meetings are rapidly increasing. The *committee,* broadly interpreted, includes trustees, councils, boards, commissions, congresses, assemblies, conventions, and various other control groups as well as lesser and subsidiary committees.[40] Of the meetings of such *committees* there is no end. They range from the casual small local meetings to international and ecumenical conventions. Business, politics, education, and religion abound in committees and every new development in arts and sciences gives rise to more of them.[41] Millions of dollars are expended annually for committees, and untold hours of the best minds in the world are spent in meetings. We need a sociology that will deal intimately and adequately with the composition arrangement and functioning of *committees.*[42] Such a sociology must make it possible to determine just how many and what persons should be brought together for committee purposes. It should deal with the matter of arrangements of members, physical[43]

40. Juries are in a sense committees. The processes by which juries come to a collective decision and the causes of failure to agree would form a most interesting and useful chapter in a sociology of committees.

41. Edward E. Hunt, *Conferences, Committees and Conventions; and How to Run Them.* Re number meetings see intro. pp. x-xiii; re cost see p. 8.

42. For discussions revealing the need of a sociology of committees and conventions in commerce and trade, see the articles in *System,* the *Magazine of Business,* "Paving the Way for a Successful Sales Conference," Aug. 1924; "Starting the Convention Many Months Before it Meets," Feb. 1923; "When a National Sales Conference Pays," Nov. 1924; see also *Printers Ink Monthly,* esp. Mar. 1923, p 33 et seq.; 44 et seq.; July, 1923, p. 43 et seq.; Mar. 1924, p. 56 et seq.; July, 1924, p. 39 et seq.; Aug. 1924, p. 66 et seq.; Jan. 1925, p. 35 et seq.; p. 104 et seq.

43. Even the physical arrangement of members is important. M. P. Follett, *The New State,* p. 31, says: "Mr. Gladstone must have appreciated the necessity of making conditions favorable to joint thinking, for I am told that at important meetings of the Cabinet he planned beforehand where each member should sit." The physical location of delegations at large political and religious conventions is generally conceded as being a tremendously influential factor in the entire procedure of the conventions. The relative position of the members affects the process of "reciprocal conditioning."

as well as psychological. It should reveal types of committees with form patterns adapted to specific kinds of functioning. It should provide experimental procedures whereby it will be possible to evolve superior group processes. It should deal with all the efforts of members (including chairmen and other designated leaders) to influence the behavior of other members.[44] It should justify extensive research in applied sociology not only because of substantial economies to which it would contribute, but even more so, because of the social achievements which it would make possible.

Summary and Inferences. The foregoing has brought out the fact that the subject matter of sociology is not limited to a comprehensive analysis of anthropological, ethnological and historical phenomena, nor is its application limited to politics or social reform. The theories and principles that have been developed in the analysis of social evolution and in experiments in political and social betterment give promise of usefulness for the practical diagnosis and for the scientific treatment of a variety of specific and intimate social problems of every day life. In other words sociology has practical possibilities for men of affairs who live in what they are pleased to call "the world of reality." It is a science which aids in the solution of every problem of human relations and social behavior. It has practical possibilities as a scientific basis for studying the social factors involved in demand, organization for production, and administration. Its practical value in business and politics as well as in the professions and social work gains recognition in direct proportion to the extent that it is available for the achievement of specific proximate ends.

The use of sociological knowledge as a basis for the achievement of specific proximate ends was not possible until sociology had passed through the formative stages leading to definition and systematization. This task of definition and systematization, together with the working out of theories and generalizations, has

44. *Cf.* H. A. Overstreet, *Influencing Human Behavior;* Frederick E. Lumley, *Means of Social Control;* Arland D. Weeks, *The Control of the Social Mind;* W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking.*

been the primary task of the sociologists of the last two generations. The application of sociology to the accurate analysis of specific social problems was also dependent upon the development of the quantitative or statistical method. The use of this method has already ushered in a new epoch in general and applied economics. It has also been responsible for the development of behavioristic psychology. There is reason to believe that by means of the statistical method and the behavioristic psychology, general sociology will be capable of producing an applied sociology with possibilities for meeting specific, concrete social needs like those mentioned in this and in the preceding chapter.

When sociology demonstrates its capacity for actual usefulness in reducing costs[45] or increasing the returns from a given investment it will enter into a new epoch in its development. Sociology has already demonstrated some of its possibilities of usefulness in the field of social work. These appear in the development of superior diagnosis, more economic and efficient methods of work, and increased dependence on preventive methods. These improvements have been brought about by cooperation between social workers and sociologists. They are to a considerable extent the outgrowth of three types of research, generally described as the case method, the social survey, and sampling. They represent the beginning of an attempt to replace the social reform of sentimentalists by the societal engineering of practical idealists. But social work is not conducted for profit and many of its most important benefits cannot be reduced to tabulations of changed behavior. The difficulty in estimating many of the most important results of social work limit the possibilities of working out ratios between cost and achievement. At best, social workers can divert but a relatively small part of their funds to a search for more economical and more effective methods.

When sociology can demonstrate that it is practically useful for reducing costs and increasing production in those social arts which are financially profitable, it will doubtless receive incomparably

45. *Cf. Waste in Industry,* a report by the Committee on Elimination of Waste in Industry of the Federated American Engineering Societies, published by Federated American Engineering Societies, Washington, D. C., 1921.

larger funds for research, and it will have open to it laboratories in which the practical experiments in methods of industrial social control are planned and executed. The sociology which would be useful to the financially profitable social arts would doubtless be much the same as that which has been useful to the scientifically minded social workers. The development of the possibilities of sociology for usefulness in the commercial social arts should increase its capacity to serve the social reformers in the same way that sociology itself has been enriched by the cooperation of sociologists and social workers. It should be benefited even more by a cooperation between sociologists and those social artists in the world of industry and commerce who have at their disposal large funds for research and experiment.

CHAPTER IV

Useful Formulations of Sociology

Sociologists have made numerous attempts to place sociology more completely at the disposal of those who have expressed their desire for it. These endeavors have frequently resulted in useful formulations of sociology. Occasionally they have been general, but more frequently they have been specific. Thus far, most formulations have developed as a result of attempts to apply sociology to the needs of social workers. There have been no comprehensive efforts to formulate a sociology calculated to meet the needs of business.

Many efforts have been made to bridge the gap between sociological theory and social work. They have been of at least three distinctly different types, (1) those initiated by practically minded sociologists, (2) those attempted by social workers, and (3) those projected by sociologically trained social workers or by social workers in cooperation with sociologists. The efforts of sociologists to put sociology at the disposal of social workers and other social artists have produced treatises which are characteristically sociological. The efforts of social workers to organize the knowledge essential to their work have produced treatises that are technological and often permeated with sound social theory. Cooperation between sociologists and social workers (and the efforts of sociologically trained social workers) have produced practical formulations of social theory in terms of particular social problems or processes.

This chapter deals with the formulations which represent the efforts of sociologists to gather together and present in the form of a general applied sociology the more immediately and specifically useful data and theories of sociology.[1] The next chapter deals with

1. This procedure, the developing of general theory and the applying of it wherever possible, has been clearly stated and repeatedly defended by Rene' Worms. In *Philosophie des sciences sociales,* Paris, 1903, p. 174, he states that the proper procedure is "not to think of application so long as we are pursuing science, but when we have completed our scientific work, to pass immediately to the examination and putting into practice of whatever admits."

those sociological formulations which have been fostered by social workers in cooperation with social theorists. A study of the results of the efforts to bridge the gap between sociology and social work should throw light on the entire problem of the practical applications of sociology, including, of course, its application to the needs of business.

The efforts to state sociological theory in terms adapted to practice have been highly individualistic. This is not surprising since most of the sociological theory has until recently been individualistic. This was the almost inevitable preliminary to extensive cooperative research by the quantitative method. A survey of current works on applied sociology is not likely, therefore, to reveal a comprehensive and coordinated scheme for the development of applied sociology. It does promise to disclose in some detail the concepts which certain of the sociologists have had as to the practicability of sociology. It will at least throw light upon the genesis of applied sociology, and will reveal not only points of origin but also tendencies and trend.

Interesting variety marks the initial attempts of the various sociologists to produce practical or applied sociology. Some of these authors gathered and arranged what seemed to them the most useful sociological data and theories in significant "situations" and added what motion picture producers call "continuity" and "interpretation." Others produced a sort of running commentary on the practical value of various social theories. Still others wrote sociological expositions of all the lesser social problems in terms of the larger problems. Though there have been many different approaches and treatments they all seem to agree (1) that applied sociology, general and specific, must be based upon sound principles of sociology; (2) that specific social problems must be studied as parts of comprehensive social problems; and (3) that applied sociology must be an integral part of all applied science.

Applied Sociology. The term most extensively used to denote those productions of sociologists which were attempts to make sociology applicable, or actually to apply it, has been *applied*

sociology. As early as 1898, Edward Payson wrote *Suggestions Toward Applied Sociology,* an unpretentious volume, but suggestive and not insignificant when the time of its publication is taken into account. The classical work to date with the title *Applied Sociology* is that of Lester F. Ward, of Brown University. Although this work did not appear until 1906, it was almost predicted in his *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883. In 1920 Ward's colleague and successor, James Q. Dealy, published his *Sociology, Its Developments and Applications.* In 1916, Henry Pratt Fairchild of Yale produced his *Outlines of Applied Sociology.* These works although they all purport to deal with applied sociology, are varied in subject matter and diverse in their treatments of the subject. Charles R. Henderson used the terms "applied sociology" and "social technology" interchangeably.[2] Although he wrote no books designated as applied sociology, his activity at the University of Chicago and most of his publications dealt with the application of sociology. For several years Emory S. Bogardus of the University of Southern California has been publishing a *Journal of Applied Sociology.*

Edward Payson. The little volume by Edward Payson published over twenty-five years ago is a move in the direction of applied sociology. In his discussion of the nature and function of applied sociology, he writes as follows (p. 143):

> Having dislodged old and faulty assumptions, the business of applied sociology as a theory is to replace these with new assumptions, and as rapidly as may be, follow this by a readjustment of practice to theory making use of such deductive and inductive proofs as may speedily show either the uselessness or advantages of the changes proposed.

He makes a valid and necessary distinction between (1) applied sociology as a body of usable sociological knowledge and (2) the application of the theory (*a*) to the readjustment of prevailing social practices and (*b*) to the practical sociological analysis of proposed social changes. The latter chapters of his book are devoted to a

2. "Applied Sociology (or Social Technology)", *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xviii, p. 215. Also, "The Scope of Social Technology" in vol. vi, p. 465. Compare Albion W. Small, *General Sociology,* part ix.

"demonstration" of how "criminal law, education and public philanthropy may be taken to illustrate the possibilities of an applied science of sociology, under which these branches may be made to depend upon sensible fact instead of upon fact and assumption inextricably woven."

Lester F. Ward was one of the first and foremost of optimistic American sociologists. He continually and indefatigably urged the possibilities of the modification of social conditions, relations and processes.[3] The fact that we disagree with his idea of the mutual inclusiveness of ethics and applied sociology must in no way be interpreted as an effort to discredit the fact that Ward has made a valuable contribution to the development of applied sociology. His *Applied Sociology* continues to be unique and widely read. It is regarded by many as the outstanding work on this subject. His discriminating use of the term "applied sociology" as distinguished from "pure sociology" seems to have commenced about 1898 or 1899. Some sociologists contend that he was the first American sociologist to make this distinction. In the opening sentence of his *Pure Sociology* he declares that the terms "pure" and "applied" may be used in sociology in the same sense as in other sciences and that "pure science is theoretical, applied science practical." With this distinction it seems impossible to find fault. The difficulties come with his actual extension of this idea. No more explicit and condensed statement of his conception of the nature, scope and function of applied sociology can be given than that contained in the following excerpt from the *Applied Sociology*.

> Just as pure sociology aims to answer the questions What, Why and How, so applied sociology aims to answer the question What for. The former deals with facts, causes and principles, the latter with the object, end or purpose. The one treats the subject matter of sociology, the other its use.

3. Even Ludwig Gumplowicz confessed after Ward's visit to Graz in 1903 that he was compelled to admit, on account of the force of Ward's argument, that "the eternal iron laws" of the "social nature process" are modified by the help of the human intellect, itself "also a natural force." See Ludwig Gumplowicz, "An Austrian Appreciation of Lester F. Ward," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. x, pp. 643-53.

> However theoretical pure sociology may be in some of its aspects, applied sociology is essentially practical. It appeals directly to interest. It has to do with social ideals, with ethical considerations, with what ought to be. While pure sociology treats of the "spontaneous development of society" applied sociology "deals with the artificial means of accelerating the spontaneous processes of nature." The subject-matter of pure sociology is achievement, that of applied sociology is improvement. The former relates to the past and to the present, the latter to the future. Achievement is individual. Improvement is social. Applied sociology takes account of artificial phenomena consciously and intentionally directed by society to bettering society. Improvement is social achievement. In pure sociology the point of view is purely objective. It may be said to relate to social function. In applied sociology the point of view is subjective. It relates to feeling,—the collective well-being. In pure sociology the desires and wants of men are considered as the motor agencies of society. In applied sociology they are considered as the sources of enjoyment through their satisfaction. The distinction is similar to that between production and consumption in economics. Indeed, applied sociology may be said to deal with social utility as measured by the satisfaction of desire.[4]

If the ethical implications are eliminated from the above statement there remain some very real contributions to the fundamental difference between "pure" and "applied" sociology. Men's "desires" are not necessarily idealistic or social-ethical. Man may desire to use scientific methods for very selfish and perhaps even anti-social ends. As he desires to use chemistry for wanton human slaughter, so, he may desire to use sociology to devise more efficient collective procedures by which to effect the slaughter. Either individuals or groups may desire to use applied sociology for anti-social purposes and for the immediate satisfaction of self interest.

Sociology, developed and organized so as to be practically useful, will undoubtedly make possible "production" and increase "achievement" and "improvement." But the social "product" may be anything good or bad for which there is sufficient demand. It is

4. Lester F. Ward, *Applied Sociology*, p. 5, 6. Compare this concept of "utility" with the discussion *supra*, p. 71.

true that demand and desire can themselves be changed. This, however, is the task of ethical, educational and religious institutions. These institutions will find general sociology useful for the determination of their objectives, but they will need a specially organized "applied sociology" to work out ways and means of achievement.

Ward's statement that applied sociology relates to the future and that pure sociology relates to the past is even more significant if it means that pure sociology is primarily historical and descriptive and in that sense deals with the past and some of the present (or immediate past), while applied sociology is a science of probabilities and in that sense deals with the future. This interpretation is in direct line with Ward's general practice throughout his writings. Ward also claims that applied sociology deals particularly with artificial social processes. However, his "pure sociology" is primarily a *description* of these artificial social processes and ways and means of accelerating them. Therefore, when he states that applied sociology *deals with* the means of accelerating social processes, it is evident that *deals with* is not the equivalent of *describes*. A general perusal of his works justifies reading into the phrase *deals with* such ideas as *makes possible* or *is practically useful for*. To the extent that these inferences are correct, Ward maintains the thesis that applied sociology must serve the social arts.

In summary, Ward's conception of applied sociology, independent of its ethical connotations, is that it must be practically useful in bringing to pass deliberate artificial accelerations of social change based upon the prediction of the future in terms of probabilities scientifically ascertained from studies of the past and present.

James Q. Dealey, who succeeded Ward at Brown University, and who collaborated with him in publication, does not make a similarly clear distinction between *pure* and *applied* sociology in his *Sociology, Its Development and Applications*. He speaks of the application of sociology to practical problems as the application of general principles (p. 44) or of teachings (pp. 49-57) of sociology to studies of social conditions. He writes:

> If one knows quite fully by observation and comparison a field of social phenomena, and is familiar with the law of its development, or evolution, and in addition, comprehends the principles underlying such phenomena, he would then be prepared to go one step further and to show how such principles may be applied in studies of social conditions, so as to produce modifications in these in any desired direction. Like the formulæ of chemistry, certain combinations under certain conditions should produce certain results. . . . . When in any science desired results can invariably be attained at the will of the scientist he has reached the acme of scientific accuracy.

In this statement his use of *desire* carries no ethical connotation. He regards the relation of applied sociology to pure sociology as the relation generally existing between the pure and the applied sciences. His idea of the development of an "applied science of sociology" appears to be limited to the application of the teachings of general sociology to present conditions. On this point he is not clear, for he considers it to be part of the task of sociology (general or at least undifferentiated) "to work out empirically improvements in the situation." A science (pure or applied) does not work out improvements. It may be *used* to work out changes which may or may not be in any ultimate sense improvements.

Henry Pratt Fairchild in his *Outline of Applied Sociology* calls attention to the danger of working out social problems as if each problem were detached. He has endeavored to show the "interrelationships" of social problems and thereby make more of general sociology available for their study. He also takes the stand that the same relation should exist between "pure" and "applied" in sociology as is common in other sciences. He does not distinguish between applied sociology as a specially organized body of sociology and the application of sociology as a practice. Following Ward's suggestion he describes the function of applied sociology in terms of good and bad, better and pernicious. Thus, in a strictly scientific sense, he mars his otherwise excellent statement of the function of applied sociology: "It is not so much concerned with finding out why society is as it is, as with determining how society can be

made different from what it is—better than it is." There is a nice and fundamental discrimination in this presentation, but it is weakened by the addition of the phrase "better than it is." Applied sociology cannot be limited to producing such changes as are better. Even wishful thinking cannot change the function of the applied sciences.

Journals of Applied Sociology. Three periodicals are now being published, each of which is an effort to work out effective relations between the theory and the practice of sociology. The oldest and the first in the field is *The Survey.*[5] The other two are recent, and, although originally intended to deal primarily with regional social problems, they have already assumed national importance. One is the *Journal of Applied Sociology*[6] and the other is *The Journal of Social Forces.*[7] All three of these periodicals have been and are edited by sociologists who are endeavoring to make sociology practically useful and at the same time to enrich and perfect sociology generally. Various journals, sociological, psychological, anthropological, statistical and ethical and especially the *American Journal of Sociology*[8] deal occasionally with the numerous problems of the application of sociology. There are, in addition to these, many periodicals treating the application of sociology to particular problems such as the family, community, child welfare, women in industry, etc. Certain of these will be reviewed in the following chapter which is devoted to the formulations of sociology for use in specific problems. The journals mentioned in this paragraph should be considered as factors now effective in the integration of a general applied sociology.

5. *Charities Review* (1891) monthly. *Charities* (1897) weekly. *The Survey* (1909). At present, *The Survey*, semi-monthly, as "A journal of social, civic and industrial welfare and the public health" and *The Survey Graphic*, monthly, "An illustrated magazine of social exploration, reaching out to wherever tides of generous progress are astir."

6. First published (1916 to 1921) as *Monographs and News Notes.* Since October, 1921, vol. vi, no. 1, published bi-monthly as the *Journal of Applied Sociology*, University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles, California.

7. First published November, 1922, and by the University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Published quarterly since Sept., 1925.

8. The official publication of the American Sociological Society, published bi-monthly since July, 1895, by the University of Chicago Press.

The *Journal of Applied Sociology* is a product of the activities of the Southern California Sociological Society, organized in 1916 for "the increase and diffusion of sociological knowledge through research, discussion and publication." It is edited by the head of the Department of Sociology of the University of Southern California and the associate editors are members of the regular staff of the department. It is a distinct effort on the part of a university department of sociology to develop an applied sociology. According to the president of the Southern California Sociological Society, the journal takes its name and function from the usage of "applied sociology" established by Lester F. Ward.[9] It is a deliberate "striving to bind all persons who are interested in applied sociology into a closer union", and, as such, is, of course, an active agent for the promotion of research in applied sociology and the assembling and exchange of practically useful sociology.

The *Journal of Social Forces* emphasizes social movement, action, processes and forces. The scope and grasp of its work is contained in its "effective objectives" appearing among the editorials of the first volume.[10] "The Journal," writes Professor Odum, the editor, "seeks to obtain effective objectives, some more specific, some more general. To make definite, concrete and substantial contributions to present day critical problems of American Democracy, and to make usable to the people important facts and discussion of social life and progress is one purpose." Stating it otherwise, "the *Journal* will seek to contribute something in theory, something in application toward making democracy effective in unequal places." It promises to attempt to discover and to emphasize wherever possible that social theory "which has a content that is institutional—such theory draws the sociologist, the historian, the economist, the modern psychologist and the modern student of ethics together." This periodical is an attempt by the sociology department of the University of North Carolina to make sociology practically available especially in North Carolina and wherever similar social problems are found.

9. *Journal of Applied Sociology*, vol. vi, no. 1, pp. 1, 2.
10. *Journal of Social Forces*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 56-7.

The Survey has met an extensive and growing need. The size of its subscription lists (general and student) is a manifestation of the desire for an effective medium for the exchange of practicable sociological information and for a medium of interpretation between the theorizers and the practitioners in the field of social problems. It has aimed to fulfill a synthetic function in the field of applied sociology, (1) by conserving those integrations which are the natural results of the exchange (equilibration) of experience and (2) by relating particular social empiricisms to the theory of sociology. On the occasion of its tenth anniversary, the *Survey* attempted to appraise and to describe its function. This description represents ten years of intimate experience with the problem of using social theory for the analysis and treatment of concrete social situations and is, therefore, worthy of special consideration as an index to the trend of the application of sociology during those years. The following two paragraphs from the *Survey's* description of its function are especially suggestive:

> It is oftener easier to visualize what is at once a prospect, a problem and a project—by means of comparison. Let us turn to the field of engineering in this instance. There are civil engineers and mechanical engineers, electrical engineers, mining engineers, chemical engineers, industrial engineers. No doubt others. Each branch has its own concerns; all have much in common; and the public has a stake in the larger bearings of the engineering.
>
> *The Survey* long since gave up endeavoring to serve as a trade journal in the specialized fields of social work comparable to the specialized divisions of engineering which have been named. To do so would have been to attempt the impossible —like an omnibus trade journal specializing at once in chemistry, mechanics, electricity, coal-mining, metallurgy and architecture. Perhaps fifty separate technical journals have grown up to meet the need in our own broad field—Industrial Hygiene, Mental Hygiene, Social Hygiene, the Modern Hospital, the Journal of Nursing, School and Society, the Family, the American City, the Journal of Criminology and Criminal Law and so to the end of the list. . . .
>
> What we seek to do in the *Survey Mid-Monthly* is to serve as a common denominator—to do a synthetic job. . . . .

In other words *The Survey* is a journal of general applied sociology (including of course applied psychology, economics, politics, etc.), contributing to all the variegated activities of what is commonly designated as social work. Its experience tends to substantiate four generalizations; first, social work, like all other social art, must be put on a basis of engineering; second, there is a difference between *general* applied sociology and *specialized* applied sociology; third, there is a difference between applied sociology and that technology of social work which depends on the application of many special sciences; and fourth, there is need for "common denominators" that will enable social workers, technologists and sociologists to clear their information.

All three of these magazines stress the need of sociological research for the building up of a practically applicable body of sociology. Their activities in stimulating research and disseminating its results will undoubtedly aid in accumulating sociological data for organization into an applied sociology.

Thus within the last twenty-five years and especially within the last few years notable efforts have been made both to publish in book form and to accumulate in periodicals the data of usable sociology, often with the avowed purpose and generally with at least the implied purpose of developing between the generalizations of pure sociology and the specific and concrete needs of social work that which has been described as "applied sociology."

Practical Sociology. About the same time that the phrase *applied sociology* came into vogue in this country, the term *practical sociology* was used by each of two distinguished statistical sociologists—by Richard Mayo-Smith at least as early as 1895 and by Carroll D. Wright as early as 1899. This practical sociology was another effort to work out a scheme for the use of sociology. Just which of the two terms, *practical* or *applied*, will ultimately prevail is probably a matter which will have to be determined by usage. Both may continue in good use. The really exact term for this body of knowledge would probably be *practicable sociology* but there are too many usages to the contrary to permit the use of this term.

Carroll D. Wright in his remarkable work entitled *Outline of Practical Sociology* assembled much of the best sociological data of his day in such form as to make it capable of practical sociological interpretation. He believed that it was unnecessary to wait until the sociological theories were completely developed before attempting to make practical use of them. Therefore, he selected what he believed to be the most immediately useful theories of sociology and used them as a setting in which to present statistical and other concrete specific sociological data. The major divisions of this work were those of a prophet for they are in accord with the most acceptable outlines of general sociology in use today. In the first edition of the above mentioned work (p. 6) he makes the following comment:

> These considerations relative to the development of the science of social relation call for some explanation as to the use of the term "practical sociology." Sociology,—broadly speaking, and without any attempt at specific definition,—being the science of society, must comprehend all society and society for all time, for it undertakes to explain the origin and growth and condition of human institutions. Any treatment of the subject would be "practical" which dealt with things as they are, but the term may with propriety be applied especially to such a book as this, which undertakes to consider only the status of present-day conditions, without attempting to show how far they may be the result of the development or evolution of many previous conditions, and without attempting to show all of their relations to the general subject of sociology. The word "practical" is not chosen as in contradistinction to "impractical", but to make clear that the book deals with the actual, pressing social questions, which may be understood, even though the science of sociology be still uncertain. To be sure, the study of sociology as a science must include all the questions considered in this work, but it must include also systems of classification and analyses which "practical sociology" may avoid by dealing with indisputable facts and conditions which in a scientific treatise of sociology would be only illustrations. Were the science much further developed than it now is, there would perhaps still be a place for a dis-

> cussion which avoids technical terms and philosophical analysis. One may know that filthy streets are demoralizing without being absolutely certain as to the nature of the state.

Wright believed that the end of practical knowledge was in action and that a practical sociology should be sociological knowledge organized for the accomplishment of specific and general ends. His practical sociology was a *selected sociology*. The parts of sociology which he selected and assembled as practical were (1) those which were most completely developed and (2) those which dealt with the most immediate realities.

Wright was well aware of the fact that trend and tendency must be given due consideration in any study of the "status" of present-day conditions. He realized that practical sociology must deal with the present and the future. This was clearly evident in the constant use which he made of statistics showing changes over a period of time. He defended the idea that quantitative study of trend was the best basis for calculating probable future changes.

He also desired to avoid in practical sociology all unnecessary use of technical sociological terms. This is another difference between *practical* and *applied* sociology. In an applied sociology there must of necessity be a considerable number of the technical terms of sociology. Although much may be done to clarify and standardize the meaning of these technical terms and to relate them in an effective and interpretive way to applications of the theory, a technical terminology is necessary and it will probably increase rather than decrease. There is a place for a semi-popular usable sociology with a minimum of technical terms. Perhaps this will be called practical sociology. Often courses in sociology given in colleges and professional schools are excellent preparation for a further intensive study of sociology. But these courses are so loaded with technique and so philosophically analytical that they cover but a very small part of the field of sociology. What the majority of college students most need is a selected non-technical sociology giving in compact form the sociological knowledge and the training in sociological thinking that will be most needed in their

social and in their vocational life. In some schools only the latter type of course is offered and no introductory courses are given for a student who desires to become a specialist in sociology. Both types are needed. Doubtless both types of usable sociology will be developed—a practical sociology, semi-popular and non-technical, and an applied sociology capable of being used as a scientific basis for societal engineering.

Perhaps there is a difference then between practical sociology as Wright conceived of it and applied sociology as we have found it set forth by others. Whether this be true or not, much in Wright's work must be taken into account by everyone who proposes to aid in the working out of a sound approach to an applied sociology.

The careful reader of Wright will be impressed by these three facts. First, that practical sociology, as he conceived it, is not social art but social science; second, that an exceedingly practical presentation of sociology may be made over an organization plan that is inherently sociological; and third, that the problems of sociology must be stated in terms of the scientific data available for the checking of the theories.

With very limited data and with a methodology that now seems almost hopelessly crude, Wright made a move in the direction of quantitative sociology. He and Mayo-Smith were outstanding pioneers in this approach to the general problem of the application of sociology by this method in this country. One cannot read the *Practical Sociology* without feeling that in the future the pragmatic checks and the quantitative method are destined to play an increasingly important part in the development of sociological theory. In fact this work seems to suggest that if sociologists desire to create a sociology that will be useful for solving problems instead of a logically coherent system of abstractions, they will need to state their theories in ways that lend themselves to pragmatic checks and quantitative verifications. Wright has demonstrated that one of the important functions of practical or applied sociology is the sociologically significant statement of social problems.

Wright was impressed with the need for a practical study of the societal conditioning of human behavior. This is apparent in the opening sentence of his *Outline,* which is as follows: "The science of social relation is really the science of the institution which enables society to perform its infinitely varied functions." From this it is evident that considerable stress was laid on the institutional or societal conditioning of individual behavior. In fact he regarded this institutional conditioning of human behavior as one of the most practically significant of social phenomena. He interpreted institution in a broad sense and claimed that "Every feature of society which comprehends the action of a group of individual units represents an institution."

Thus, over a quarter of a century ago, Wright made two permanent contributions to practical or applied sociology; first, he demonstrated the advantages of the use of the quantitative method, and second, he emphasized the practical significance of societally conditioned human behavior.

Richmond Mayo-Smith in his *Statistics and Sociology* makes an effort "to present the statistics of population in such a way as to show their real significance." In order to achieve this end each social problem is studied in terms of (1) the sociological purpose of the investigation, (2) the statistical data available, (3) the scientific tests of the trustworthiness of these data, and (4) the reflective analysis of the results obtained. These investigations are an aid to what he describes as the four purposes of sociology, the last of the four being "to guide social action" for which purpose a *practical sociology* is necessary. The four purposes were briefly described as follows:

> The general sociological purpose of any group of statistics is to throw light on the organization of society. . . . . The second sociological purpose is to arrange the particular statistics in such a way as to reveal any relation between population and the land (physical environment) . . . . A precisely similar purpose must be kept in view in regard to social environment. . . . . Our sociological purpose in many groups of statistics must be to gain information for the purpose of

> guiding social action—what we have called *practical sociology.* What effect does the infliction of certain penalties have upon the repetition of crime? From what classes in the community are juvenile offenders recruited? Is pauperism due to economic misfortune, lack of thrift, lack of intelligence, habits of dissipation, or to general social causes over which the individual has no control? The statistician *who would neglect such practical questions while seeking to establish the general outlines of social organization,* would fail to comprehend one very important sociological purpose of his investigation.[11]

The author tried to state in statistical terms (in so far as possible) the conditions and circumstances which affect social relations and social behavior. Although he was interested in the general effect of conditions and circumstances on social relations and behavior, the dominating motive of his work was to learn what changes in environment (conditions and circumstances) might be effected with a high probability that these changes would bring about desirable social changes. In brief, he studied the conditions and circumstances of social life for the practical purpose of guiding social action, either directly or through the environment. He sought to discover what human relations and social behavior were amenable to social control and how that control might be effected.

It is interesting to note that Mayo-Smith like Ward had an ethical and indeed almost a metaphysical strain in his thinking about applied sociology. After he has discussed somewhat extensively what he meant by "reflective analysis," he has summarized in a single sentence the main thought and motive of his work. "Finally," he wrote, "we must determine whether we can formulate any sociological laws, what effect these laws will have on the doctrine of the freedom of the will, and whether our results have any practical sociological significance." (p. 35).

Thus both of these self-styled "practical sociologists" have made a start and given us suggestions as to how to approach the discovery and organization of practically useful sociological information. The statistical methodology advocated by them as invaluable for the

11. *Statistics and Sociology,* Richmond Mayo-Smith, pp. 29-31.

evolving and verification of various general "laws" of sociology will, in its modified and developed forms, undoubtedly be influential in building up an applied sociology. They have made an important move toward bridging the gap between theory and practice. They approached the task as sociologists, and the sociological unity of their books has encouraged those sociologists who believe that any "applied sociology" should be a fitting part of a systematized general sociology. By the way they used the quantitative method, they have also encouraged those social workers who believe that "applied sociology" should relate specific social problems in a sociologically sound way to the larger social problems of which they are a part. In other words, they indicate that it is possible to derive specifically practical sociological knowledge from general sociological theory, and also to use the specific analyses of practice as an inductive method for developing social theory. Both of them saw the necessity of stating theoretical problems in ways that lend themselves to verification by quantitative methods.

Inductive Sociology. Although Professor Franklin H. Giddings did not set out to develop an applied sociology as such, his *Inductive Sociology* (supplemented by articles and more recent publications bearing on this subject) suggests practical sociological methods of dealing with specific and concrete social problems. Manifestly written as an inductive approach to general sociology, it is at the same time a supplement to the practical quantitative analyses of Wright and Mayo-Smith. The organization plan of this book is identical with that of his comprehensive work on theory, the *Descriptive and Historical Sociology.* The object of *Inductive Sociology* "is to present a scheme of inductive method, a somewhat detailed analysis and classification of social facts, and a tentative formulation of the more obvious laws of social activity,—all as a basis for further inductive studies." (p. ix) The especially important fact in this discussion of the application of sociology is that Giddings is able to use the same "formulation" of sociology as an approach to general sociology, and as an approach to inductive study. The development of any satisfactory applied sociology must relate the

analysis of specific concrete social situations to the general theory of sociology. The "formulation" used by Giddings in the *Inductive Study* may serve to make this possible.

In the nature of things, the inductive method moves from the specific, definite and concrete to the generalized and abstract. For that very reason, any inferences that might be drawn from observations made primarily in the interest of testing, correcting or supplementing general sociological theory would likely be superior to the empiricisms which social artists are now compelled to use as a basis of action. Even if inductions yield no inferences sufficiently typical or accurate to be valid bases for general theories, they may be of practical significance if they but serve to reduce the error in the understanding of the particular problem, or reduce the probability of error in action directed toward change of the phenomena under observation. The practical possibilities inherent in the inductive method are even more apparent in *The Scientific Study of Human Society* which "formulates the fundamental sociological problems, and sets forth the more important generalizations that admit of verification."[12]

Social Problems. There have been several efforts to make practical application of sociology in publications on "social problems." These range from such well organized works as those of Ellwood, Bailey, Dow, Parsons and Beach to selections of readings such as those of Wolfe and Ford and to text books for secondary schools. Of their usefulness there can be no doubt. As indications of the probable future trend of applied sociology they are but mildly significant. They have been principally (1) sociological interpretations of the data of population, (2) critical commentaries on social institutions, (3) discussions of social abnormalities and (4) statements of problems of social economy and of principles of relief and (5) inquiries into the concrete nature of social progress. In fact most of them have been sociological treatments of the available data pertaining to the country in which they were published. These general works on social problems draw

12. *Ibid*, Preface p. v.

heavily upon all the social sciences. Sociology has played a synthetic role and furnished a point of view. But no distinctly differentiated sociology has been needed for this purpose. In fact, nothing in this field has been written superior sociologically to Herbert Spencer's *Study of Sociology,* although, of course, the modern works have had more theory on which to draw and better data as a basis for comment. On the whole these general studies of social problems have simply placed concrete but general data and theoretical abstractions in significant juxtaposition. The applications of sociology to social problems which are more significant of the trend toward and possibilities of applied sociology are those which have dealt with specific problems intensively. Some of these will be discussed in the ensuing chapter.

Summary and Inferences. This review of the beginnings of an interpretive sociology brings out a number of constructive suggestions as to the nature and function of an applied or practical sociology. (1) There is a rather general agreement among the sociologists that the relationship between pure and applied sociology is the same as that which usually exists between pure and applied sciences. There is much variation in the interpretation of this idea, and in the actual efforts to organize an applied sociology bearing such a relation to pure sociology. A clearer understanding of the distinction between the application of sociology to policy and ethics (through general philosophy of which it is a part) and the application to engineering and control (through a specially organized applied sociology) will aid in clarifying the relation of applied sociology to other sociology. (2) The interpretive sociologists have recognized the need for sociological statements which emphasize and portray the essential unity of all social problems (including socio-economic, socio-physiological and all other problems to any considerable extent social). Here the practice has been quite consistent and uniform, for not only in works on sociology which are specifically labeled "applied" and "practical", but even in general works on "social problems"—e. g. Ellwood's *Modern Social Problems*—there is evidence of efforts to work out coordinated statements

of practically applicable sociology. (3) Ward has taken the position that pure sociology should deal primarily with the past and present, and applied sociology with the future, and in this position he has many supporters. The distinction which Ward had in mind is more succintly and effectively stated by Giddings, who calls the former, descriptive sociology, and the latter, the sociology of probability.[13] (4) Wright has stressed the need for the organized presentation of selected sociology interpreted to meet the demands for action, and both he and Mayo-Smith (5) emphasized the need for a statement of sociological theory that would lend itself to pragmatic checks and to the tests of the quantitative method. (6) Giddings, use of the inductive approach to general sociology has revealed therein possibilities of practical usefulness along the lines pointed out by Wright and Mayo-Smith. (7) Almost without exception the sociologists have conceived one of the first and most important functions of applied sociology to be the clear and explicit statements of social problems in sociological terms; for in societal engineering, as elsewhere, a problem well stated is half solved.

Perhaps the most obvious inference is also the most important. It is to the effect that there have been a number of serious attempts to bridge the gap between social theory and social practice with an applied or practical sociology. It is also evident that these general works have done little more than use sociology as a setting, background or point of view for the discussion of ethics, policies and social problems. In other words, these attempts to build up an intermediary sociology have been treatments of the positive social philosophy rather than of the special social science. The works of Wright and Mayo-Smith are the first general demonstrations of the possibilities of the quantitative method as a means of obtain-

13. *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, Franklin H. Giddings, ch. vii, esp. pp. 127-129.

ing a more practically significant statement of social problems[14] and of its advantages for analysis and diagnosis leading to action. While they suggested some of the possibilities of such an approach, no comprehensive scheme of approach was offered prior to the publication of Giddings' *Inductive Sociology*.

14. Of course the use of statistics for military and political purposes is very old. See, e. g., 2 Samuel xxiv; 1 Chronicles xxi. Statistical methods were taught as early as 1660, and Quetelet developed the statistical method in the social sciences during the first half of the nineteenth century. But Wright and Mayo-Smith were the first to attempt to use it as a basis for a comprehensive applied sociology.

CHAPTER V

Specific Formulations of Useful Sociology

Cooperation between sociologists and social workers has resulted in a variety of formulations of sociology, each useful for some particular purpose. These formulations are adapted to the needs of those who deal with specific social problems (e. g. public health and child welfare), social processes (e. g. assimilation and democratization), or social institutions (e. g. ecclesiastical and marital). In fact every social problem, process or institution that requires the service of a special group of workers is sooner or later likely to become a focal point for the formulation of such social theory as these workers find useful.

Within the last few years the number of groups of workers consciously making practical applications of sociology in various specific fields has rapidly increased. Many of these workers have developed a group and some almost a professional consciousness. In several instances they have organized nationally for the purpose of working out the possibilities of sociology in their fields of special interest. A number of these groups have established journals for the promotion of intensive research and for the exchange of information.[1] These journals become active agents for the assembling of whatever sociological knowledge is found useful by the members of the group.

Objectives and Methods of Social Workers. A rapid increase is discerned in the number of foci of interest which are becoming centers of what has been variously described as the integration, nucleation, or formulation of useful sociology. Reference has been made to the twelve major "fields" or "objectives" of action and to the "six methods" recognized by the American Association of Social

1. e. g. There are more than fifty journals in various specific fields of social activity, each of which assembles sociological data adapted to the needs of its fields. The following are typical and suggestive of the range—Industrial Hygiene, Mental Hygiene, Social Hygiene, American Journal of Public Health, the Modern Hospital, the Journal of Nursing, School and Society, the Family, the American City and the Journal of Criminology.

Workers in their organization program. Each of these activities has its own projects, its accumulation of experience, its technique, and in some cases its technology. Each has been the theme of many books and pamphlets. The appearance of sectional conferences of social workers interested in special "fields" and "methods" indicates the desire of the workers to clarify their specific objectives and to improve their methods. Social workers need a sociology for practical aid in the determination of objectives and in the development of superior methods in the various fields of their work.

Many social workers are themselves well trained sociologists. Their annual national conferences are attracting increasing numbers of sociologists. As a result, there is a noticeable spread of sociological influence both in the "objectives" and in the "methods" of social work. Social workers in each of these "fields" have frequently expressed their need for a sociology usable in their specific fields and the Association has voiced its need for a sociology generally useful for outlining policies of social work and for evolving ways and means of effecting social change.[2] In fact these social workers have the same dual need for sociology that has been discussed in previous chapters. They need (1) a general sociology stated in such a way as to enable them to test the validity of their "objectives," to refine them, and push them forward, and (2) an applied sociology that can be used in the development of superior "methods" of achieving specific proximate social changes.

Special Interests of Sociologists. For a number of years the evident specialization of interest among the members of the Ameri-

2. Mr. Allen T. Burns, president of the National Conference of Social Work, in his address to the forty-eighth annual session (Milwaukee, June, 1921), said: "Social soil analysis I propose as the next step in social service, not excluding problems of technique and methodology, but adding to them a study of whatever kind of combination of vital elements and currents of life are needed for the effective working out of any device or mchanism. . . . We should realize that to give the greatest service we must take into consideration these vital forces which are interacting and interplaying with all we may do and strive to accomplish, defeating or advancing our efforts according to whether we work with or against them. . . . The demand of today is for the organic chemist of society, the discoverer of the missing ingredient, of the essential elements that will precipitate this formless, chaoitic, nebulous condition of society into solidarity, cohesion, organic unity."

can Sociological Society has presented a serious problem to the Society. It is almost inevitable that a growing organization should tend to segregation of special interest, otherwise it would do violence to Spencer's theory. But in addition to the usual general reasons for segregation, specific reasons have arisen for such a tendency in this Society. Two of these reasons are very apparent. First, sociology is attracting to its ranks many who are interested in action and see possibilities of immediate usefulness in sociology. Second, the principal contributions to sociology are the result of research, and the research of modern science by means of the quantitative method requires a specialization of interest and of technique.[3]

These manifestations of special interest represent therefore an increase in the number of members desirous of applying social theory to specific types of action,—to special social problems, processes or institutions. This type of persons is attracted to conferences and associations where they can obtain enlightenment on definite problems of policy and where the research findings are specific and concrete and therefore capable of use. Unity of interest within the Society will grow out of (1) the common need for a general sociology useful for the determination of objectives and of policies, (2) the realization that there are natural principles of sociology upon which all general and specific applications must be based and (3) a recognition that an understanding of the principles of quantitative behavioristic research is essential to every specific type of research. So long as these needs are recognized and met, the multiplication of special interest may add to rather than detract from the common interest in sociology.

At the last meeting of the Society there were seven interests each of which had a program of its own. Five of the "interests" met as "sections" of the Society and two as independent associa-

3. The range in research has been brought out by lists published by the committee on research of the Society. This was very evident in the result of the canvas made in 1925 by Professor Ogburn as chairman of the division on research. *Cf.* Lists of research completed, in process and projected in the recent volumes of the *Publications of the American Sociological Society.*

tions.[4] The increase in the number of these sections and associations indicates not only specialization of interest and research on the part of general sociologists, but also an interest in the application of sociology to the needs of these particular fields.

The sections of the American Sociological Society are distinctly *sociological*. They deal with various phases of sociology, with sociological reasearch in special fields and with the development of sociology applicable to specific demands for action,—they are sections of the science. The sections of the American Association of Social Workers (and the social work sections of the various professions) deal with social problems. They deal with professional practice—with social art. Not merely sociology, but all the social sciences are drawn upon by them. The purpose of the Association and of the Society is different No apparent advantage is gained in having either one duplicate the function of the other, but the cooperation of the two groups in putting social work on a sociologically sound basis will undoubtedly benefit both sociology and social work. Both have brought about cooperation between sociologists and social workers. In the Society this cooperation has tended toward the development of an applied sociology. In the Association it has tended toward the development of social economy.

Cooperation between Sociologists and Social Workers. Sociologists and social workers have cooperated in three different ways toward the formulation of a sociology useful for specific purposes, (1) at the instance of social workers, (2) at the instance of sociologists and (3) by mutual agreement. Each of these ways resulted in a different process of formulation. Each of the three specific formulations of useful sociology selected for more detailed discussion in this chapter represents a different one of these three procedures in cooperation.

The formulations which took place at the instance of social

4. In addition to the divisions on (1) Social Psychology, (2) Statistical Sociology and (3) Biological Factors and (4) Sociological Reasearch, there were sections on (1) the Family, (2) International Relations, (3) Religion, (4) Rural Sociology, and (5) Educational Sociology. The National Community Center Association and the American Association for Labor Legislation represented two other interests.

workers were often begun only after the social workers had made considerable headway in the development of technique and practice. Not infrequently they had developed a technique and a beginning of a technology before they turned to the sociologists for assistance. In some cases they had accumulated on their own account a body of empirical sociological knowledge of no mean merit. Various motives prompted them to cooperation with the sociologists. Accident and personal friendships played their part. However it may have come about, the cooperation usually marked the beginning of a new epoch in that special field of social work. In general this type of procedure led to the formulation of *community sociology*.

The formulations which took place at the instance of sociologists began with analyses and the suggestion of remedies. In some cases these had been developed extensively before they attracted the serious attention of social workers. This procedure usually took place where there were social problems among people who were not able to help themselves and whose needs were not such as to call forth assistance from those who might have helped them. One of the best illustrations of this type of cooperation is that which has produced *rural sociology*.

The formulations by mutual agreement represent those projects which from their inception were the result of cooperation between social theorists and those who actually sought to control and direct social action. It is not always possible to prove that the cooperation was deliberately planned or to disprove that either the theorist or worker had precedence in entering the field. Generally speaking, most of the activities in these fields have resulted from the continuous cooperation between theorists and practitioners. This type of continued cooperation between practice and theory led to the formulation of *educational sociology*.

Because each of the following--community sociology, rural sociology, and educational sociology, is in a general way typical of one of these three procedures, the three types mentioned have been chosen as illustrations of the specific formulation of useful sociology. Other reasons that have entered into the choice might be summed up under

these two heads. (1) the stage of development which these formulations have reached and (2) the diversity of purpose which they represent.

Community sociology must be regarded as a term used for convenience to apply to the study of social problems from the standpoint of the neighborhood, district of a city, or small town. The phrase is employed much more frequently by sociologists than by social workers. It is seldom used as the designation of a field of social effort, principally because the subject originated in the practical field or organization and consequently has been usually entitled *community organization*. The word *community* is itself capable of various interpretations, two of which may be of profitable consideration here. The one used by R. M. Maciver[5] covers "the community life" a blanket concept under which are set out the nature and fundamental laws of social life. Used in this way the term comes to mean the subject matter of sociology. In somewhat the same fashion, other authors have called any association or grouping a *community*.

Quite distinct from this usage is that of the word designating the persons living in a limited area which they regard as their community and in which there is at least some face to face or primary association. The rural sociologists have best defined the term in this sense. E. C. Lindeman in distinguishing it from the neighborhood says:

> The community, which is an aggregate of families, is the vital unit of society in which the individual secures his education, receives his standards of health and morality, expresses his educational tendencies and labors to earn his share of worldly goods. The neighborhood is also an aggregate of families but with this distinction: the community is an organized unit with institutions having specific functions, while the neighborhood is merely the group of families living within an acquaintance area.[6]

Dwight Sanderson claims that a community (rural) "consists

5. R. M. Maciver, *Community, a Sociological Study*, pp. vii-x; 22-24.

6. *The Community*, p. 9.

of the people in a local area tributary to the center of their common interests." He stresses the need for distinguishing between such a community and the neighborhood which "consists of but a group of houses fairly near each other."[7]

Practical Work in Social Units Preceded a Community Sociology. Emphasis on the local community as a social unit was first deliberately made in this country by the original organizers of the settlements, taking their cue from the work of the Rev. Samuel A. Barnett, who founded Toynbee Hall in the Whitechapel district of London in 1885 where Oxford and Cambridge students become the neighbors of the working people and the poor. Their objective and procedure is well stated by Robert A. Woods:

> Their object was to make a living connection between the centers of culture and the centers of industry, and thus to bring about that common understanding which is indispensable to the welfare and progress, if not to the very existence, of a democratic country. They undertook gradually to introduce among this vast needy population such services of voluntary organization and of government as would tend to bring the people out into some of the broader and better ways of life. As soon as they had outlined a deep and general need in the local community and had demonstrated a way of meeting it, they then proceeded to get that plan introduced widely into the system of things as a whole, out through the State, and ultimately throughout the entire country. The settlement has thus done much of the pioneer duty in the establishment of a broad system of progressive and aggressive social work which has now become one of the outstanding features of American life.[8]

Again to use the authority of Woods, it can be said generally that the whole underlying note of settlement work in the United States has been the patient, systematic training of the rank and file of the people from childhood up, for collective action toward common good.[9]

The development of the community movement from these early

7. *The Farmer and His Community*, pp. 9-10.
8. *The Neighborhood in Nation Building*, pp. 234-236.
9. *Ibid*, p. 243.

beginnings has consistently followed the same general lines, firstly, a fostering of understanding between the well-to-do, the educated and the influential with the laborers, the poor, the immigrant and the underprivileged; secondly, a development among the residents in the community of local group ability to do the maximum for themselves possible under the circumstances. The movement has been unmistakably non-political and non-sectarian. The great majority of community organizations have maintained intimate relations with all local political as well as religious leaders but have avoided scrupulously organic connections.

The community center came as a logical application of the settlement idea to the use of the public schools, where rooms owned publicly might be made use of by the citizen. Beginning with the spectacular efforts of Edward J. Ward in Rochester, where ideas from the New York City public lecture system, Hull House and other neighborhood organizing efforts were brought together, and spreading to the rural communities, the movement crystalized October 25, 1911, in the First National Conference on Civic Center Development at Madison, Wisconsin. Boston, Philadelphia and Cleveland had developed certain elements of the center; other cities had begun to use the school for meetings, recreations, lectures, etc. It was with enthusiasm and hope that the prophets hailed the new institution. Perry says in *The Community Center:*

> At the Madison Conference, with the picture of the Rochester social center before our eyes, we fondly dreamed of a time when every neighborhood in the land would possess a copy of this brand new institution. As we envisaged it then, it would be a place where people would meet regularly to discuss their common affairs, sing together, dance and play, study the arts; where the jobless would find employment, where the wealthy would occasionally put their art treasures on exhibition for the benefit of all—an institution which would make one big family out of the whole neighborhood. A heightened social solidarity, the dissolution of class and racial antagonisms, the rise of a civic intelligence that would see through the smoke screens behind which political bosses did their dirty work,—these are only a few of the benefits we saw readily following

> the realization of our dream. The peculiar beauty of it was that the foundation—indeed practically the whole edifice—of the new establishment already existed in every neighborhood. The people's school-house needed only a room or two, some different furniture and equipment and a night staff,— and the thing was done. Just a few thousand spent in every city and the millenium was sweeping on toward us. We put ordinary dollars into a mill and it ground out tremendous civic results.[10]

The expansion of community organization has not taken place in quite the fashion expected by the community center pioneers. Rather it has developed in different directions. The extension of education in the evening schools has grown to enormous proportions under a centralized city direction. Recreation activities have been multiplied, diversified and organized under many specialized groups. Forums, an early feature of the early school center, have become separate institutions or aspects of the work of religious, educational or other neighborhood agencies. Likewise a number of forms of community organization have appeared, among them the neighborhood association, the community council and the community house.

The neighborhood association sprang out of the soil of the settlement idea, encouraged by the multiplication of the school centers, several of which were often stimulated by a neighborhood association in their districts. The first description of such a local body was given at the National Conference of Social Work in Kansas City in 1918 by LeRoy E. Bowman, as follows:

> Given the local community with its streets, homes, vacant lots, public buildings, its many groups, and its lack of organization; given the people that compose the real community, with their prejudices and predispositions, their inertia and their conservatism, also their love for broad fellowship and their capacity for cooperation when once they are brought together rightly; given the local customs and the historic individuality of a certain locality; given the larger governmental agencies— given all these and a desire to lead, the problem of the neighborhood association is to mobilize these resources and human forces for the whole social welfare of the entire community.

10. *The Community Center*, vol. iii, no. 5, p. 34. "Ten Years of the Community Center Movement."

1. Membership in a neighborhood association is open to all reputable citizens of the district.

2. Each organization is non-partisan, non-sectarian, and so far as the boundaries of the association are concerned, non-sectional.

3. Each association is so organized as to give practical and real representation on the governing board to each recognized civic and social group working in the neighborhood.

The Great War brought its official style of community organization in which the forces of each neighborhood were mobilized for national defense. To quote from the same Conference, excerpts from E. L. Burchard's speech:

> A call to organize Community Councils of Defense, with the school as the recommended center, issued by the Council of National Defense, was sent by personal letter last February from the President to the chairman of each State Council of Defense, who referred to the school as an "apt" center for this local organization. Forty-six states have responded, many have appointed state community organizers, and in some cases 100 per cent membership of the local community is reported. It has gone like wildfire through the West. Oklahoma has 750,000 members in its school district community councils. In the East splendid progress is being made. New York City Mayor's Council of Defense has an organizing committee for establishing these Community Councils of National Defense in each neighborhood of its five million people, and a superintendent of schools as the organizing director. The Woman's Councils have joined in whole-heartedly and the County Councils of Defense in a large part of the 3,000 counties are now striving to make these local community organizations 100 per cent complete and 100 per cent efficient team work for all kinds of local war service—"all for each and each for all." Twenty states are from 75 per cent to 100 per cent organized on this basis.

Most of the war organizations flourished for the period of hostilities and for varying lengths of time after the armistice. Then they gave way to peacetime forms of social service. Many, however, are to be found functioning as civic organizations today. As a

result of the various approaches to the problem of community organization in the ways described above, as many as half a dozen forms, may often be counted in one city. Referring to New York City, Bowman said at the Toronto National Conference of Social Work: "There are altogether six general types of community organizations comprising at least 233 separate neighborhood groups." [11]

The efforts begun by the prophet and the organizer have come to be a field of sociological study. At the 1920 Conference of the group formed at Madison in 1911, three of the speakers were from college faculties, one of them becoming secretary. The following year Professor Robert E. Park of the University of Chicago became president, and the annual conference became in effect a section of the American Sociological Society. The publication, "The Community Center," dropped all semblance of a propaganda periodical and devoted itself to studies, theories of organization and factual material. Recently it has become the section on community in the *Journal of Social Forces*. Of the officers of the National Community Center Association (as the organization is now called), the president, two of the three vice-presidents, the secretary and editor and chairman of the Executive Committee are all sociologists.

That the directors of community organization are turning to the sociologist is shown also by their solicitation of a paper by Ernest W. Burgess of the University of Chicago at the Toronto Session of the National Conference of Social Work. It was entitled, "Can Neighborhood Work Have a Scientific Basis?" "Neighborhood work at present and as now practiced cannot, for two reasons, be said to be based upon science. First, the social sciences,—and I refer to sociology in particular—have at present little to offer as a scientific basis for social work; second, what knowledge the social sciences have accumulated has been used little, or not at all, by neighborhood workers." . . . "This early venture into intimate contact with social reality may accordingly be called the first stage in the trend

11. *Proceedings National Conference of Social Work*, 1924, p. 402.

of neighborhood work toward a scientific basis." . . . . "This interest in the discovery of factors in the social situation may therefore be called the second stage in the trend of neighborhood work toward a scientific basis." . . . . "Neighborhood work, by the logic of the situation, if it is to evolve a successful technique, will be compelled more and more to depend upon research into the social forces of modern life." Thus have social organizers shown their appreciation of the value of sociology and also of sociologists for the determination of objectives and policies, for administration and for the improvement of method.

Rural Sociology. It has been more than a quarter of a century since that pioneer in so many fields, George E. Vincent, called attention to the "Retarded Frontiers."[12] Not long afterward C. T. Nesmith presented the "Problem of the Rural Community."[13] The intimate relation of rural and community problems was thus early recognized. Some sociologists claim that rural sociology is really but a sub-division of community sociology. Other sociologists, although admitting the vital importance of the community in every rural situation, stress the basic differences between rural and urban social problems. They claim that the rural environment or heritage develops attitudes of mind entirely different from those which are formed in cities. They insist that groups that are to function in rural situations must be organized differently from those that are to function in urban situations.[14] They contend that rural mental processes, modes of behavior, folkways, thoughtways, culture complexes and institutions present problems requiring a special adaptation of sociology.

The rural village attracted the attention of sociologists and economists long before any organized activity existed for improving village and other rural life. The first researches were historical. The later ones have included analytical surveys and quantitative

12. *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. iv, pp. i *et seq.* See also *An Introduction to the Study of Society,* Albion Small and G. E. Vincent (1895).

13. *Ibid,* vol. viii, pp. 812 *et seq.*

representations. Sir Henry Maine and H. E. Seebohm wrote descriptions of rural life in Scotland, Ireland and Wales which are familiar to every student of social conditions. Viollet, Babeau, Bonnemère and Doniol in France; Maurer, Sohm, Dahn, Janssen and Wilhelm Arnold in Germany and anthropological sociologists in various other countries have furnished remarkable historical researches in rural social life. Since 1910 numerous social surveys have been made. Many of these were under the supervision of Warren H. Wilson whose *Evolution of a Country Community* appeared in 1912. Paul L. Vogt's *Rural Survey in Southwestern Ohio* appeared in 1913. Perhaps no one organization in this country produced more rural surveys at this early date than the Department of Church and Country Life of the Home Missions Board of the Presbyterian Church. All of these researches preceded any extensively organized rural social work.[15] A number of the sociologists have since gone into the field and are testing their theories in what are in a sense the laboratories of practice—they are working with relatively isolated groups with many factors under the control of the sociologists.

The great impetus to an organized activity for the improvement of rural social life was the appointment by President Roosevelt in 1908 of the Commission on Country Life. This Commission, in addition to making an enlightening and suggestive report, started a movement throughout the country such as is described by L. H. Bailey in *The Country Life Movement*. As one of the consequences of this movement there was announced in January, 1919, the First National Country Life Conference—a conference of workers for the study and discussion of rural social problems . . . . looking toward a country life program. It was called by a Committee on Country Life, of which Kenyon L. Butterfield was chairman.

14. For comparison of differences between rural and urban social problems compare *Our Social Heritage*, J. M. Williams, and the "Theory of Rural Attitudes", L. L. Bernard, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxii, pp. 630 *et seq.*, with "The Urban Habit of Mind", H. B. Woolston, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xvii, pp. 602 *et seq.*, and the *Sociology of a City Block*, Thoman Jesse Jones.

15. For a comprehensive list of rural surveys, general and specific, see Newell F. Sims, *The Rural Community; Ancient and Modern*, pp. iii-x.

The Committee (of nine) had been chosen in November, 1917, by a group of those interested in rural social problems who had assembled in Washington to discuss these problems. The purpose of the 1919 meeting, as stated in the call was the actual motive of the meeting, and has continued to be the motive of the National Country Life Association which was organized at the close of the conference. That purpose is:

> To establish a better understanding of existing rural social conditions and the agencies for improving them, and with a view to *formulating a comprehensive statement of principles,* policies and relations which may form a basis for programs of work so that there may be larger correlation of effort, and a more general recognition of the goals of country life.

It is interesting to note here again the need for an applied sociology for purposes of correlation and for the determination of objectives.

The first effort to meet this situation by an especially adapted sociology was made by John M. Gillette of the University of North Dakota. He chose for his title *Constructive Rural Sociology.* In the introduction of this work George E. Vincent, then President of the University of Minnesota, calls attention to the fact that in the various attempts at rural social betterment there is a mass of "conflicting ideas, suggestions and devices" which need "the steadying of fact and of authoritative principles."[16] Professor Gillette announced that the purpose of his book was "to consider together the various phases of the life of the rural community and so to organize and present them that they shall convey a knowledge and appreciation of the problems."[17]

Professor Gillette's book might with propriety be called an "interpretive sociology." It is the first serious venture of a sociologist to use sociology to interpret and relate the social problems and institutions of rural life and to interpret also the sociological significance of some of the economic problems and economic

16. John M. Gillette, *Constructive Rural Sociology,* (1913), introduction, p. vi.

17. *Ibid,* p. vii.

changes. It suggests possibilities of a general applied sociology as an interpretive sociology. Many social workers feel that such interpretation should be the major function of applied sociology. It is undoubtedly true that Professor Gillette deliberately organized a body of *practical sociology* relating to a particular group of social problems commonly called rural. In his first chapter he claims that this is no dilettante study but that "it seeks to be *useful.*" Also, "Its aim is to be *practical,* in the sense of organizing information with a view to throwing light on a given situation." Gillette claims that his inspiration came from Charles R. Henderson who was giving a course in Rural Communities at Chicago in 1900.

Another *rural sociology* was published in 1917 by Paul L. Vogt.[18] In this book (p. 15) he has defined rural sociology as "the study of the forces and conditions of rural life *as a basis for constructive action* in developing a scientifically efficient civilization in the country." His appreciation of rural sociology as a part of applied sociology which is a part of general sociology, is exceptionally sound and so clearly set forth that it is stated at length.

> This study is primarily in the realm of applied sociology because its principal intent is not so much for the purpose of discovering new principles of social coordination as is to understand conditions for the purpose of applying principles of sociology, already discovered, to their maintenance or improvement. But in the present state of development of social theory it is not at all improbable that the study of rural life will ultimately contribute much of real value to the knowledge of the laws of human society. Indeed, it is the judgment of some of our leading sociologists that the next few decades will produce some of the richest contributions to social theory from the study of the phenomena of rural and village social life. But it should be kept in mind that the practical or applied point of view is maintained by those entering into this field at the present time.

Newell L. Sims undertook (1920) to devise a new method whereby rural social problems could be submitted alike to the scrutiny of workers and of theorists. He assembled, in a work entitled *The*

18. Paul L. Vogt. *Introduction to Rural Sociology,* 1917 (Revised). Esp. p. 15.

Rural Community, selections from many of the best historical and descriptive studies of rural social problems, made by social economists and sociologists. The book is avowedly written to be used in a "case system" study of rural social problems with the hope that it will further this type of study. Much is to be said in favor of the case study method as an approach to all social problems. This method is not an approach from any one scientific angle but a direct approach to the problem as a whole. Any one or all of the social sciences (or any other science) needed for understanding or action may be used. *An applied sociology should be practically useful in the case method of studying all social problems.*

A more recent work in the field of rural sociology is that of James Mickel Williams. Its title *Our Rural Heritage: The Social Psychology of Rural Development* indicates that it is a study of the societal conditioning of human behavior. The author says that it is an attempt "to explain historically the attitudes and beliefs of a considerable part of the rural population of the United States." [19] He stresses the need for a rural social psychology because of its "great practical importance as well as of scientific interest." He implies that there are psychological and sociological problems common to all rural groups, and that the problems of any one group are involved in the problem of a common social heritage. To the extent that this is true a general sociology is needed that will be useful not only for the analysis of specific rural problems, but also in showing how these specific problems are related to larger problems.

Educational Sociology. Comte and Spencer were interested in education as a social process. From their times to the present there have been community of interest and combination of effort on the part of educators and sociologists. In 1883 Lester F. Ward introduced the concluding chapter of his *Dynamic Sociology* with this appreciation of education: "We have now arrived at the highest application which the human race is capable of making of the indirect method of conation—the loftiest flight of inventive art." This is followed by a vigorous and thoughtful—though somewhat narrow—statement of the social implications of education.

19. *Intro.*, p. xiii

The value of sociology both for the determination of "aim" and the development of "method" was indicated in 1896 by Professor George E. Vincent who stated:

> The thought of social philosophy which sees in the development of society the growth of a vast psychic organism to which individuals are intrinsically related, in which alone they find self-realization, is of the highest significance to the teacher, to whom it suggests aim and method.[20]

The term *educational sociology* was used by Henry Suzzallo to describe a course which he introduced in Teachers College, Columbia University, in 1908.[21] Since that time the use of the term has spread rapidly and, although no recent survey has been made, it is safe to say that many courses are being given under this title. Suzzallo contended that "as we have a school hygiene and an educational psychology, so we must have what is basic, an educational sociology."[22]

He regarded educational sociology as "one of the basal subjects in the systematic study of the professional theory and practice of education, which emphasizes the social factor in education; that organized application of modern sociological thought which has special bearing on the problems of education." He stated that "The purpose of an educational sociology is, in a specialized and scientific way, to investigate and reveal the social facts and laws upon which educational theory and practice must in large part rest."[23] In 1914, only six years later, John M. Gillette, reported that out of seventy-six institutions reporting, fourteen universities and colleges were giving courses in educational sociology.[24] In 1917, out

20. *The Social Mind and Education*, p. v.

21. Bulletin, Teachers College, 1908-9. According to Walter R. Smith, the first person to use the term for a school course was John M. Gillette. See *An Introduction to Educational Sociology*, Smith, p. 17.

22. For his concept of the term, discussion and statement of the need for an educational sociology, see his article, "Education as a Social Study", in *School Review*, vol. 16, pp. 330-340, May, 1908.

23. Article on "Educational Sociology" in *Cyclopedia of Education*, edited by Paul Monroe, 1913, vol. v, p. 361.

24. *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. ix, p. 178.

of one hundred normal schools, forty-six were giving courses in the subject.[25] Much objection has arisen to the term "educational sociology" and some of the larger universities have persistently refused to announce courses under that title, although they have covered the subject matter under other designations. At present, a constantly increasing usage and the publication of text books under the title portend that the term has come to stay. Usage has a strange habit of winning its way over logical and philosophical protests. A certain recognition of the probable permanence of the term is reflected in the fact that an "Educational Sociology" section has been created within the American Sociological Society,[26] and furthermore that the meeting of that section in 1922 was one of the outstanding events of the session of the society.[27] The program of this meeting is itself suggestive of the concept of the term *educational sociology* which is held by its champions. The theme of the meeting was expressed in the general program title, "Foundations of Education in Sociology," and the following phases of the subject were emphasized: "Sociology, a Basic Science to Education," by David Snedden; "Some Practical Applications of Sociology in Education," by C. C. Certain; "Sociological Bases of Education for Culture," by Charles C. Peters; and "Social Controls as Training for Larger Controls," by Walter R. Smith. Both the professional educators and the sociologists seemed to be in accord as to the need and the opportunities for some sort of sociology-education liaison. Concerning the nature of this liaison there was much difference of opinion.

In response to this demand which has been felt for a decade or more, a number of works have been published discussing the relation of sociology to education and endeavoring to make that relation more effective. Perhaps it was a prophet's premonition of this need which caused Herbert Spencer to publish his *Education* in 1860 prior to the publication of his *First Principles*, and sixteen

25. *Ibid*, vol. xiii, p. 65, 6.

26. The entire session in 1918 was devoted to "Sociology and Education."

27. *Ibid*, vol. xvii. Note papers on Education and Sociology.

years before his *Principles of Sociology.* Spencer's approach to the study of sociology was through the practical problems of education. In 1902 Charles H. Cooley produced his *Human Nature and the Social Order;* in 1908 Colin A. Scott published *Social Education;* in 1912 George A. Betts gave us *Social Principles of Education;* and Irving King, *Social Aspects of Education;* in 1915 came John Dewey's *Schools of Tomorrow,* followed the next year by his *Democracy and Education* and in 1918 Charles L. Robbins published *The School as a Public Institution.*[28] During the five years, 1917-1922, no less than three Educational Sociologies appeared, each with its own interpretation of educational sociology, but each agreeing with the other that a link was needed between sociology and education.

Walter Robinson Smith in *An Introduction to Educational Sociology* (1917) makes clear in his definition of educational sociology the triple alliance defended throughout this study—(1) the art or profession of teaching dependent upon (2) applied sociology, which is dependent upon (3) sociology. His definition is as follows:

> Educational sociology may be defined as the application of the scientific spirit, methods and principles of sociology to the study of education. By such study the social laws governing education may be obtained and applied in such ways as will improve our educational practice. Whatever contribution educational sociology can make to educational theory will be reflected in the improvement of the arts of teaching and of school administration.[29]

He states that the delay on the part of sociologists in entering this applied field is due to the fact that "they have been so busy outlining the methodology, materials and general principles of a new

28. Among other significant works are: William Chandler Bagley, *Social Discipline;* W. E. Chancellor, *Educational Sociology;* L. D. Coffman, *Social Composition of the Teaching Population;* J. Dewey, *School and Society;* C. E. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects;* W. A. Jessup, *Social Factors Affecting Special Supervision in the Public Schools of the United States;* M. V. O'Shea, *Social Development and Education.*

29. Walter Robinson Smith, *An Introduction to Educational Sociology,* p. 15.

science that they have scarcely had time to work out many of its applications." [30]

He believes that it is time for such an effort. Admitting that it "may be argued that the principles of sociology are still too inchoate to provide a basis for scientific educational sociology" he is convinced that:

> No science was ever born full grown, and no other science ever waited until even comparative maturity had been attained to begin its applications to practical life. The rapidity and growth of any science, even its permanent existence, depends upon its applications, and to await the perfection of a science of sociology before attempting its applications to social progress is to doom it to inanity.[31]

Speaking of the need of this liaison, Ellwood P. Cubberly remarks in his introduction to Professor Smith's work that "an understanding of the principles of the new science of sociology, and the application of these principles to our educational work, are of fundamental importance to the student of educational theory and administration." He is among those who hold that applied sociology should be *interpretative,* and that educational sociology "should prove of much interest and service to teachers and school officers who desire a social interpretation of our modern educational progress."

Frederick R. Clow of the State Normal School at Oshkosh, Wisconsin, published in 1920 *Principles of Educational Sociology.* [32] This is a text book of selected sociology drawn from many excellent sources. The writer has learned by experience with his students to arrange his material so as to increase its availability and usefulness for particular and intimate group studies. In a paper which he read before the American Sociological Society two years previous to publishing his book, he stated very positively and effectively the need for an applied sociology as a tool. In this address he stated that:

30. *Ibid,* preface, p. viii.

31. *Ibid,* p. 16.

32. This title appears on the back of the book, but the exact title (appearing on the first page and elsewhere) is *Principles of Sociology with Educational Applications.*

> The efforts of theological seminaries, schools of philanthropy, schools of business, and schools of education to employ sociological theory as an instrument for the analysis of any kind of social situation or as a master-key to all of their treasure houses, are destined, I believe, to result in success. . . . . Such success awaits standardization, and that . . . . the university professors will yet give us; they . . . . will come to the aid of the schools that educate social workers and will trim down the far-ramifying sociological theory to the shape of a tool which these workers can be easily trained to use.[33]

This tool to which Clow refers is another concept of applied sociology. There should be a selecting, which he calls a trimming down of general sociology; a standardization of terms, and a unification into a usable instrument. All of this he suggests is the task of university professors, and there is reason to believe that it will take place as a phase of graduate work in sociology.

In his *Principles,* he admits that the general application of sociology to technical uses must probably await the appearance of such a treatise as is foreshadowed in the statement just quoted. He does not aim to make his text book such a treatise because he realizes that the applied sociology must not only serve educational sociologists but all social workers. His *Principles* is written to enable each of his students who works with some particular group or institution to make use of sociology. The method is described in another part of the previously mentioned address to the American Sociological Society. He says:

> As we advance through the principles of sociology he (the student) applies them to his own special groups and writes a sociological analysis of it by installments. In this way sociological theory came to him as an instrument for practical use rather than as a body of doctrine for the delectation of scholars.

This last statement is also suggestive of a desirable characteristic of applied sociology. It should be of such matter and arrangement as to make it useful in protracted case studies.

33. *American Sociological Society Publications,* vol. xiii, p. 68, Clow, "Sociology in the Education of Teachers."

The most recent *Educational Sociology* is that by David Snedden. It immediately followed his *Sociological Determination of Objectives in Education.* The theses of both works are substantially the same, but the treatment differs. Professor Snedden considers the province of educational sociology to be the determining of educational objectives. He admits that hitherto sociology more philosophic than scientific has been solicited by speculative thinkers who sought some paramount or all-inclusive aim of education. This is not his idea of the practical use of sociology as a science. His claim is that "practical sociology can formulate scores, if not hundreds, of concrete objectives, derived largely as goals or 'optimum resultants' from consideration of three factors—the educabilities of specified types of learners, the personal needs of these learners, and the needs of their societies —from families to nations." [84]

These three specific formulations of sociology for use—community sociology, rural sociology and educational sociology—are but a few of the numerous attempts to adapt the subject to the fields of action. Sociology has been sought by community and neighborhood workers. By means of it they have organized a vast amount of empirical knowledge into basically sound knowledge concerning organization and leadership and the methods of using and developing them. Sociologists blazed the way for social workers who tested out the hypotheses of the theorists in county and village experiments. The pragmatically tested theories are becoming the basis of works on practical rural problem analysis and of rural social welfare practice. Sociologists and professional educators have for a number of years cooperated in sociological experiment to their mutual advantage. Both groups are now more thoroughly convinced than ever before of the need of education for an applied sociology, and of the value of educational units for sociological experiment.

In all three of these fields the need for and the possibilities of an applied sociology have been recognized (in some cases demonstrated) by both social workers and social theorists. As yet these specific formulations of useful sociology represent mere beginnings. But they

84. *Educational Sociology*, p. 83.

are beginnings of attempts to develop an applied sociology and a social economy by the use of sociologically supervised experiment, by testing pragmatically the value of social theories and by refining and organizing social empiricisms.

Inferences. A review of the various, specific formulations of useful sociology reveals efforts both by social workers and by sociologists to meet situations in which action is needed. In some fields the exigency has called forth action prior to the development of a scientifically sound procedure. The needs of the workers in due time enlisted the cooperation of the social scientists. In other fields sociologists from their point of vantage recognized and revealed to social workers needs that were more important than they seemed at close range. When the social workers endeavored to meet these needs or the new opportunities that were disclosed by the sociologists, they entered into cooperative relationship with the latter. Both the social workers and the sociologists have profited by this cooperation.

Attention should be called to the fact that all of the specific "fields" have common social problems. They all have to do with "attitudes" that are a result of social experiences,—attitudes toward law, education, politics, religion and to every other activity. They all deal with communication, suggestion, imitation, competition, discussion, association, administration, control, etc. All institutions are societal mechanisms for accomplishing ends. Regardless of the difference in the functions for which they exist, certain problems of function are common to all such mechanisms. Public opinion, or at least group opinion, also plays an important part in every "field" of social work. The fields of social work are very different and often require highly specialized programs, but in every field there are problems of ways and means of effecting social change which are common to all the fields.

This in brief seems to be the situation. (1) There are no social problems in which sociology is not needed. (2) Few, if any, of these problems can be solved merely by the application of sociology. (3) There are social phenomena that appear in almost every social

problem. (4) Social workers in one field are not able to benefit from the experiences of social workers in other fields because no adequate terminology or interpretive medium exists for the purpose of describing the social phenomena common to their different fields. (5) Social workers are not sufficiently able to understand the relation of their specific problems to larger problems because the terminology used for general sociology is not adapted to the needs of specific fields of action.

General sociology should be part of the equipment of all social workers who are responsible for the determination of objectives and for the working out of policies in their respective fields. Cooperation between sociologists and social workers should lead to a statement of general sociology in terms of the conditions which are actually met by social workers. It should lead to a terminology sociologically accurate and at the same time usable by workers in practical description of the phenomena with which they are dealing.

Cooperation between social workers and sociologists should lead to the development of a sociology that will be practically applicable to all social problems common to the various fields of social work—a general applied sociology. It may also lead to the development of formulations of sociology adapted to the different fields of social work. This applied sociology should satisfy the demand for superior ways and means of effecting social change. It would be used together with applied psychology, biology, economics, etc., for the analysis of social problems and the treatment of social conditions. The combined use of all the social sciences in the analysis of social problems will probably lead to an organization of social science in terms of problems. Such a science may well be called *social economy*.

Summary. In these first five chapters an effort has been made to present evidence of the need for *applied sociology*—not merely a general sociology that may be used as a basis of ethics or for the determination of political or other social objectives—but a sociology of ways and means which can be applied to each and every practical problem in which social factors are involved, a sociology adequate

for the development of societal engineering. For almost a quarter of a century this need has been recognized by leaders in social work. In recent years they have not only very explicitly stated this need, but they have attempted to adapt existing sociological method and knowledge to the solution of their problems. Sociologists have endeavored in various ways to place sociology at the disposal of social workers. And much has been done to bridge the gap between sociological theory and practice in social work. The methodological devices of social statistics, sampling and the survey are being used for research and experiment both by sociologists and by social workers. The pressure upon sociologists to teach the theory already known, and the pressure upon social workers to use what is known in action have tended to retard the development of an applied sociology. But as universities give their instructors more time for research, and as social workers are learning to appreciate the economies that may be discovered by research and experiment, these two groups may enter into a more effective cooperation in developing a practically useful sociology. A larger opportunity for developing applied sociology lies in the realm of business. If applied sociology is to be anything, it must be a science of social control, of organization and of administration. The social problems of the business men are not unlike those of social workers. Once the business man has become as convinced of his need for sociology as is the social worker, he will be able to make vast funds available for research and experiment. He will be able to open up for observation and experiment laboratories vastly more diversified and rich in material than those which are now available. Whenever sociologists are able to demonstrate that they are able to use the data of business to the advantage of business, they will have opened up a new epoch in sociological research. The essential to such a demonstration is a clear conception of the nature and the possibilities of an applied sociology.

PART II

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

Applied Sociology and Ethics

Applied sociology and ethics are not identical. Because of the valuable contributions which sociology has made to ethics and because of the use which ethics has made of the data and the methodology of sociology, ethics is frequently referred to as being the principal application of sociology. This tendency has gone so far that some sociologists speak of ethics and applied sociology as if they were almost if not quite mutually inclusive. This practice is inaccurate and leads to erroneous views. A clearer distinction between the functions and fields of these two subjects should in no way detract from a proper appreciation of the usefulness of sociology to ethics nor from the approval of an ethics well adjusted to the enlightenment contributed by sociology.

Lester F. Ward's treatise entitled *Applied Sociology* is to date the classical American work on this subject. In it he stresses the ethical nature and function of applied sociology. This conception of the approximately mutual inclusiveness of applied sociology and ethics undoubtedly had its origin in part at least in (1) the philosophic character of the sociology of his day and (2) in the motives of the earlier sociologists. Ward's interpretation has had more influence on those sociologists who have written on social ethics than on those who have written on sociology. Even among the latter however very little tendency has been shown to dispute the limitations which this concept would place upon applied sociology or to deny that the ethical was the major application of sociology. In order, therefore, not to make a mere arbitrary reversal of Ward's interpretation, it is well to ask whether his idea of the limited usefulness of sociology may not be attributed to the kind of sociology which was at that time available for application. It is just possible that the nature and trend of sociology are now so different from what they then were as to make a change in the conception of applied sociology natural and perhaps inevitable.

Sociology: A Positive Philosophy or a Special Science. The fact that the sociology of Ward's day was primarily social philosophy is generally admitted. It is, therefore, almost self-evident that the sociology which was primarily a philosophy would be regarded as practically useful in such ways as philosophy is customarily regarded as useful, that is, for the determination of objectives and for the development of ethics. Some, however, admit that the sociology concerning which Ward wrote was a positive philosophy, but these claim that the sociology of the present is a special science. The latter contend that the application of special sciences may be a matter quite independent of their usefulness in the development of ethics. They believe that general sociology may be divided into pure sociology and applied sociology, in such a way that the *pure* and *applied* shall have the same relation to each other as commonly exists between these two parts of all the special sciences. It becomes necessary, therefore, in order to appreciate properly the nature, function and possibilities of applied sociology, to raise the question whether the sociology which is to be applied is a positive philosophy or a special science.

"Sociology is the science of society." Students become infatuated with this definition. They learn it and believe it. They visage in sociology a Sesame to possibilities of power and control in the human realm akin to the increased control in the world of things made possible by the physical sciences. If they sincerely attempt to understand the definition, to read and to study sociology and then endeavor to apply it, they may sooner or later doubt its absolute correctness. In fact, speaking descriptively, sociology is merely becoming a science, and it might be more to the point to say that the objective of sociology is to become a science of society, or a science of human relations and of pluralistic human behavior. Some of the sociologists are certainly endeavoring to make sociology scientific, so that like other sciences it will be accurately descriptive and nicely applicable. A vast deal of the so-called sociology of the present is nothing more than positive philosophy, and some of it is not too positive. Many of its producers, as Professor Giddings

has suggested, might with more propriety be called "sociologians" than sociologists. If the question as to whether the sociology of today is a science or a philosophy be pressed still further, the sincere answer of the most ambitious social scientist who would not deceive himself must be an admission that it is both—that is, if he would include the science. At the present stage in its development, to describe sociology as a science is more of an act of faith than a record of fact. Despite the statement of ardent "wishful thinkers" to the effect that "sociology is the science of society" there is as yet no well organized comprehensive body of scientific knowledge of this sort.

There is a sense in which science may be regarded as very ancient. The term is sometimes used to describe all efforts to explain observed changes in terms of natural antecedents. Professor James T. Shotwell some years ago in an article on "The Role of Magic"[1] used the term science in contradistinction to religion or metaphysics as explanation of antecedent and consequent and as a basis for projects of control. In this very liberal use of the word, it would doubtless be correct to say that social science is very ancient, that it had its beginnings in magic and that it included all positive social philosophy. But if science be limited to what W. Stanley Jevons describes in his *Principles of Science,* Karl Pearson discusses in *The Grammar of Science,* or A. D. Ritchie reviews in *Scientific Method,* it is a recent development in the world's history. It is in the sense that Broad, Jevons, Pearson, Mach, Thomson, Ritchie, et al. have described science, that Giddings describes sociology as becoming a social science. In his two recent works, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society* and *The Scientific Study of Human Society,* he has shown the need for such a social science. He has also made suggestions as to ways and means of developing a sociology which will be an objective analysis of the behavior of groups by the quantitative method. Therefore, when in this discussion sociology is described as a science rather than as a philosophy, there is no intention of discrediting the objective basis of positive

1. *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xv, p. 781 *et seq.*

philosophy. Rather an effort is made to distinguish an intensive phase of sociology from broader and more general methods of abstraction on the one hand and from inadequate empiricism on the other. Sociology as a special social science will attempt to describe multi-human behavior with the nicety of an objective science, the methodology of which has its roots in the methodologies of such masters as Faraday, Clark, Maxwell, Helmholtz, Kelvin, Huxley, Darwin and Pasteur and their successors in physical and biological science. This structural and behavioristic sociology is as yet in the first stages of its emergence.

Since most of the sociology which is at present available for use is more in the nature of social philosophy than of a special social science, it is not surprising that applied sociology is quite commonly regarded as the application of the data and principles of sociology to the formulation of social polity, and the development of social ethics. The facts of sociology have been, are and probably will continue to be presented in the form of a social philosophy which will in turn be used in the manner just described. But sociology is also becoming a social science. As such it will be applied differently and to other problems. It is necessary, therefore, to endeavor to discern the relationship which will probably exist between the applied positive philosophy and the applied special science. This may be accomplished by considering—first, the limitations and possibilities of the applied positive philosophy, then those of the applied social science, and finally by comparing the two.

The Philosophic Nature of Sociology. There can be no doubt as to the philosophic origins of sociology. Herbert Spencer's sociology was born as an integral part of a Synthetic Philosophy. August Comte cradled his sociology in Positive Philosophy. The sociology of Lester F. Ward showed signs of fitting easily into the Glimpses of the Cosmos. It is true that from the beginning these sociologists established a trend away from transcendental and speculative philosophy toward positive philosophy. But it is just as true that they were philosophers. The first descriptions of sociology were akin to the definitions of philosophy itself. They

delineated sociology as the science of the sciences, the organized sum of the sciences, or as the science of which all others are branches. Even the most modest of them rated it highest in the hierarchy of sciences. It is not surprising that social theorists who considered sociology a positive social philosophy, the chief function of which was to work out theories of social progress, should think of usable sociology as a kind of positive moral philosophy much akin to ethics. But ethical and moral philosophies are almost if not quite as old and as comprehensive as the reflective experience of man. Although their development will certainly be modified by the development of positive social philosophy and social science, they cannot be comprehended within a part of sociology—applied sociology.

Ward's Idea of the Ethical Nature of Applied Sociology. As late as 1906, Lester F. Ward, in reviewing the trend and status of sociology as a positive philosophy claimed that applied sociology and ethics are practically the same. Having stated that Comte's *Positive Polity*[2] and Spencer's ethical "regulative system"[3] were "intended as practical applications to society of the scientific systems that preceded them", he also said that "what they called sociology may properly be called pure sociology, and what they called ethics, applied sociology." Since to date no one sociologist has worked more faithfully to define and determine the function of applied sociology than Ward, it is well to consider his more elaborate statement of this unity of ethics and applied sociology. He says, "Ethical sociology is applied sociology, and applied sociology is essentially ethical in the sense of the new ethics, i. e., in the sense of an attempt to show on scientific principles how society may be improved."[4]

Such a conception of the nature and function of applied sociology easily fits into the idea that general sociology is a "comprehensive system of social philosophy" which differs from other philosophy

2. *Cf.* ch. ii of this work on the relation of positive polity to sociology.

3. *Cf.* Preface to *Data of Ethics* or pt. i of the *Principles of Ethics* (1879) and republished in the *Principles of Ethics*, Vol. I (1892).

4. Lester F. Ward, *Applied Sociology*, pp. 28; 317-8. See also *Pure Sociology*, pp. 65-9, esp. footnotes containing correspondence between Spencer and Ward. Cf. also James Q. Dealey: *Sociology, Its Development and Applications*, p. 58.

"in its practical character of never losing sight of the end or purpose, nor of the possibilities of conscious effort."[5] If the philosophic nature of sociology is thus stressed, if sociology is regarded as but a slightly differentiated part of philosophy, and if philosophy in turn be defined, as by Paulsen, to be simply "the continually-repeated attempt to arrive at a comprehensive and systematic knowledge of the form and connection, the meaning and import of all things",[6] it is but natural to conceive the major applications of sociology as residing primarily in its contributions to ethics.

Applied Sociology and Ethics not Identical. The intimate relation of sociology and ethics as it has been represented by the various sociologists, and also the impossibility that these two subjects be mutually inclusive is nicely summarized by Charles A. Ellwood. "It is impossible to separate ethics from sociology or sociology from ethics in any hard and fast way," says Professor Ellwood.[7] On the other hand he makes this clear statement to the effect that social ethics and sociology cannot be mutually inclusive.

> Ethics is an independent science because it has problems of its own, such as the origin, nature and the validity of moral ideas and ideals, norms of conduct and the like. These problems are distinct from those which we have already pointed out for sociology. Ethics cannot be reduced, therefore, to a mere chapter in sociology, because its problems are sufficiently distinct and important to constitute it a relatively independent science; nor, on the other hand, can sociology be regarded as a mere extension of ethics, because its problems are not only distinct from, but fundamental to, those of ethics.[8]

Thus Ellwood leaves with us the statement that sociology and social ethics are not easily separable, and yet are not identical. In this position he has the support of most of the contemporaneous sociologists. If applied sociology is but a part of general sociology,

5. Lester F. Ward, *Applied Sociology*, p. iii, Preface.

6. Frederick Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*. Tr. Thilly, 1898, p. 3.

7. Charles A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 39-44.

8. *Cf.* Professor Ellwood's article on "The Social Basis of Ethics", *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1910. Also Professor Höffding's article on "The Relation Between Sociology and Ethics," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. x, pp. 672-79.

and it cannot take in all the field of ethics, it is quite evident that the part cannot comprehend more than the whole. If Ellwood is positive in his statement that "ethics cannot be reduced to a mere chapter in sociology," Edward C. Hayes is equally positive in his assertion that "sociology . . . . must be scientific ethics and *also much more besides.*" This statement is especially significant because it is made in the middle of a chapter discussing the various applications of sociology, one of the most important of which Professor Hayes believes to be the application to ethics. According to Hayes, both ethics and sociology must be built upon *"constant principles that hold good for all social phenomena."* He believes that the inquiries of general sociology may be divided into two groups, the first relating to "the *terminus ab quo* and the second to the *terminus ad quem* of the life man lives in society." The latter group of inquiries of sociology are much the same as the inquiries of ethics. The development of a specially organized applied sociology is not needed. In fact in the same chapter the author expresses his doubt as to the possibility of sociology's ever becoming a "practical science," a doubt based on an even more fundamental doubt as to whether sociology "can ever be a truly fundamental science."[9]

If then ethics is more than a "mere chapter in sociology" and sociology is "much more besides" ethics; and if where the two fields do overlap, the inquiries of ethics are fundamentally the same as those of general sociology and no special methodology or organization of sociology is necessary to the development of ethics, it seems quite unnecessary to designate this field of common interest and inquiry as that of applied sociology.

The Overlapping of Sociology and Ethics. In the light of the foregoing, there is ample reason for taking issue with Ward as to the identity or mutual inclusiveness of applied sociology and social ethics. Two facts, however, have been established. First, there is an overlapping of the fields of sociology and of ethics. Second, sociology is practically useful in the development of ethics. *Should the term "applied sociology" be used to denote either that part of*

9. Edward C. Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*. ch. iii. esp. pp. 29, 31, 35.

sociology which overlaps ethics, or to describe that part of sociology which may be applied to ethics or is practically useful for the development of ethics? Or should sociology and ethics be regarded as two distinctly separate sciences, related the one to the other in much the same way as ethics is related to other sciences? In the previous part of this chapter attention has been paid to Ward's *interpretation* of Comte and Spencer in this matter. Is there any further light to be obtained from Comte or Spencer or from more recent leaders in sociological thought?

August Comte's Master Science. Comte regarded ethics or morals as the *Master Science.* This was a position at which he ultimately arrived, although at first he appears to have given ethics no place among the sciences. Having in his philosophy discarded all supernatural sanctions, he endeavors to work out an ethics of altruism and a religion of humanity. Sociology was more or less a means to an end. In the latter part of his life, the end was not only the working out of Positive Polity but also of the Master Science. He makes clear his idea of the subordinate relation of sociology to ethics in the statement that "till Moral Science is instituted, all branches of speculation, even sociology, using that term strictly, can be only preliminary."[10] Having accepted ethics as a science, but as the Master Science, he in no way confuses it with sociology. Sociology and ethics are in his mind distinctly separate; for he writes, "The distinction between Sociology and Morality is at bottom not less real and not less useful than the distinction between Sociology and Biology."[11] Sociology is a basis for ethics. Perhaps it is fair to say that physics is a basis for chemistry and that both of these are in turn basic to biology. But this is not considered a reason for describing chemistry as applied physics, or describing biology as applied chemistry. In fact all the sciences, either directly or indirectly, are basic to ethics, but one would not think first of ethics upon hearing the term *applied chemistry.* By these signs, it seems reasonable to conclude that Comte regarded ethics and sociology as

10. August Conte, *Positive Polity*, vol. iii, p. 41 (Eng. tr.).

11. *Ibid*, vol. ii, ch. vii, *cf.* also vol. iii, intro., p. 4 and ch. i, pp. 40-42.

different sciences and that sociology was basic to ethics. There is however no evidence that he regarded ethics as an equivalent of applied sociology. Even though the sociology which Comte had in mind was more of a general positive philosophy than a special science, he regarded it as having about the same relation to ethics as any other science would have, with the possible exception of a little closer relation due to its high rank in the hierarchy of sciences.

Herbert Spencer's Principles of Ethics. Spencer admits in the various prefaces to his *Principles of Ethics* and elsewhere that he never lost sight of his chief objective, the formulation of the principles of justice. The working out of his *First Principles* was to this end. However, he makes no claim to an identity of ethics and sociology either in part or whole. He does show that sociology may be exceedingly useful in the developing of ethics. It may for instance serve a philosophic purpose in furnishing grounds for faith in an evolutionary ethics, or it may serve very specific and immediate purposes such as explaining choice in marriage or the obligations of parenthood. In setting forth the sociological view of ethics he says that "ethics becomes nothing else than a definite account of the forms of conduct that are fitted to the associated state, in such wise that the lives of each and all may be the greatest possible, alike in length and breadth."[12] But all of his ethics is worked out of the inference that

> There is being effected a conciliation of the individual natures with social requirements; so that there will eventually be achieved the greatest individuation along with the greatest mutual dependence—an equilibrium of such kind that each in fulfilling the wants of his own life will spontaneously aid in fulfilling the wants of all other lives.[13]

If the achievement of a social equilibrium of this sort were to be the end of effort, it would be natural to conceive the major contribution of sociology as consisting of its offering of *ways and means* to this end. But Spencer further insists that this social equilibrium

12. Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, vol. i, sec. 48, p. 133 (New York, 1897).
13. *Ibid*, general preface, p. vii.

has a direction in the universe, that it is a moving equilibrium[14] with a problem of *whence* and *whither*. In a discussion of this theme, Giddings claims there are problems incident to both an *extra* or *inter* equilibration and an *intra* equilibration.[15] In this event there tend to be two groups of ethical problems, the first related to *extra* equilibration dealing with remote universal processes; the second related to *intra* equilibration dealing with more specific and proximate problems. The first group of problems requires a positive philosophy; the second requires a special science. The projection of this *extra* equilibration complicates the calculations of social science somewhat as Einstein's theories have complicated the calculations of the abstract and the physical sciences. Sociology may prove adequate for working out the principles of what Spencer considered the ethical problems of the "knowable" and of the ethical problems incident to the attainment of the social equilibrium. But however much it may contribute of data or of methodology to these ethical problems, sociology is not supposed to comprehend all of this. Consequently no *part* of sociology (such as applied sociology) would comprehend it.

This however is not all the story. Some thinkers insist on consigning to ethics problems associated on the one hand with ventures of faith and hope in the yet entirely unexplored (perhaps "unknowable") fields of human possibilities—the guesses and gambles of life where the odds are creatures of purely speculative rather than of scientific reasoning. Others turn over to ethics the problems associated with society's effort to determine the whither of its own moving equilibrium—a whither which may be in part controlled or determined by society itself. The problems of the adjustment of individuals to each other in the attainment of an equilibrium are simple compared with the problem of the collective self-control of the direction of the moving equilibrium. Sociology may be able to contribute substantially to

14. Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, sec. 144.

15. Franklin H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, pp. 135-143, and *Principles of Sociology*, p. 374.

reflective thought concerning this whence and whither of the moving equilibrium and to its ethical connotations. The relationship which would exist in this case between sociology as a positive *philosophy* and the ethics to which it would be contributory is suggested by Giddings in an article on "The Grounds of Presumption." He states that

> While philosophy may not confound itself with religious faiths or with esthetic or moral values, nor lose itself in them, it should not ignore them nor let them alone. All of them build upon presumptions. These presumptions philosophy should scrutinize and pronounce them philosophically valid or invalid, as impartially as it judges the presumptions underlying inductive science.[16]

In this article Giddings makes clear that philosophy (of which positive social philosophy is a part) has another function in relation to ethics, a critical as well as a contributory function. But he also makes clear that philosophy and ethics are not to be confounded. Sociology, therefore, even if it be regarded as philosophy should not be confounded with ethics.

Ethical Data of Applied Sociology. Practical sociology must of necessity study the effects of philosophical and religious beliefs and ideals, and of the ethical values and motives associated with them. It examines them, however, as *conditions* of formation of other social conditions, of the formation of new social relations and of the development of changes in human behavior. It should make careful investigation of the way in which these beliefs can be used for changing social structure or social processes. But applied *sociology does not evaluate these beliefs and ideals except as they are conditions of specific social changes or of social status.* Nor does the practical sociologist need to pass judgment on the philosophic or ethical desirability of maintaining of status or of making any social change. It is his business to know how these ethical factors can be used to create specific changes. The specifications for the changes desired are the work of *character architects.*

16. Franklin H. Giddings, "The Grounds of Presumption", *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. xix, no. 23, p. 623.

Practical sociology tells these architects how certain things which they desire may be attained. It defines for them the limits of practicability within which it is safest to work.

But the practical sociologist may be called upon to outline a procedure for changing group opinion in regard to these very beliefs and ideals. There is no gainsaying the fact that group beliefs, opinions, mores and customs are social phenomena. The specifications in this case call for a social change in these very phenomena. The practical sociologist may outline a procedure for the accomplishment of this change with whatever information he may have at hand for that purpose. He need not, however, even in this case, adjudge the ultimate philosophic or ethical significance of the change. He brings it to pass, studies the process, the new social conditions and the other social changes resulting from this one in so far as they are scientifically verifiable.

There are those who say that *conscience* which is itself at least in part a social product and which is certainly a conditioning social phenomenon, demands the consideration of any useful sociology. It must be included in the field of applied sociology, they contend. As a result it is impossible to separate applied sociology from ethics. Pure sociology will undoubtedly study all the social phenomena of social conscience, of individual conscience as a part of social conscience and of its social development. But it will make no general evaluation of different types of social conscience, except as these are verifiable conditions of social structure or behavior. Applied sociology will include the study of the use of conscience and ethical motives for maintaining social status or effecting social change. It will formulate procedures for effecting change in conscience. It will also formulate procedures for the attainment of specific social changes which may be required by men's consciences. The value of these proposed or accomplished changes in any universal scheme of affairs is a problem of ethics. The practical sociologist deals only with those phenomena which can be specifically identified as antecedents and consequents,

with conscience as a stimulus or with the effects of various stimuli on conscience.

Having set forth the ways and means by which social changes can be effected, applied sociology does not essay to recommend one way or another as superior in any ultimate ethical sense. The practical sociologist is willing to state the probable social change or changes resulting from a single (simple or compound) change in condition or situation. He is also willing to go further and to work out the practical probabilities of series of social changes consequent upon one change of conditions, or of series of social consequences associated with a series of changes in condition. His task ends when he has reached the limits of scientific analysis and of significant probability.

Franklin H. Giddings' "Proximate Ends" and "Ultimate Ends." A consideration of the relationship of sociology to the attainment of what Giddings calls *proximate ends* and *ultimate ends* may further clarify our thought and strengthen our position in taking issue with Ward. Giddings after having stated that "the sum of the ends for which society exists is social welfare",[17] proceeds to divide these ends into *proximate* and *ultimate*.[18] The proximate ends are but means to the ultimate end, which Plato and Aristotle recognized as being the perfection of personality, the creation of the socialized man, or of what Giddings has called "social personality" or "adequacy *of* man and *in* man." The proximate ends, public utilities are but means to this "ultimate." As a positive philosophy, sociology lends itself to the determination of "proximate ends", "remoter values" (Ward) and "practicable objectives" (Snedden). It is the basis also for evaluating general policies or polity leading up to them. But the development of ways and means by which the proximate ends can be achieved requires the specific findings of an exact science of social relations and of social behavior.

17. Article "Sociology," *New International Ency.*, p. 812.

18. Franklin H. Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 522-3.

This special science should reveal "causation"[19] in such a way as to make possible the acceleration or the retardation of social sequences. It should provide the information for modifying the circumstances and conditions of pluralistic behavior. It should give us the data for the conditioning pluralistic behavior. It should provide a theory of causation which could be exploited for purposes of social control. It should provide, through the intensive development of the theory of causation, ways and means of achieving proximate ends. Its use, however, could not be limited to the attainment of ethically approved proximate ends. It can be used for the attainment of preferential ends which may have a mooted ethical value. And it may be used for achievements which are unethical.

Albion Small's "What and How." This idea of the double usefulness of sociology is in line with the position taken by Albion W. Small. He maintains that the premises of any code of morals must include sociology. But he implies that there are other premises. His statement is as follows:

> Ethics must consist of empty forms until sociology can indicate the substance to which the forms apply. Every ethical judgment with an ethical content has at least tacitly presupposed a sociology . . . . No code of morals can be adopted in the future without implying a sociology as a part of its premises. To those who are acquainted with both the history of ethics and the scope of sociology these propositions are almost self-evident.[20]

He further exactly states that sociology as a "pure science" is tributary to ethics and that therein lies the only sufficient reason for its existence. He appears to use the term "pure science" to describe much the same phase of sociology that has been designated as "positive social philosophy" in this chapter. His more explicit

19. Franklin H. Giddings, "The Concepts and Methods of Sociology," *Amer. Jour. Sociology*, vol. x, no. 2, Sept., 1904. Esp. pp. 175-6. *Cf.* Also his *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*. chs. vii, vii.

20. Albion Small, *General Sociology*, p. 668.

statement of the *tributary* relationship of the "pure science" to ethics is as follows:

> Sociology would have no sufficient reason for existence if it did not contribute at least to knowledge of what is worth doing. As it is hardly worth while to challenge the traditional concession of the whole field of conduct-valuation of ethics, we may frankly rank sociology as tributary to ethics. The ultimate value of sociology as pure science will be its use as an index and a test and a measure of what is worth doing.

Without committing himself to the term *applied sociology*, Small distinctly states that sociology should contribute to our knowledge of *how* to accomplish those social changes which in the light of positive sociology are most worthy of effort. His statement is as follows:

> The ultimate problem on the side of pure science is, *What is worth doing?* The ultimate practical problem is, *How may the thing worth doing be done?* The former is the most general form of the constructive problem of ethics; the latter is the most general form of the technical problem of life.

In this last statement Small seems to follow Ward in limiting the *use* of sociology to the achievement of that which is "worth doing." In fact, even if it were desirable, such a limitation of the use of sociology is impossible. Those who have quite different and perhaps opposite or even antagonistic views of what is worth while will use sociology to achieve what in their own minds is most satisfactory. Sociology will be used in trial and error experiments. Some of these experiments may be efforts to improve human welfare; others may be merely phases of the struggle for existence or advantage.

The Twofold Application of Sociology. This, then, seems to be the substance of the matter. Ethics comprehends more than positive social philosophy. Sociology and ethics do overlap, and ethics is dependent upon sociology. In a very real sense ethics makes use of the data and principles of sociology. The sociology which contributes to Small's *what* is intimately associated with the sociology which leads to Giddings' *ends*. The sociology which is thus related to

ethics is and perhaps always will be, in the nature of positive philosophy. Ethics makes use of this positive *social* philosophy as a part of the entity of positive philosophy on which it is established. No special organization of sociological material is necessary for this purpose. A well organized *general sociology* is all that is needed. There is no more warrant for describing this use of positive social philosophy as *applied sociology* than there is for labeling as applied philosophy all other philosophy which may be used for the development of ethics or the projection of remote objectives.

There is a sense in which sociology as a special social science is contributing to ethics. As has been intimated, this type of social theory will not only make it possible to reduce the probability errors in the calculation of "remoter values", "proximate ends" and "practical objectives", but it will also evaluate factors of condition and circumstance in terms of their usefulness for attaining these values, ends, and objectives. In so far as sociology, as an intensive social science, makes it possible to refine the calculations of these values in terms of their probable usefulness, it will undoubtedly make definite and specific contributions to conduct-values. Applicable, practical or applied sociology may force a revision of appreciation that will demand new ethical codes and what is more significant, new ethical thought processes. These multitudinous specific contributions of the special science will doubtless be most effectively contributed to ethics as an assimilated part of general sociology. And while socially minded leaders in the various highly specialized professions occasionally will draw directly from the findings of inductive sociology such data as they need for the ethics of their profession,[81] no fundamentally significant special organization of sociology will be needed for this purpose.

Major Thesis. Having now shown, perhaps at undue length, what applied sociology is *not*, we arrive at our major thesis.

The applications of sociology which require an especially organized and a differentiated applied sociology are those which have to do with how to achieve proximate ends.

81. *Cf. The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. ci, no. 190, entitled "The Ethics of the Professions and of Business."

The ends which are to be achieved may or may not have an ethical justification. Their pursuit may be by socially minded theorists, or by merely self-interested empirists and pragmatists. The argument may be presented that sociology is so comprehensive, its description so vast and inclusive as to make it difficult to draw off the abstractions essential to ethics or basic for ethology.

If such be the case, the answer does not lie in an applied sociology, but in quite the opposite direction—in a pure sociology. This pure sociology, which would in a sense be a super-abstraction, might be regarded as a nucleation within general sociology. In this latter sense, as a part of the whole, it might be regarded as a subdivision of general sociology. Whether there will be such a need between general sociology and ethics remains to be seen. This much seems obvious, that any subdivision for this purpose would be essentially different from an applied sociology, organized in terms of ways and means, in terms of how to achieve and how to control—a sociology which will be a liaison between theory and practice.

Ethics and Social Control. One really significant contribution which the development of a practicable science of social control will make to ethics, will consist of a host of entirely new ethical problems as an inevitable product of the use of scientific methods of social control. The revolution which followed the discovery of scientific ways and means of harnessing physical energy ushered in a new social order. This in turn brought an unprecedented demand for a revision of ethics. The materialistic development, and especially that of communication and transportation, resulting from the advances made in the physical and natural sciences has given rise to industrial and international problems in practical ethics that demand a speeding up of the development of something like that which John Stuart Mill was pleased to call ethology. But the modern ethology must be saved from the failure which befell Mill's effort by being based on behavioristic psychology more than upon logical deductions from a utilitarian philosophy. Positive social philosophy as a comprehensive theory of social causation, organized and stated so as to absorb the contributions and corrections

of the special social sciences, should be of very real practical value to those who as ethologists rather than as ethologians endeavor to develop such an ethology.

Who will use a science of social control and just what will they do with it? This is almost always the immediate query of those who have contemplated for the first time the possibilities of a practical science of social control. Many fear that it will be the most dangerous tool ever put into the hands of unscrupulous self-seekers. Some feel that it is equally dangerous as a tool of well-meaning but ill-advised zealots for social betterment. Others see in it unlimited possibilities of social self-control led by socially minded intelligentsia. It is not feasible to attempt to discuss specific phases of these questions prior to an inquiry into the probable nature and scope of applied sociology. A single problem may serve as suggestive of the ethical complications that may occur. On whom would the responsibility for behavior fall in a situation of this sort? Mr. A, a promoter, desires to achieve certain specific ends. He asks Mr. B to draw up a social plan by which they may be achieved. Having accepted the plan, he asks Mr. C to set up the social device or mechanism outlined by Mr. B. This having been done, the organization (device or mechanism) is turned over to an operating social engineer, Mr. D. The societal mechanism is so constructed that various individuals as unconscious receptors of external stimuli of a suggestive sort may start a multi-individual response within the mechanism. By a process of societal psychology involving something like synapse in reflexes, the stimuli may pass to and through a functional or rational center of the mechanism and culminate in an efferent activity of a group which may know nothing of the nature of, or of the reason for the original stimulation. This particular societal response may have been unknown to A, B, C or D and may have been the result of a suggestion deliberately given by Mr. E. This hypothetical problem may be at least suggestive of the complications of ethics that may accompany societal engineering.

The extension of projects of social control and of societal engineer-

ing such as must inevitably follow in the wake of the intensive development of the practical values of sociology as a special social science will usher in a new epoch in ethics. The new ethics, even as the new sociology, must depend increasingly upon a methodology which will correlate specific variations of conditions with variations of human behavior. It must also have an objectively determined knowledge of the societal conditioning of human behavior. In fact, however much of practical value the development of the positive social theories of Comte and Spencer concerning *ab quo ad quam* may have contributed to the ethics of the past generation, the objective observational sociology of this generation is likely to contribute even more of practical value both in content and in methodology.

The efforts to exert social control in the interest of special groups on the basis of "confidential" empirical knowledge (social trade secrets) are rapidly multiplying. It is quite probable that an applied sociology of the sort described in these pages will increase the possibilities of social control, and these possibilities may be grasped alike by socially minded idealists or unscrupulous individualists. The revision and synthetizing of social empiricisms into a systematized applied sociology will make them available for the use of the general public for programs defensive and offensive. The development of a science of social control will open up new possibilities of control to those who desire to use it. This is likely to lead to a more complete control of those who are relatively indifferent as to what extent they are controlled.

The devices and mechanisms of social control now existing and in use are powerful, extensive and often subtle. New processes are continually being developed and new mechanisms devised and set up in every walk of life. Not infrequently these creations and their operation is the work of self-interested empiricists who guard their "rules of thumb" as trade secrets. The easy accessibility of a science of social control would tend to reduce the effectiveness of such practices. On the other hand, will certain groups by means of scientific investigation always have a lead on the public? Perhaps

so. Who can tell in this or any other field how many of the benefits of pioneering in social research should go to those who are responsible for the risks and who pay the costs of the search for new and better ways? It is conceivable that the development in the great educational centers of laboratories of general applied sociology which could do business with such specialists on a basis of mutual advantage might in this field as it has in other fields operate to put social control less on a basis of trade secrets and inside information and more on the basis of ability and desire. However this may work out, it is evident that the rise of a science of social control would both complicate the problems of public policy and contribute to the ability of the public to meet them.

Sociology Applied to Public Policy. In one of the Atlantic coast summer resorts a most interesting problem in public health policy recently presented itself. The dispensaries of the city, organized as usual for the economically disadvantaged, were so efficiently administered as to be most attractive to the overprivileged as well as to the underprivileged. The "limousine" patronage became very noticeable and called forth various protests not only from the profession immediately concerned, but from the very same people who considered no education too good for the children of the community and who took a certain amount of satisfaction in the large number of economically favored children who availed themselves of the opportunity offered by the city's superior public school system. This situation is typical of problems in policy which the practitioner is meeting every day. It reminds one of those delightful opening paragraphs in Spencer's *The Study of Sociology*, wherein he says:

> Over his pipe in the village ale-house, the labourer says very positively what Parliament should do about the "foot and mouth disease." At the farmer's market-table, his master makes the glasses jingle as, with his fist, he emphasizes the assertion that he did not get half enough compensation for his slaughtered beasts during the cattle plague.

As in Spencer's time, so in the present, conflicting ideas exist in regard to every effective or proposed social policy. Men are

still saying, "We must adapt our measures to immediate exigencies, and cannot be deterred by remote considerations." Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that men of affairs, feeling that they "must do something" are paying increasing attention to the possibilities of sociology as a background or basis for the determination of policy.

The manifestations of the growing appreciation of the practical value of sociology for policy are of various kinds. In the first place, a review of the men who were advanced students of sociology from ten to twenty-five years ago reveals the fact that a very considerable number, instead of continuing in academic work, as they had expected to when they commenced specializing in sociology, have entered into various fields of practical activity. With few exceptions they have attained remarkable success. Some of them have converted their sociology into business administration, not a few into practical politics, many into social work and other forms of public service, a large number are shaping public opinion as editors and preachers. Sociologists are increasingly in demand for advisory boards. The custom of paying them "advisory" or "directors" fees when "sitting in" with men of affairs, although of recent origin, has been growing steadily. No less steadily has been the growth of the custom of submitting practical projects to sociologists for "opinions" as to the more remote social consequences to be expected. A not too clearly defined but urgent need repeatedly pressed by professional schools for what might be called fundamental courses in sociological appreciation adapted in each case to the needs of the profession is as significant as any of the other needs. Such are the evidences that there is a growing faith in the practical possibilities of sociology as a basis for the formation and evaluation of social policies.

These demands do not require a sociology especially organized for the purpose. They do require the intensive treatment of particular problems of policy against a general sociological background. Lawyers appreciate Jethro Brown's *Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation* and the numerous sociological interpretations of Roscoe Pound and Paul Vinogradoff. Religious leaders have profited by

Simon Patton's *Social Basis of Religion* and Charles Ellwood's *Reconstruction of Religion.* Practical politicians still read Walter Bagehot's *Physics and Politics.* Many have commented on the practical value of Giddings' *Responsible State,* and others will doubtless read to practical advantage Harry Elmer Barnes' *Sociology and Political Theory.* These works are typical of the usefulness of general sociology for purposes of interpretation and as a basis of social policy. In time, each profession will doubtless have a considerable number of works dealing with the larger social aspects of the profession. These works are usually written over outlines representing distinct phases or problems of the profession. In other words, whatever organization of material there may be other than the usual organization of general sociology is but a restatement of the more significant theories of general sociology around an outline that is natural to the profession. Works of this sort are generally those of theory drawn directly from general sociology. Since their function is to show the relation of particular social problems to more comprehensive social problems, they are in a very real sense the interpretations of a positive social philosophy. They do not represent intensive researches and experiment in special fields so much as they are the use of general theories for the examination of the postulates and general procedures of particular kinds of practice.

The tendency to regulate social behavior and to construct social mechanisms is steadily increasing. The by-products of the operation of these regulations and mechanisms are often more significant than the functions which the regulation or mechanisms were originally designed to accomplish. With the ever increasing complexity of society and the extended possibilities of regulation and organization, the task of discerning the by-products of policies and procedures becomes more difficult. It is relatively easy to repress certain types of social behavior by education, intimidation or legislation, or to stimulate other types of behavior by sanction of social esteem, religious blessing or political preferment. It is much more difficult to calculate the by-products of the procedures used to effect

changes in social behavior. It is relatively easy to set up social organizations that can achieve or produce certain desiderata. But it is almost impossible to forsee all the by-products of such mechanisms. One of the practical services of general sociology is to make it possible to estimate more accurately the unforseen or as yet unpredictable by-products of social regulation and purposive social organization.

Summary. Sociology until recently has been almost entirely a positive philosophy, and general sociology may continue to be such. There have also developed within the last two decades the beginnings of a sociology which is a special social science—an intensive behavioristic study of the specific social phenomena. Both are of practical value to ethics and for the determination of public policies. The special science makes most, if not all, of its contributions to ethics and polity through general sociology of which it is a part.

The exceptionally satisfactory manner in which general sociology contributes to ethics and polity is one of the chief justifications of its integral existence. There are those who maintain that the ascendency of theoretical social science like that of Ricardo and Marshall in economics and of Comte and Spencer in sociology is near its end, and that social philosophy of this type will be absorbed by general philosophy, of which it may remain a somewhat distinct phase. Impressed by the rise of inductive sociology and of observational sociology based on objective studies of multi-individual and societal behavior by the quantitative method, they point to it as the only sociology sufficiently and characteristically differentiated to deserve a special designation among the social sciences. There are others who regard the latter as merely a phase or an extension of social psychology. This discussion is indeed but an incident of that interminable question as to whether there is but one science or subject or whether there are many. The question is not raised at this point in order to debate the titular rights of sociology or to defend these rights, if such there be, as covering any specific scientific domain. It is raised merely as the proper setting in which to present the single claim that the usefulness of general sociology

to ethics and for polity for the last quarter of a century may be regarded as evidence of worth perhaps sufficient in itself, to justify the recognition of sociology with rights in its own name to a place among the social sciences. General sociology may be regarded as a comprehensive theory of social causation and an exposition of societal phenomena, which has developed as a natural and useful integration of thought interjacent between the limited generalizations of the special social sciences and the more comprehensive generalizations of philosophy based upon all sciences.

General sociology may represent an integration of but partially tested theories and of tentative generalizations with limitations that are obvious. But if it is an integration of theories that have passed through superior pragmatic tests and if the error of its generalizations is known and can be discounted, it may be of inestimable practical value as compared with the types of social philosophy which heretofore have been used for the calculation of policy and the development of ethics.

General sociology is of practical value as a science of order. It is a comprehensive statement of the findings of all the social sciences in so far as they relate to human relations and social behavior. As a comprehensive description of social and societal phenomena it is useful not only for orientation and appreciation but also for the determination of ethical values and as a basis for estimating the remoter implications of policy. General sociology is available for the needs of ethics without any special organization of its content such as might properly be described as applied sociology.

Although ethics has made much use of sociology, there is no adequate reason for calling ethics applied sociology in accord with the custom started when sociology was only a social philosophy and ethics and policy were its major applications. Ethics is more than a subdivision of sociology called applied sociology, and at the same time it represents but one of the fields in which sociology is applicable. General sociology is a systematized body of knowledge primarily descriptive which contributes to social ethics. Ethics, or "ethology," in so far as it is a systematic organization of knowledge,

is organized for practical guidance and only part of its content is sociological. Even if the fields are considered as overlapping, there is no very evident need for any special organization of knowledge that might be called ethical-sociology, or sociological ethics. Thus, although ethics makes practical use both of the content and of the methods of general sociology, no specifically differentiated subdivision of sociology such as might be called applied sociology seems to be necessary for this purpose.

Applied sociology is a science of practical probability. It is a science of ways and means to achieve proximate social ends. As such it will doubtless also contribute to ethics and to ethical achievements. To regard it as equivalent to social ethics is not only confusing but misleading. Applied sociology will not be extensively developed in laboratories of social ethics nor organized primarily for the use of ethics. It will grow out of the persistent attempts to use sociology as a basis for societal engineering, and it will be organized for use by social engineers.

Since applied sociology is not identical with ethics, and since the application of general sociology to the development of ethics does not require any special organization of sociology such as might appropriately be designated as applied sociology—*the term "applied sociology" is left free and available as an appropriate designation for a sociology developed and organized so as to be practically useful in devising ways and means to achieve proximate ends.* These ends may or may not be ethically significant. In so far as applied sociology is useful in practical refinements of the arts of living and working together, and in so far as it contributes to the elimination of social waste and the development of practical social economy, it is useful for social betterment.

CHAPTER II

Social Science and Social Art: Social Economy and Social Work

Practically useful sociology must not be confused with the practical application of sociology. The one is organized knowledge; the other is practice. Applied sociology is treated in this work as a characteristically differentiated part of sociology. As such it is of course a scientific study of society and should in no wise be confused with social work which is an art rather than a science. Auguste Comte, the father of the term "sociology", clearly distinguishes between the terms "social science" and "social art." The distinction which he made when sociology was still in its infancy remains valid, significant and useful. But in a strange and unaccountable way his valuable contribution to clarity of thought concerning this difference has received little or no serious attention, not even from those who either first or most consistently adopted his term "sociology." As a result there has been a vast deal of confusion of thought in regard to the nature, scope and function of (1) pure or general sociology, (2) practical or applied sociology, (3) what has frequently been called social economy and (4) social work, the art based on the science of applied sociology and social economy. Most of this confusion might have been avoided by consistently following this distinction which he so clearly makes in his *Philosophie Positive*. The first three are parts of the field of social science, the latter is a mode of social art.

Social art is improved by the use of social science. This use of social science in the development of social art is undoubtedly a practical application of the science. Any part or parts of the science which may be organized and developed in order to meet the needs of social art or to bring out its possibilities may be called *applied social science*. More specifically, that sociology which is organized and developed to meet the needs of social work or of any other social art and to bring out its possibilities may with propriety be

called *applied sociology*. This applied sociology cannot be the mere systematized projections of academic sociology. It should be a development growing out of the practical efforts to use social science to meet the needs and the possibilities of social art. On the other hand, there can be no unified applied sociology, nor an applied sociology fitting naturally into general sociology, and thereby into all social science, unless the development of applied sociology is in line with and restrained by the projects of general sociologists. Some of the efforts of sociologists to meet the most urgent of these needs, both general and special, have been presented in preceding chapters. Suggestions have also been made as to the possibilities of the use of the science in the further development of social art. This chapter is devoted to an analysis of the relations which prevail between social science and social art. It deals in a general way with all attempts to improve social art by means of practical applications of social science. More especially it deals with the relation of social economy to that branch of social art usually described as social work.

The Significance of the Term "Social Art." There are professional social workers who object to having their "profession" styled an "art" and who shrink from being regarded as "social artists." This may be in part due to the fact that they regard an art as carrying with it something of opprobrium. Perhaps they think of it as a proper term for the activities of the medicine man, the conjurer, the astrologer and the alchemist. It is true that the word art has frequently been used to cover artfulness and cunning, often based upon tradition rather than upon science. It is interesting to notice in this connection that Freud says: "We rightly speak of the magic of art and compare the artist with a magician. This comparison," he says, "is perhaps more important than it claims to be." For "art which certainly did not begin as art for art's sake, originally served tendencies which today have for the greater part ceased to exist. Among these we may suspect various magic intentions."[1] In making this statement, he follows Reinach who believes

1. Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, p. 161.

that even the primitive graphic artists used art as a means to "conjure things."[2]

But whatever may have been the beginnings of art or of arts, the term cannot be restricted to any such narrow limitation. Art must include everything that relates to the use of man and of things for the attainment of a purpose. Mill has said that "art is but the employment of the powers of nature for an end." It must include in its broadest sense all efforts to employ intelligence and will in the utilization of things and of men for all ends. Although its beginnings may have been crude, and its earliest methods may have been based upon magic, the nature of art is in no way dependent upon or inseparably related to inferior types of thinking.[3] Art has had a steady development that has included all purposive utilization whether it was practical or whether it was art for its own sake. This purposive utilization, built upon the controls of totemism and taboo, tradition and magic, now embodies all of man's purposive achievements in reshaping the world and the society in which he lives. It is in this sense that we use the word *social art*. When an art is developed into a profession, this term does not imply that it will be less an art, but rather that it may be more of an art.

The gradual acceptance of this broader meaning of the term art is reflected in the growth of our schools for *practical or applied arts*.[4] In some cases these schools have included practical social arts as a part of their offering in general practical arts. The extent to which this terminology will be accepted remains to be seen. Its acceptance or non-acceptance does not affect the contention that the term "art" has been used to cover arts which have become highly professionalized and which are built on the most scientific basis. When the term "social art" is used in this discussion, it will be a label to denote a concept of purposive achievement which is very

2. S. Reinach, *L'Art et la Magie*, in the collection *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, vol. 1, pp. 125-136. Also *Apollo*, tr. by Florence Simmonds (1921 ed.), pp. 6-7.

3. J. T. Shotwell, "The Role of Magic," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 15, p. 781.

4. See, for example, the scope of the professional work included in the bulletins of the School of Practical Arts of Teachers College, Columbia University.

comprehensive. It includes both social fine arts and social practical arts. These may or may not be professional. It includes art based upon cruder kinds of reflective thinking as well as those arts based upon modern refinements of social science. Neither the term social art nor the term social artist, in reality the social artisan or social worker, need carry any stigma or any narrow limitations of activity.

A Justifiable Limitation of the Term "Social Art." The term "social art" is used in two distinctly different senses. The one usage refers to any art which is collectively or socially achieved; the other usage refers to all purposeful changes in social relations and behavior, whether they are the result of individual or of group activity. The first is too comprehensive, for at present it would necessarily include almost everything that is produced and every change that is deliberately effected. If the term social art is to mean anything, it must be limited to changes in ways of living and working together. Revision of human relations and of cooperative activities will of course result in hitherto impossible achievements, but these achievements will be results of social art and should not be confused with it. It seems reasonable to limit social art to changes in human relations and pluralistic behavior which are achieved through purposive endeavor. This is what Ward had in mind when he described the results of social art as artificial society. It is what Giddings has in mind when he speaks of transition from component to constituent society. Human relations and behavior are continually becoming in this sense more artificial and constituent in every detail of human experience. The rapid and continuous modifications of ways of living and working together are inevitable. Social arts are multiplying and the need for social artists or social workers is being felt and announced in new fields of human effort almost every day. There is no question as to the demand for social workers. A very real question however arises as to whether social science is even approximately meeting the needs of the various social arts that are being developed. It is certain that there is no social science adequate for the development of the possibilities of many of the new social arts.

Social Art Precedes Social Science. Historical evidence shows that art generally preceded science. This generalization carries with it the corollary that social art preceded social science. William Graham Sumner in his *Folkways* says: "Men begin with acts and end with thoughts." His thesis is that "need was the first experience, and it was followed at once by a blundering effort to satisfy it." He is impressed with the fact that "if we put together all that we have learned from anthropology and ethnology about primitive men and primitive society, we perceive that the first task of life is to live."[5] In their efforts to live together safely, men stumbled upon pleasing and useful social relationships and effective methods of cooperation. They developed social habits and societal functioning. In so doing, they were often quite unconscious of developing or achieving a new social order. But the mere development of highly differentiated social relationships and coordinated differentiated behavior cannot be called social art, unless we are willing to include as social art such achievements among lower animals as are recorded in the first chapters of Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid*. It is only when these changes become conscious and purposive that they may be called social art. In his development of the idea of "mores" Sumner calls attention to the fact that there can be very radical reconstructions of society definitely purposive but these need not be based upon any scientific analysis or achieved through the following out of any scientifically constructed project.

Ward could not be convinced that achievements in practical art can precede achievements in science. Concerning this he says: "All progress in practical art must be preceded by progress in science."[6] Ward claims that the simpler arts were based upon those beginnings of the exercise of intellectual faculties which were either the precursors or the earliest stages of scientific thinking.

Ward's position in this matter is probably due to the fact that he uses "art" in a somewhat restricted sense. He does not seem to

5. William Graham Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 2.

6. Lester F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, vol. i, p. 87. See also vol i, pp. 59, 522; vol. ii, pp. 193, 200, 203, 249, 252, 497, 625. *Pure Sociology*, pp. 512-8.

include all that Freud and Reinach have described as art. He also is inclined to limit social art to those purposively achieved social changes which improve society. Within these limitations his thesis is probably correct, but some art (including social art) has been very crude and some of it has done society more harm than good. One of the functions of social science is to refine the crudities of social art, and to enable those who so desire to evaluate social arts in terms of social welfare.

In their recent writings Wissler, Goldenweiser, Lowie, Ellwood and others have emphasized the manner in which "trait complexes" are evolved. These authors have also shown how "pattern ideas" both of local and of universal arts have in times past grown out of a rigorous selection of empirically justified group habits. The diffusion of these arts was sometimes unconscious but was often and at many points the result of definitely purposive action. Thus there was a progressive development and diffusion of social arts for which there was no scientific basis. The art of social control appears to be coextensive with the history of man. As human relations were definitely established and as human associations were expanded, this art was increasingly based upon critical reflective thinking. But since social science is a relatively recent product, it is necessary to admit that social art must have preceded social science. In fact without doubt in every activity in human life there will be a constantly increasing development of the social arts. These social arts, like all other arts, will undergo unprecedented development when they become established upon scientific method. The critical and analytical *observation* of these arts as practiced will be a means of developing an applied sociology. In other words the scientific scrutiny of purposively achieved social changes will make possible the development of an *observational sociology* which will richly contribute to both pure and applied sociology. The development of social arts is inevitable. The social scientist must decide whether he will profit by intimate and comprehensive cooperation with social artists and in turn increase his capacity to serve them, or whether he

will hold himself aloof and let the artists fumble along as best they can. Cooperation between social artists and social scientists will be most effective when the work of the one group is clearly distinguished from that of the other. The arts are highly diversified and the sciences are essentially unified. The task of developing a sociology useful for artists includes the working out of cooperative research, and the organization of usable sociology in such form as to make it available to artists and sensitive to the corrections of experience.

Condorcet and Saint-Simon. Suggestion of the need for a clearer distinction between social science and social art was made over a century ago by one of the best students of social dynamics in the eighteenth century, Condorcet (1743-94). This practically minded man was an optimist and something of an enthusiast, especially over the possibilities of science. He regarded the turbulence and revolution of his day as the climax of a long period of preparation for a new type of civilization which was to be achieved through the use of science. In fact, he made many remarkably accurate as well as some extravagant statements as to the part which science would play in improving human welfare. Condorcet regarded "The Social Art"[7] as a kind of empirical art based upon the accumulated selections of satisfactory trial and error group efforts. Such an art of collective achievements undoubtedly commenced to develop ages ago when men learned in this way to replace the individual struggle for existence, and later the struggle for advantage and achievement, with a group struggle. Its development has been compared to that of the art of pottery—the result of many individual and separate improvements applied in various combinations and sequences to the original invention. The possibilities of the development of this social art, of course, multiply rapidly when the cruder empirical procedures give way to scientific experimentation. In a general way, it may be said that the scientific study or description

7. *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progress de l'esprit humain* (1794). See also L. F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 568. H. E. Barnes, article "Sociology Before Comte", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxiii, no. 2, p. 217-224.

of the practice of this art is a part of sociology. The intensive study of "how" it was done with a view of learning how to do the same thing better or how to achieve some other social control is applied sociology; and the actual performance is social art.

Another early recognition of this fundamental distinction was made by Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) who was the chief inspiration of Auguste Comte. Some sociologists speak of him as the "father" of Comte, and a review of his works proves that he anticipated Comte in most of his fundamental theses. There is little or no difference in meaning between Saint-Simon's *science politique* and Comte's *sociologie*. In the *science politique*, Saint-Simon repeatedly emphasizes the fact that his object in this book is to discuss the total condition of society and not merely the political institution of the state. The *science politique* is a systematic science of society needed for this task, a science which will serve as a guide for the practical reconstruction of the social order. As he was speaking of a science of the future, Saint-Simon could not state that in reality it would be distinctly different from social art. But he does make the claim that science must be distinguished from art in all departments of knowledge. Consequently social science as a part must be governed by the rule for the whole and *science politique* therefore must be distinguished from social art.

Analysis of Comte's Distinction. Montesquieu, Condorcet and Saint-Simon all stressed the need for a broad and fundamental science of society that would be practically useful in political and other social welfare. It was Auguste Comte (1798-1857) who wove these demands and the political and economic philosophy of his day into a systematic and comprehensive statement. And although Comte may have been somewhat behind the foremost science of his day, he had a remarkable appreciation of the unity of the need and of the search for a basic science of society. For this reason, his suggestions as to the major subdivisions of sociology are worthy of most careful consideration.

According to Comte, sociology was a science, and practical politics and social reform were phases of social art. Concerning the rela-

tionship between the theory of society, or the scientific study of social relations and behavior, and the use of the organized findings of this science for attaining ends Comte writes: "And here we find again the constant relation between the science and the art—the theory and the practice." That there may be no doubt as to what he means by "practice", he makes the following comparison with the science of biology and the practice of medical art built upon it.

> A science which proposes a positive study of the laws of order and of progress cannot be regarded with speculative rashness by practical men of any intelligence, since it offers the only rational basis for the practical means of satisfying the needs of society as to order and progress; and the correspondence in this case will be found to be analogous to that which we have seen to exist between the biological science and the arts which relate to it—the medical art especially.[8]

It is fully in line with Comte's philosophy to place sociology, pure and applied, in the field of "political science" and to consider political or social art as something more properly to be classed with other arts. He recognizes, however, an intimate relation between the science and the art. This he makes very clear in his statement that

> Political science enlightens political art not only in regard to the tendencies which should be aided but also as to the chief means that should be employed, so as to avoid all useless or ephemeral and therefore dangerous action; in short, all waste of any kind of social force.[9]

To him it seems quite as reasonable to discuss the social arts necessary for constructing and floating a "ship of state," arts based upon social science, as to discuss the arts necessary for constructing a seagoing vessel, arts based primarily on pure or physical science. Comte was also very positive in his conviction that the development of a sociology for prevision and as a basis for social arts should not be left in the hands of the social workers. He regards the latter

8. Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, Bk. vi., ch. lii, p. 457, trans. by Harriet Martineau, 1853.

9. Ibid, p. 473.

as essentially empiricists and would no more depend on them for a sociology than he would depend upon sea-faring sailors for astronomy or upon the leisure time activities of physicians for biology.

Thus, almost without exception the earliest advocates of a social science like sociology clearly recognized that social art and social science were distinctly different. Many social arts already existed, and in the minds of these heralds of sociology, the possibilities of these arts would be infinitely multiplied by the development of social science. Because of the pressure of the need, and the multitude of the possibilities of the social arts once they could be put on a scientific basis, some of these pioneers became fearful lest sociology should become too rapidly and too completely utilitarian. These men contributed to the sanction of good usage for the term "social art" as a comprehensive term to include all deliberate and purposive modification of society. They also in a philosophic and almost prophetic way laid down principles of demarcation between the two which have not since been modified to any considerable extent. It remains to be seen whether their prevision concerning the relationship of the unborn or infant sociology to other disciplines will continue to hold good, as sociology matures and stakes out her claims in the domain of science.

Social Economy and Social Work. Within the field of social art there has been a rapid and extensive development of what is now usually called social work. This art has become highly organized and it is pursued by many trained volunteer and paid workers. A vast amount of information has been assembled by these social workers. Some of it is thoroughly scientific. Not a little of it represents co-operation between social workers and social scientists. Much of this information has been published, and most of it has been designated as sociology either for want of a better name or on the ground that the subject-matter was primarily social. Some of this published matter is sociological, i. e., it is scientific and it deals with human relations and group behavior, but much of it belongs to the other social sciences. Perhaps the most prevailing characteristic of these

publications which have been associated with the development of social work is the tendency to draw upon all the social sciences for the illumination of all phases of specific social problems.

These synthetic statements of social science in terms of particular social problems are of two kinds, (1) those which deal with principles and which are useful for determining objectives and policies and (2) those which deal with specific ways and means of effecting changes in social conditions. The former has not infrequently been described as social economy; the latter may be designated as the technology of social work. The relation of this social economy, a phase of social science, to social work, a mode of social art, is best approached by means of a brief analysis of the nature of the development of social work. The following sections are not an attempt adequately to describe either social economy or social work. They merely state those facts which seem to be most important in determining the relation of social economy to social work and also in determining the relation which should exist between social economy and applied sociology. The discussion of the nature of the technology of social work and of its relation to applied sociology will be taken up in the next chapter.

Social Work as Social Art. In America and Great Britain the term *social work* is used to cover various social arts. Social work has been defined in a wide variety of ways. Professor Stuart A. Queen of the University of Kansas has made the definition on which he based his recent historical work on the subject so broad that it includes the entire *"art of adjusting personal relationships."*[10] Professor James H. Tufts of the University of Chicago takes an entire chapter to discuss the definition, field and scope of social work. As a philosopher he decided to fit the definition to the activities of organized social work, and especially to all types of education offered to social workers. His definition finally includes aim, method, function and setting. He claims that social work is distinguished as such by (1) the motive and the class reached;

10. Stuart Alfred Queen, *Social Work in the Light of History*, p. 18.

(2) the aim and the methods employed; (3) the growing character of the field; (4) the variety of present activities of social workers and (5) the relation of social work to the great institutions through which man has aimed to embody and secure his interests, and thus to make more definite the several elements of human welfare.[11] Following this through, he claims that (1) the motive is often that of "serving a particular class of persons, namely, those who are poor, or ill or otherwise disadvantaged"; (2) the aim and process is, "the detailed study and better adjustment of social relations"; (3) the field is growing because of and in line with (*a*) "the increasing number of individuals, groups and classes that need help or guidance or better opportunity"; (*b*) "the demand for scientific methods"; (*c*) "the enlarging skill to deal with situations once hopeless"; (*d*) the growing conception of interdependence and of the possibilities of collective endeavor; (4) the variety of activities is so great as to include almost "whatever the social worker does"; and (5) social work is related to family welfare, government, economic institutions, hygiene and medicine, recreation, education and the arts, organized religion, institutions for the cultivation of friendship and mutual aid, etc. Professor Tufts' conclusion is that "social work is not a clearly defined single field corresponding to a single need, but includes many diverse occupations which have as their tasks to supplement the work of the other professions."[12]

Edward T. Devine, one of America's foremost writers on social work, has stated that *social work* "has come into use in recent years as a comprehensive term, including charity and philanthropy, public relief, punishment and reformation, and all other conscious efforts, whether by the state or of private initiative, to provide for the dependent, the sick, and the criminal, to diminish the amount of poverty, disease, and crime, and to improve general living conditions."[13]

11. James H. Tufts, *Education and Training for Social Work*, p. 8.

12. *Ibid*, p. 28.

13. Edward T. Devine and Lillian Brandt, *American Social Work in the Twentieth Century*, Frontier Press, 1921, p. 1. See also *Social Work* by Edward T. Devine, chapters i-v (Macmillan, N. Y.), for a description of Social Work in America and other countries.

The New York School for Social Work has defined social work as "any form of persistent and deliberate effort to improve living or working conditions in the community, or to relieve, diminish or prevent distress whether due to weakness of character or to pressure of circumstances." In commenting on this definition Professor Arthur James Todd claims that social work thus conceived leads to the planting and cultivating of three special "crops."[14] These three chief crops he regards as, "first, the spread of social intelligence"; second, the alleviative and remedial work on behalf of the subnormal or handicapped members of the community; third, organized prevention against adverse and depressive forces in the community."

Multiplication of definitions and concepts is not necessary to the points at issue. There is unmistakable evidence in these statements that the field of social work includes many social arts. It is also evident that there are phases of social work in various more extensive social arts. It is further evident that the field of social work is highly variegated and that as yet clear cut criteria are lacking for determining what is properly included in social work. It is also very apparent that social work rests quite definitely on other sciences not generally designated as social. If, for instance, the primary function of economics is to answer Ruskin's question, "What is 'Wealth' or 'Welfare'?" or if as Henry Clay has said economics is "the study of business in its social aspect",[15] then social work is as much an application of economics as of sociology. In fact Dr. Devine's own chair when he was associated with Columbia University was designated as Social Economy, and the term social economics is frequently used to cover the study of socio-economic problems.

Social Work as a Profession. There have been numerous discussions as to whether social work is becoming a profession and as to whether it is desirable that it should. Dr. Abraham Flexner in his study entitled, *Is Social Work a Profession,* sets certain high

14. James Arthur Todd, *The Scientific Spirit and Social Work,* p. 63ff.

15. Henry Clay, M. A., *Economics, an Introduction for the General Reader,* p. 1.

standards as objectives of any activity which aspires to be regarded a profession in the sense that engineering and medicine are professions. Professor Tufts in his study for the Russell Sage Foundation is a bit fearful of the evils of professionalism. Social work is certainly becoming a profession. The exact stage to which this professionalism may have developed is of secondary importance in this argument. Social work has standards of training, of research and of practice. It has professional schools and publications that are becoming increasingly professional in nature. Ultimately it must be put on the basis of social or societal engineering, with the usual high professional standards of engineering. At the same time social workers must avoid those evils common to all professionalism which would be especially paralyzing and nullifying in social work. The American Association of Social Workers[16] is inclined to regard itself as a professional group. It has analyzed social work both in terms of "objectives" and in terms of "methods." Twelve fields of problems or objectives are designated: (1) child welfare, (2) the family, (3) delinquency, (4) medical social service, (5) public health, (6) housing, (7) leisure time activities, (8) the settlement, (9) the school, (10) industry, (11) immigration and (12) community development. The division according to methods includes: (1) case work, (2) group work, (3) community organization, (4) institutional work, (5) social research, (6) publicity, finance and other specialties. This classification is the result of many years of practical experience in professional social work. Philosophically it is open to grave criticisms, but practically it reflects the natural integration resulting from service in a professional field and as such is very significant.

The placement bureau of this Association lists forty-two general types (with additional subdivisions) of social service jobs. Of course these do not represent mutually exclusive activities. There is much overlapping, but a special combination of traits, experiences and training is required for most of these positions, and the combinations of activities required of these workers are also different.

16. American Association of Social Workers (formerly the National Social Workers' Exchange), *The Profession of Social Work*.

A survey of the list shows at once that some of these questions *require* a minimum, if any, sociological education, although such an education might add much to the workers' comprehension and appreciation of the general activities in which they are participating. If industry has found it profitable to teach and train "one process" men to know and appreciate the whole industrial process and the finished creation of the plant, it is not improbable that even "one process" social workers could do much better work with some comprehensions and appreciations of general and applied sociology. As yet many workers have not experienced this advantage. The major part of their training has been to acquire efficiency in the technique of that particular process in which they are working.

Foci of Social Work. The array of varieties of social work is almost overwhelming. Scores of national agencies each devoted to a special type of social work and more than a score of training schools attest to its scope and its need for workers. But within this maze of activity two primary foci of activity stand out above all the others as centers of function and operation. One is the family and the other is the locality, community or neighborhood.

The concept of the former is well set forth by Miss Mary E. Richmond in her *Social Diagnosis* and in the various works of Dr. Edward T. Devine. In his *Principles of Relief*, Dr. Devine states that "the family is the ultimate unit of our social organization" and the "unity and the responsibility of the family are the first considerations in deciding upon the natural source of relief in any case."[17] Such a conception fits very naturally into a sociological scheme such as that of Professor Charles Ellwood, who following Comte regards the family as the "primary social structure."[18] The earlier chapters in the history of the organization of relief were in terms of a growing appreciation of the family, not only as a natural

17. Edward T. Devine, *Principles of Relief*, pp. 96-97; see also *The Family and Social Work*, by the same author, ch. ii; also Helen Bosanquet, *The Family*, p. 342; also Simon Patten, *New Basis of Civilization*, pp. 48, 63; also, in preparation, Harriet Townsend, *Social Work a Family Builder*.

18. Charles Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, 1910 ed., p. 53. Charles H. Cooley in *Social Organization*, describes the family as a "primary group."

primary group but as a natural vital and important group for practical treatment. This approach to social work has given us the "case" method, as valuable for research as it is for training or for administration. It is one of the means whereby sociological data of invaluable sort are being collected, and from which very significant sociological inferences are being drawn. This method has been developed by cooperation between theorists and workers. Much more can be done to make "case" work a laboratory method for sociology. A sound sociological treatment and development of "case" work research will make it a basis for the discovery of the data necessary for the development of societal engineering in so far as this is based upon the knowledge of one of the primary groups. A more extensive appraisal of the value of the "case" method in research and of the need for an extension of the method to cover normal families will be found in the last chapter of this work.

The local community is the second major nucleus of social work. Professor Arthur E. Wood of the University of Michigan in an article on "The Philosophy of Community Organization" describes community organization as a social art. He says, "The process is more of an art than of a science, and it must proceed by the method of trial and error in which the ideal of the thoroughly socialized community is constantly kept in view."[19] Numerous efforts have been made to work into a systematic form the observations of the results of the trial and error method. There has also been a rather consistent effort to place the trial and error method on a more scientific basis. In this Dr. Wood has participated with Hart, Park, Lindeman, Bowman, Brunner, Baily, Eubank, Landis, Phillips, Sims, Wilson, Wood, Zorbaugh, and others.

Community social work has also brought about the development of a practical research method commonly described as "the survey." The "survey" has been regarded as a research method, as a practical diagnosis, and as a socializing process.[20] It has been used in recent years by educators in what they called "educational surveys."

19. *The Community Center*, vol. v, nos. 3-4, p. 14.

20. Shelby M. Harrison, *The Survey as a Socializing Process*, Russell Sage Foundation.

Efforts are now being made to use it for industrial surveys. The survey method is the result of cooperation between theorists and practitioners. Contributions to it by sociologists are regarded by some of the practitioners as the principal contribution which theoretical sociology has made to their needs. Typical findings of the method are currently published in the magazine "The Survey" and the outstanding comprehensive work to date is the "Springfield Survey" of the Russell Sage Foundation.[21] The survey may be made comprehensively or specifically. It may be applied to communities or to institutions. It has also been used for a crime survey.

Industrial social work, including studies in the cost of living, leisure time, working conditions, fatigue, etc., have added another significant method to those worked out by cooperation between social workers and social scientists. It is usually described as the method of "sampling," and although it is fundamentally a mathematical, or even more properly, a statistical method, it has been made practically useful both for social workers and for social scientists, especially in its application to expense and time budgets.

Without discussing at this point the lesser scientific methods that have been evolved and without taking up the subject of the scientific spirit of social work,[22] it may be stated without fear of contradiction that cooperation between social scientists and social workers has demonstrated the usefulness of three methods as a basis for the scientific projection of social work. They are—the *case,* the *survey* and the *sampling* methods. The part which these methods are playing in the development of an applied sociology and the contribution which applied sociology can make toward the extension of their usefulness to social workers is discussed in subsequent chapters.

Social Economy. Social economy should place at the disposal of social workers data from all the social sciences organized in terms of social problems. If, for instance, the social worker is interested in the problem of housing, he should be able to find in social economy

21. Shelby M. Harrision, *Social Conditions in an American City.*

22. *Cf.* Arthur James Todd, *The Scientific Spirit and Social Work.*

a presentation of those principles of taxation, rent, family budgeting, financing, etc., needed for a comprehensive understanding of the economic factors involved in housing. In addition he should find in social economy data concerning laws of ownership, leasing, tenantry, etc., as well as data concerning public health, safety, and sanitation. These are no less important than the sociological content of the subject matter of housing, which would deal more directly with such subjects as the relation of housing to family life, juvenile delinquency, crime, etc. In brief, social economy should give the social worker a coordinate comprehensive understanding of all the principal social and economic factors involved in the problem of housing or of any other social problem.[23] If the interest of the social worker happens to be in housing, social economy should enable him to draw readily and easily upon all social science in order to evaluate objectives and motives in schemes for housing. It should also properly relate the problems of housing to the other social economic problems with which social workers are dealing.

Both as a curriculum subject and as a field of research, social economy will probably receive rapidly increasing recognition. There is a growing demand not only in professional schools but in colleges and in secondary schools for the synthetic teaching of the social sciences in terms of social problems.[24] Not only in the fields known more professionally as those of social work, but also in various professional schools, education, law and medicine especially, there is a demand for a synthetic use of social science for the purpose of revealing the social significance, implications and factors involved in the practice of these professions. It is quite probable that in the not distant future there will be senior colleges especially organized for granting a science degree to students taking work in social economy and other social sciences as a preliminary to professional training

23. *Supra*, p. 181, 2.

24. The entrance requirements for Columbia College are at present being revised so as to make one of the fifteen units required for college entrance an optional unit composed of a year's work in social problems, or in problems of democracy or of two half years of these subjects or of sociology, economics or politics.

in social work, law and education.[25] An increasing demand for problem research, in which the research techniques of the various social sciences are combined in problem analysis, may cause social economy to demand increasing attention as a graduate subject. There is at least a possibility that the development of a case, survey, sampling technique for the purpose of social problem diagnosis and the development of social projects may in time develop so as to permit social economy to rate a research technique characteristically its own.

Social Economy and Sociology. This social economy will both by the nature of its function and by virtue of the predominating matter in its content continue to be intimately associated with sociology. There are also reasons for believing that the research technique of social economy will more nearly resemble that of sociology than that of any other one of the social sciences. There are those who regard social economy as but little more than an adaptation of positive social philosophy to the problems of social workers, and they therefore look upon it as merely an organization of sociology in terms of problems. Others who realize that the content of social economy is much more inclusive than that of sociology claim that it is so disproportionately sociological as to justify its being regarded as more nearly sociology than any other one of the social sciences. If sociology should continue to develop as a comprehensive positive social philosophy, then social economy may well be regarded as primarily an adaptation of this social philosophy to the needs of the social worker. But if sociology develops as an intensive special social science, i. e., a study of human relation and group behavior, then social economy may occupy a field much more characteristically its own, although it will probably be more intimately related to sociology than to any other one of the social sciences and be more dependent upon it. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to define the nature, scope and function of social economy except to the extent that this is essential to an understanding of the function of applied sociology .

Social Economy and Applied Sociology. Social economy is not

25. Note the inauguration of a School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse, a school for training and for research.

applied sociology in the sense in which the latter term is used in this thesis. Applied sociology is used as a term for a distinct and definitely organized part of sociology, as a special social science developing intensively rather than extensively. It deals primarily with ways and means of achievement rather than with the determination of objectives and the projection of social programs. There is no evident need for any definite rearrangement or organization of the data of general or philosophical sociology for the use of social workers; at least no need for anything worthy of the name of applied sociology. Both general and applied sociology can be made available to the social worker through the medium of social economy. This social economy includes data from all the social sciences, is more comprehensive than sociology, and consequently much more comprehensive than applied sociology which is but a part of sociology.

But social economy does not include all of any of the social sciences. It is an organization of those parts of the sciences which are of use to the social worker in attempting to understand the problems with which he deals. Is that part of sociology which is included in social economy akin to applied sociology? It is not, if we recognize any difference between social economy and the technology of social work, for the latter as well as the former will draw heavily upon applied sociology. Applied sociology cannot be both social economy and technology of social work. Then, too, applied sociology must contribute to all the other social arts as well as to those generally described as social work. On the one hand, applied sociology is not as inclusive as either social economy or the technology of social work: on the other hand, applied sociology reaches out to usefulness in the direction of social arts other than those of social work. Applied sociology should contribute liberally to social economy. But the former is a subdivision of sociology dealing with ways and means of achieving proximate ends, and the latter is a synthesis of social sciences dealing primarily with the determination of objectives and the evaluation of projects unless it merges indiscriminately with the technology of social work.

Social Economy and Technology of Social Work. Social economy

should not be confused with or merged with the technology of social work or the techniques of the various social arts. Social economy is inclusive. Its functions are to reveal social and economic principles, to show problems in true proportions, to make plain the relations which one problem has to others and to give comparative evaluations of all the factors involved in each social problem. It is like technology of social work in that it draws heavily upon all the social sciences. It is distinctly different in the nature of what it draws and in the purpose for which it makes the draft. The technology of social work draws not only upon the social sciences but upon all the other sciences that contribute to ways and means of achievement. The techniques of the various social arts tend toward extreme specialization. They are frequently highly empirical. The development of principles of technology is accomplished by the careful scrutiny of the practice of techniques. This is a very different process from that by which the principles of social economy are established. Social economy should give the social worker something by which he can more accurately evaluate the economy or efficiency of various social techniques. But this is something very different from a science of techniques or a technology. This difference will become more evident in the discussion, in the next chapter, of the relation of applied sociology to the technology of social art.

Summary. The social arts are as old as the memory of man. They seem to have begun with the group struggle of man for survival, advantage, achievement and control. Crude in their origins, many of the social arts were highly developed at least five or six thousand years ago. In other words some men have been making other men live together, play, worship and work together at least to a certain extent as they saw fit. Of early attempts at purposive social control there can be no doubt. In time men commenced to reflect on the ways and means of such control in terms of explanations ranging from those of primitive magic to those of modern science. From the start the sociologists recognized and distinguished the difference between the practice of social control and speculation as to how it was accomplished. The practice of purposive social control

they called social art; the speculation concerning how it was done they regarded as the beginnings of social science. The development of the social sciences is very recent, especially that of sociology. The arts have not waited for the sciences, but the advent of the sciences will doubtless mark a new epoch in the development of the arts.

Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Comte and the other early sociologists, stressed the need for clearly distinguishing between social science and social art. Most of the foremost modern sociologists have agreed with them in principle but not always in practice. With the multiplication of social sciences, the development of applied social sciences, the emergence of social economy and the development of techniques of social work and of other social arts this distinction has been very difficult to establish in practice.

There has been an unfortunate tendency to describe various social arts and much of all the social science that did not too evidently belong to history, politics or economics as sociology. All of this miscellany of social arts and all of the science that was not in the nature of pure or general sociology has frequently been swept together under the term applied sociology.

The field of social art in which the development has been most intimately associated with that of social science is usually described as social work. In connection with this field we find that there have developed applied social sciences, social economy, techniques of social work and perhaps a technology of social work. In order to distinguish between sociology as a social science and social work as a mode of social art, it becomes necessary to determine the functions of applied sociology, social economy and the technology (or techniques) of social work as intermediaries. The principal purpose in making this distinction is to determine more accurately the nature and function of applied sociology. There is an assumption that its relation to the other social arts may be like its relation to social work.

It is first of all made clear that no social art should be called applied social science or applied sociology. One is a science made available for practical application, the other is a practice in which the science is used. Attention is then called to the fact that general or

pure sociology should not be called applied sociology merely because it has been of use in guiding the practice of social workers. The term applied sociology should be reserved for a specifically systematized or characteristically differentiated part of sociology that will fulfill those functions which are usually fulfilled by applied sciences, functions to be described in the next chapter.

Much that has been designated as applied sociology is more properly social economy. This social economy is a synthetic statement of principles and data selected from all the social sciences and organized in terms of social problems. It cannot be identical with applied sociology because it is drawn from all the social sciences. It is more intimately related to sociology than to any other one of the social sciences and more dependent upon it. Neither is social economy to be confused with the technology of social work. Social economy is a comprehensive science of general evaluation. Technology of social work is a science of method. The technology of social work is but a part of the technology of social art. The relation of the latter to applied sociology is the theme of the next chapter. Social economy and the technology of social work will undoubtedly impinge and perhaps overlap. An effort is made to discover principles by which the one may be distinguished from the other in the ensuing study of the relation of the technology of social art to applied sociology.

CHAPTER III

Technology of Social Art and Applied Sociology

What is social art? Is there a technology of social art? If so, what relation does it bear to applied sociology? Answers to these three questions are necessary for a further and more accurate statement of the field and function of applied sociology. The preceding chapters have shown that applied sociology is not social ethics, neither is it polity, nor social economics. The effort to ascertain the relation of applied sociology to the techniques of the various social arts and to the technology of social art, if such there be, is evidently the next and perhaps the final inquiry essential to the determination of the field and function of applied sociology.

At this point a more definite and comprehensive presentation of the concept of social art should be helpful. Thus far the discussion of the nature of social art has been somewhat abstract except for the analysis of social work.

Not as an attempt to catalogue the arts or to survey the various fields of social art, but merely to present certain concrete illustrations of the varied and extensive nature of social art, the following paragraphs may be suggestive.

Social Art. Is not the arbitration of intergroup or intragroup disputes an art? Certainly if deftness, skill, delicate appreciation, accurate distinctions and keen interpretation are characteristics of art, it must be admitted that industrial conciliators or impartial chairmen of arbitration groups, as well as diplomats in religion and politics should be considered social artists.

Or, if an artist be he who can play at will upon the emotions of people, one must at least consider the advisability of calling him a social artist who has learned to play upon the emotions of the crowd, whether he be a political orator, a religious exhorter, a propagandist or an entertainer. He may play upon the emotions for a purpose or he may do this simply as an end in itself, for the joy he gets in the playing and the joy which the crowd feels in sharing the stimulated emotion.

Again, in terms of another social activity, those might be regarded as social artists who seek to mold the social imagination, creating and modifying images, concepts, ideas and ideals, shaping the very minds of people with physical and psychological stimuli as tools, sculpturing in the living social mind rather than in less plastic matter.

In fact social art comes close to our every day life. Who would not give credit for artistic ability to those who devise and direct certain week-end parties, or to the leaders and inspirers of certain social clubs, or to those geniuses who have learned to arrange the benches, nooks or crannies in a coffee-house or tea-room, and to adjust properly all the stimulating conditions which make for the feeling of sociability, pleasure or repose in the presence of the other members of the group? Hospitality has long been thought of as a social art.

The social mixer is also a social artist, and, in fact, he is not infrequently a well paid professional artist. The capitalization of personality is an old story in politics, but the scientific study of the capitalization of personal interstimulation and of its value in almost every field of life, especially in business, is a recent development. Sometimes this art of attitude adjustment takes a negative turn. Then trouble is absorbed in trouble departments, not by argument, not by logical justification of situation and conditions, but by men and women trained in the art of the adaptation of personality, people trained to absorb the unpleasant emotions of an irritated public and to stimulate feelings of sympathy and assurance. We have not time here to recount the whole catalogue—the outside men in the office, the front men at the hotel, the trained hosts for propagandist dinner parties, all the personnel workers of many sorts. These social mixers, social contact men and social shock absorbers are in a very real sense social artists.

The handling of crowds certainly presents many problems for an applied sociology. The working out of a procedure by which to accomplish this task is a problem of social engineering. There are men who can handle crowds so as to make their accomplishment seem like a happy feat of social art. On the contrary there are other men who can no less certainly do it, but who in so doing will commit

nothing less than a social outrage. Occasionally we are genuinely inspired by the policeman who enters into such tasks with a Gaelic imagination that makes his work really artistic. Sometimes, at an Army and Navy game or at the Yale bowl, we see the college cheer leader handle thousands of men in a way that merits an artistic appreciation. And then, again, we may see the same skill shown in managing community singing, or in certain forms of worship, or in the handling of a forum or a political mass meeting. And, if we may trust what some have told us, there is an art in the accomplishment of a drill as finished as that of the West Pointers or the Navy Cadets. It has been suggested that the drill is never quite perfect until the men almost feel as though they stepped as one. There seems to be an art of wide range which may be described as the art of moving, leading or directing crowds.

Certainly he is a social artist who can take groups, awkward and cumbersome in structure and function, and transform them into groups symmetrical and delicate, nicely and pleasantly coordinated. He is a social artist who can eliminate needless play or friction, waste or irritation in society, and produce instead conditions and functionings which please his fellow men and call forth their admiration or evoke other sentiments. He is likewise a social artist who by manipulation of circumstances and pluralistic human reactions to them can set up new social processes more pleasing than the existing processes. He is also a social artist who can take a complicated delicate, highly dynamic, social mechanism and either control the human variables within or skillfully guide the mechanism itself through the physical and human maze around it.

The cultivation or achievement of ability to bring about such social changes as have just been described in illustration of social art is generally considered as the way to solve our so-called social problems. The diagnosis of the problems requires social science, perhaps a specially organized applicable or applied social science. A technology of procedure may ofttimes be necessary, and also the work of a social engineer. The actual achievement, however, is the work of the social artist. In every phase indeed of social relations

and behavior it is easily possible to imagine the development of social arts similar to the development which Comte so clearly saw in connection with political relations and behavior.

The Social Arts of Business. There are social arts which are an essential part of business, the development of which is dependent upon the advent of a practically useful sociology. These arts include organization, personnel management, advertising, administration, salesmanship, propaganda, conciliation, arbitration, public relations, etc.—in fact every activity in which business must negotiate social and societal conditions or situations. Business has ceased to be merely a matter of dealings between individuals. It is a matter of dealings between societal groups, and a practical knowledge of the nature and functioning of such groups is now essential to business. In addition, business must know the conditions and circumstances which effect the behavior of these societal groups. Since social values are increasingly recognized as one of the most determining factors in commercial values, the business man must also have a sound sociological knowledge of the ways in which social values are or may be determined. Business administration and management is rapidly becoming a social art and less a mere strenuous individualistic competition. Business managers invent, evolve, set up and operate social mechanisms quite as much as do political managers. They deal with social and societally conditioned reactions of competitors, clientele, labor and the public. At present the social arts of business are on an empirical basis.

But far-sighted business men are already commencing to see that business (commercial, industrial and professional) may be quite as much revolutionized by the development of an applied sociology as it has been and is being reconstructed by the development of a practically applicable economics. Certain business men have already made beginnings in sociological research and a number are conducting experiments under the observation of trained sociologists. It is not unreasonable to suppose that once the usefulness of such researches for economy, efficiency and the accomplishment of new achievements has been demonstrated, a

new era will appear in sociological research similar to that which came in the development of the other sciences when their practical possibilities were discovered and demonstrated. In the social arts of business the researches will not only pay for themselves, but many of them will yield returns invaluable to those social arts which must finance research under much less evidently profitable conditions. It seems highly probable that the relationship of the social arts of business to sociology will be quite like the relationship existing between business activities and the other sciences. There will be a demand for a sociology organized for use—an applied sociology. A part of this sociology will be combined with the useful findings of other sciences and the experience of practitioners in technique, and will in turn be used by social artists, artisans, artificers, craftsmen and mechanics in the actual accomplishment of the works of industrial social art.

Usages and Customs in Arts and Science. How is this great variety of social arts related to social science and especially to sociology? Most of those sociologists, who have given thought to the matter, seem to agree that the relations which exist between other sciences in this application to the arts are the relations which should exist between sociology in its application to the social arts. Are there any general principles governing usage and custom in the determination of the relations between science and its application to art? Is motive, content or objective the most important determining factor? Are there overlapping fields, and, if so, how are they usually regarded? In pursuit of these inquiries, let us turn to the longest established of the arts to see whether there are guiding principles by which to distinguish between fine arts, practical arts, composition, technology of art and the sciences upon which the latter are built.

Art, Fine Arts and Practical Arts. Art may be used as a comprehensive term to cover any production of the mind and hand of man. It refers especially to what is artificial rather than natural. It is used to designate those creations in which human skill and intelligence have intervened and diverted natural processes. It is usually the result of an objective, purpose or ideal. Intervention of this sort

in social processes is described by Ward as *artificial,*[1] by Giddings as *constituent,*[2] and by some of the anthropological sociologists as *cultural,*[3] although exception is frequently taken to the last term on the ground that some cultural patterns are primarily natural developments. Common definitions of art in this broad sense represent art to be "the combination or modification of things to adapt them to a given end" or "the employment of given means to effect a purpose."[4] Carver emphasizes this conscious and purposeful *active adaptation*[5] of means to social ends and, in effect at least, presents it as a social art. In this broad sense of "purposeful achievement" it is therefore in line with well established usage to define social art as the combination or combination of human relations or of pluralistic human behavior to a given end or ends, including any skill or special facility essential to performing such an operation.

Art is divided into two groups—practical arts and fine arts. Concerning the basis of this division much has been written. The following statement from Reinach suggests the essential difference between the two, though art is there used in a more restricted sense than in the preceding paragraph.

> A work of art differs in one essential characteristic from those products of human activity which supply the immediate wants of life. Let us consider a palace, a picture. The palace might be merely a very large house, and yet provide a satisfactory shelter. Here, the element of art is *super*added to that of utility. In a statue, a picture, utility is no longer apparent. The element of art is *isolated.*
>
> This element, sometimes accessory, sometimes isolated, is itself a product of human activity, but of an activity peculiarly free and disinterested, the object of which is not to satisfy an

1. Lester F. Ward, *Pure Sociology,* pp. 83, 84, 452; Dealey and Ward *Text-Book of Sociology,* pp. 269, 271; *cf.* Auguste Comte, *A General View,* ch. vi, esp. p. 319.

2. Franklin H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology,* p. 171 ff.

3. For discussion see Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture,* esp. pp. 74-75.

4. *Century Dictionary, loc. cit.*

5. Thomas N. Carver, *Human Relations,* ch. iii, esp. pp. 44-46; also Lucius Bristol *Social Adaptation,* pp. 245-263; 326-329.

immediate need, but to evoke a sentiment, a lively emotion—admiration, pleasure, curiosity, sometimes even terror.[6]

If *isolated* art is fine art and *superadded* art is practical art, may not purposive social effort to meet evident and real needs be considered under certain circumstances as practical art? According to the principle set forth by Reinach this would be true when the art element is superadded to the element of utility. But what is this art element? Curiously enough Reinach claims that art itself is primarily a social phenomenon[7], its object being the "evocation of sentiment in others." He illustrates this by stating that "man fashions a tool for his own use, but he decorates it to please his fellow-men, or to excite their admiration." According to this concept, any consciously effected social change having the element of utility becomes practical social art when to the element of utility is superadded the desire to please one's fellow-men or to excite their admiration. A social institution is a tool. Exigencies require and opportunities inspire men to make changes in the institution, in creed or platform, personnel or administration, constitution or by-laws. These utilitarian changes are, in practice, almost invariably undertaken with the idea of "pleasing" fellow-men and exciting their "admirations". In this respect, therefore, they are social art.

Already, the development of sociology as a "point of view" has strengthened the motive to please and serve our fellow-men. There is every reason to believe that sociology will continue to promote the development of social art and to furnish the scientific standards by which its effectiveness may be judged.

Exceptions of course have been taken to Reinach's method of distinguishing fine art from applied or practical art. A notable difference was frequently expressed by the late Arthur Wesley Dow of Teachers College, Columbia University. Professor Dow insisted that *isolation* was not a necessary condition of fine art, but that art was art, whether it happened to be associated with a utilitarian satisfaction or not. He regarded the giving of pleasure

6. S. Reinach, *Apollo*, tr. by Florence Simmons (1921 ed.) pp. 1, 2.

7. *Ibid*, p. 2.

and the evoking of admiration in themselves as practically desirable, and in this sense he claimed that all art was somewhat utilitarian. He conceived fine arts as "pure beauty" and called space fine art, "visual music".[8] From Dow's point of view practical social art would cover a wider range, and all practical social achievements such as gave pleasure or evoked sentiment would properly fall within the domain of social art.

Among the facts brought out or suggested by this discussion of the nature of art are the following: (1) art is purposive, but not necessarily telic—its motives and drives may be mere prepotent reflexes, self-expression, or desire to please; (2) art may or may not be coupled with utility; (3) its object is not ethical good or betterment but to please, to excite admiration and to evoke sentiment; (4) art may be good or bad and still be art. If the artist works with humanity rather than with inanimate material he is a social artist. As a social artist he so maintains or alters the circumstances, conditions and relations of human beings as to please his fellowmen, to call forth their admiration or to evoke some other sentiment. If he has also been inspired by utilitarian motives, practical considerations that may be either personal or social, his work is that of a practical social artist, and his creations are practical social art.[9] The next consideration is the process by which this is accomplished.

Composition. Professor Dow, after more than twenty years of painstaking effort, set forth a principle of art production which has such an excellent philosophical and psychological basis that it is worthy of consideration as a principle of social art. In speaking of painting he says that "art should be approached through *composition*[10] rather than through imitative drawing." A similar truth applies to social art. There is need for more of "composition" and less of "imitation," for the latter too frequently becomes the method of otherwise socio-artistically minded persons. There is danger,

8. Arthur Wesley Dow, *Composition* (1912 ed.), p. 5.

9. Social fine art as a possibility need not be discussed here.

10. *Ibid*, pp. 4, 5.

for instance, that China will imitate American institutions, America imitate British policies and that the lesser nations will *imitate* the social achievements of their greater associates rather than *compose* institutions of their own. In the interest of the sound development of social art it is essential that there be worked out a "social arts composition", a sociologically acceptable procedure for "putting together" human reactions, interactions (including thought and emotion) and relationships so as to produce "harmony" in status and in function. As in art generally, so in social art specifically "only through the appreciation does the composer recognize such a harmony". There is a growing demand for a type of instruction which might appropriately be described as *social art appreciation.*

Practical social artists need then, in terms of art, a social arts composition, a body of workable sociological principles which will be the basis for all the social arts, differentiated to serve the major arts in particular, and which will be organized so as to absorb the correctives of each and every social arts practice and make them available for all the arts. This applied sociology would of course be continually modified by the findings of general sociology and would in turn bring back correctives and perchance contributions to general sociology.

Will applied sociology come to bear somewhat the same relation to social art that *composition* bears to graphic art? Is it the theory of how to put things together in order to get certain results? Or is this the function of a technology?

The term art has thus been used to include the organized knowledge or systems of rules and methods used in art for putting things together harmoniously and producing works of art. This extension of the term art is common in the art of building or of engraving and in the art of music or of dancing. If the term were similarly extended in the social arts would it include applied sociology? Information on this point may be derived from a consideration of a few outstanding opinions on the relation of art to science. These opinions are not intended as a compendium of thought on the general subject of the relationship of art and

science. Rather, are they selected opinions which may be especially suggestive in clarifying thought on the probable relation of social art and social science.

Art and Science. Art and science have close relations, says J. Arthur Thomson, for "science has a great deal to offer to art in the way of raw materials,—and these of a kind that art is ennobled in working with them."[11] But although he admits that "science is cold without art", he also says that "it cannot be denied that the artistic and the scientific mood are in some measure opposed", for while "science aims at being unemotional and impersonal, art is intrinsically emotional and personal." Because of this undoubted opposition of mood "when either is in the saddle it must keep the other at spears length." How can social art and social science have "close relations" and yet on occasion "keep each other at spears length"? This is a difficult problem but one which at this time squarely confronts the sociologist, and indeed all social scientists. How can social science and social art become more interdependent and at the same time avoid unhappy conflict? Although a complete answer to this query is difficult, if not impossible, one thing is quite certain—the social science which is used by social artists must be the result of scientific scrutiny, dispassionate appraisal of values and frank recognition of sequences, combined with mental fearlessness in exposition. It must be more than a science that may be exploited by sentimental reformers. It must be a science that will serve that steadily increasing group of social artists who are trained to be careful calculating social engineers. It cannot be merely the findings of wishful thinkers. The sociologist is undoubtedly in a better position than the social artist to formulate such an applied sociology.

An interesting positive statement of the complementary relationship of art and science is found in a unique work entitled *Civilization Considered as a Science,* published about the middle of the last century. In it the author states that "art is corrective of science,

11. J. Arthur Thomson, *An Introduction to Science,* ch. vi, "Science and Art," esp. pp. 188-91; *cf.* Also various statements by the same author in *The Bible of Nature* and *The Progress of Science in the Century.*

refines its followers and renders tasteful its operations; and so far from being superseded by, it is at the present period more than ever essential for these ends. Science on the other hand, improves art, and renders it applicable for all the purposes of life."[12]

Sociologists are generally cognizant of the corrections which have been effected in social theory by the practices of social art. The eighteenth century theories of democracy, for example, have gone through a continuous revamping to make them accord with practical experiences in developing workable democratic procedures. What theories concerning kinship and the family groups have not been modified or even abandoned as the result of practical efforts to develop a family functionally adapted to the economic and intellectual conditions affecting the present generation? Theories of business administration, of education, of reform, and of all the vital social processes are constantly passing through similar changes because of the findings of practical workers in each of the specific fields. Not only have the conclusions of positivistic philosophy been subject to this pragmatic type of revision, but even the more careful inductions of observational sociology in field and laboratory have shared similar modifications. In fact one of the severest tests of most social theory is the pragmatic, "Will it work?" An applied sociology should be composed of that sociology which social artists find workable. One of its functions would be to operate as a corrective agency between general theory and specific practice.

Social workers, on the other hand, are increasingly aware of errors resulting from procedures based upon incomplete and inaccurate empiricisms. They are demanding a comprehensive science on which to base their calculations and to project their programs. They desire a sociology designed to improve their arts and crafts and to render them increasingly applicable for all the purposes of collective life. Practical social legislators, for example, have frequently admitted their indebtedness to the formulations of socio-

12. George Harris, *Civilization Considered as a Science* (1861), p. 195. The work is described by its author as "a comprehensive though concise view of the nature of civilization, to demonstrate its capacity for scientific treatment, as also for practical application," p. vii.

logical principles by Jethro Brown, Roscoe Pound and Samuel McCune Lindsay. Practical politicians have acknowledged similar indebtedness to Spencer, Bagehot, Sumner, Ward, Giddings, Graham Wallas, and other political sociologists. Social workers are likewise indebted to such sociologically minded persons as Henderson, Richmond and Devine. In fact this list might be extended to include almost every group of those who are making carefully planned efforts to institute social change. One of the ever recurrent demands in all the sections of the National Conference of Social Work is for presentations of workable and corrective sociology. Everywhere social artists are seeking for a sociology which will enable them to increase both the quality and the scope of their operations.

Applied Sociology and Social Art. The difference between applied sociology and social art, and the relationship of the two to each other is, generally speaking, such a difference as would naturally exist between "a sociology which is practically available for application," and "the application of practically useful sociology." The one refers to a body of knowledge; the other to a kind of human behavior. The one is a sociology; the other is an activity. To anyone uninitiated in the problems of the social arts this may seem like clear and unequivocal distinction. But just as soon as any attempt is made either to extend it theoretically or to apply it practically, there is immediate evidence to the contrary. Part of the difficulty is that which usually accompanies any effort to distinguish between theory and practice. This is complicated by a certain indefiniteness concerning the exact nature and function of sociology, and also by the fact that social art is so often intricately interwoven with other arts.

Ward in his *Applied Sociology* makes the following negative distinction between pure and natural applied sciences and the arts closely related to them:

> Applied mathematics is not mensuration, surveying or engineering. Applied astronomy is not navigation. Applied physics is not manufacture. Applied chemistry is not agri-

culture. Applied biology leads to a great number of arts, some of which are of very recent origin.[13]

In a later work [14] he defines social art as "the application of social science to human betterment, especially through legislation and government." That the actual process of applying sociology in such arts as education, legislation and government must always be distinguished from the process of developing an applied sociology is made very clear in his *Applied Sociology,* from which the following is quoted:

> But applied sociology is not government or politics, nor civics nor social reform. It does not itself apply sociological principles; it seeks only to show how they may be applied. It is a science, not an art. The most that it claims to do is to lay down certain general principles as guides to social and political action.[15]

This conception is an improvement on the much quoted statement which he made about twenty years previous in his *Dynamic Sociology."*[16] In this earlier writing he divided those who contribute to human progress into two classes, "those who *know*" and "those who *know how.*" The first are interested in the "acquisition" of knowledge; the second in the "application" of knowledge acquired. According to this distinction, sociologists should know human relations and pluralistic human behavior, and social artists should know how to alter them. Here is the crux of the complication. In the earlier work he says that it is the task of the social artist to *know how;* in the later work he says that it is the task of the applied sociologist to *show how.* But, can one *show how* unless he *knows how?* No one will deny that this is often attempted, and occasionally the social artists suggest that sociologists are the chief transgressors. The fact is that those who attempt to show how should know how. Does this necessarily mean that sociologists of application and social artists are to be one and

13. Lester F. Ward, *Applied Sociology,* p. 8.
14. Dealey and Ward, *Textbook of Sociology,* pp. 269, 271.
15. *Ibid,* pp. 8-9.
16. Lester F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology,* ii, p. 893.

the same? Without attempting to criticize Ward's lengthy argument and his variations from his own thesis, the following suggestions are offered in a terminology akin to Ward's to facilitate comparison.

In the first place the sociologist must *know* society. He must know all there is to know about human relationships and pluralistic human behavior. But the sociologist of application is also a scientist and as such he also must know. His knowledge is the knowledge of *how* to change circumstances and conditions of human situations so as to maintain or obtain specific social consequences. In a sociological sense he must *know how* to maintain social status or to effect social change. Perhaps it is fair to say that sociologically he must *know what* needs to be done for the achievement of either. The social artist, on the other hand, must know how in a technical sense to accomplish what the sociologist of application shows must be done in order to accomplish certain ends. In addition to this, the social artist must be able to do what is to be done. If this scheme were followed, there would be sociologists whose task would be to *know* in the most scientific sense of that word. Among these sociologists would be some who had intensively studied how to maintain status or effect change and who would make it their special business either to *know* generally *what* to do in order to obtain general results, or to know specifically *what* to do in order to obtain highly specialized social results. Among the social artists there would be technicians who would know how technically to do what must be done and who would develop the technique of social art and give training in its use. There would be other social artists who would be more *able to do* what is to be done according to the best technique of social art.

Perhaps an illustration of this scheme will make it a little clearer. Take, for instance, a problem in the molding of public opinion, which is unmistakably a social art. The term "public opinion" will be found in the index of almost any recent general sociology. Sociologists have already commenced a study of the part which public opinion plays in the various social relations and processes, and they will continue to work out the most accurate and comprehensive

description of public opinion that is possible. Much of this will of necessity be in cooperation with social psychologists. Among the sociologists will be those who intensively *study the ways and means* of maintaining or changing public opinion. Such studies must be made by persons who realize and understand the relation of public opinion to all other social functions and processes. These will be sociologists of application. They will be supposed to arrange their sociological findings so that these will be easily available to persons engaged in the actual molding of public opinion. Some of these sociologists of application may be specialists in community, class, sect or other types of group opinion. Some may be specialists in the various types of psychological processes involved. And some may even be specialists in the formation of such opinion through the press, the cinematograph, the platform, or many of the other agencies. The latter may be specialists in applied sociology. All of these sociologists of application study either in general or in particular just what may or must be done in order to accomplish certain desired ends in the control of public opinion. It may be that none of them ever have or ever will become experts in the actual accomplishment of the task of shaping public opinion. This task is for artists most of whom have given their lives to this undertaking and many of whom are specialists. They have an intimate knowledge of the machinery available for this purpose, and they are familiar with the elaborate technique of operating part or parts of that machinery. They are experts in putting over drives and campaigns. They are trained in the art of handling public relations, or they have attained proficiency in popular education. Many of them will work on specific assignments and will have but a sketchy idea of the relation of their particular task to the more comprehensive schemes of which it may be a part. They are mostly men with certain types of native *ability educated or trained to skill and pro-*

ficiency in achieving specified ends in the general process of influencing or enlightening public opinion.[17]

Motive and Objective as Criteria. May the members of the quartette,—science, applied science, technology and arts—be distinguished in terms of their respective objectives? There are those who claim with the English scientist and philosopher William Whewell that art and science should be distinguished by their objectives, and that the "object of science is knowledge and the objects of art are works." Such persons conceive that in art, "truth is means to an end", and in science, "it is the end only." Karslake says that "science and art may be said to be investigations of truth but *science inquires for the sake of knowledge, art for the sake of production.*"

Does sociology "inquire" for the sake of knowledge or for the sake of production? Hitherto, sociologists were motivated by both these objectives. To state this in another way, the sociological search for the truth in regard to social relations and behavior has thus far been motivated in part by the desire for knowledge, but it has also been motivated by the desire for knowledge which could be used to produce social change. A continuation of this practice would make it necessary to use the term *sociology* to cover all phases of social science and of social art not included in the other social sciences. This procedure would find sanction in that justifiable usage of the term "art"[18] in which the same branch of knowledge may be considered either an art or a science. In accordance with this usage sociology might be viewed as a science "seeking, coordinating, arranging and systematizing knowledge, and by observation, comparison and generalization deducing laws." Or it may be considered as an art which "with more or less reference to such preparatory work" frames "rules which are the lessons of experience and are designed to facilitate work or to give it superior excellence."

17. In connection with the above illustration of applied sociology, it is interesting to note that as early as 1880, when the School of Political Science was opened at Columbia University, the second of the four "practical objects" was "to give an adequate economic and legal training to those who intend to make journalism their profession." See Columbia College Catalogue issued May, 1892, part v, p. 3.

18. *Century Dictionary*, Art, syn. 4.

An alternative, in terms of the objective, is to regard as *sociology* only that science which inquires for the sake of knowledge and to regard as social art all inquiries for the sake of production. This would tend to restrict sociology to what has often been regarded as *pure* sociology and would group the other three members of the "quartette" under the social art. By this arrangement social art and the social science pursued in the interest of art production would form a unity distinctly separated from sociology pursued in the interest of knowledge.

To date, both of these practices have been followed, and the confusion has been "confusion worse confounded." On the one hand, in teaching and in writing, the term *sociology* has been used to cover almost everything that related either to the contemplation or manipulation of anything social. Criminology, penology, dependency, relief, etc., were conceived (science and art) as parts of sociology. On the other hand, there have been social artists (social workers) who were convinced that they had developed in connection with their art all the sociology that was really worthwhile, and that meanwhile the universities were indulging in various theoretical abstractions.

Neither of these procedures have proved satisfactory. As has been stated earlier in the chapter, there are very definite advantages in separating the science of sociology from social art. This would rule out the scheme for extending the term sociology to include both art and science. Can the test of objectives be used to clarify the relationship of the remaining trio,—applied sociology, technology of social arts, and social arts? It is very difficult, if not impossible, to make dichotomous division of any science on the basis of motivation. It is impossible to set on one side of a line that sociological knowledge which is a product of the so-called pure science motive and that which is a product of the so-called art motive. Most of the sociology would pile up on the line—a result of mixed motives. It is these mixed motives which have brought forth most of the unified and coordinated sociology that we now have.

In so far as motive or objective may be regarded as a basis for the distinction which we are seeking, it will be found in the predominance of one motive over the other. The motive of the sociologist is always in part a desire for knowledge. When this knowledge is sought not only for its own sake but also for what it makes possible, the sociology may be usable, applicable or "applied." The methods of research are sociological, the findings form an integral part of sociology—incidentally they are useful and the motivation somewhat utilitarian. On the other hand, there are things which the artist must know if he would pursue his art. There is knowledge which he *needs.* Perhaps it is scattered and unrelated, perhaps sociological and perhaps not. He seeks this knowledge in order to use it in action, control and production. If the so-called science motive is present, it is secondary.

This seems to be the gist of the matter. If motive and objective determine the relationship of *pure sociology, applied sociology, technology of social arts* and *social arts,* the following appears to be a valid and workable distinction. Sociology resulting from the predominance of the "desire for knowledge" motive is relatively "pure," and any recognizable integration or organization of such knowledge may be called *pure sociology* (chart 1, p. 215). Sociology sought and assembled by those who desire to "know" but who are very definitely inspired by immediate and specific utilitarian motives is *applied sociology.* The latter will probably occupy a field related to pure and to general sociology somewhat as shown in chart 1. Its periphery will be much less distinct than its focus or nucleus, and it will probably be irregular and impinge on many if not all the other subordinate developments of sociology. On a scale ranging from the pure knowledge quest to that of extreme utilitarianism, as shown in chart 2, it would be much nearer the latter. The criteria for determining whether data belong to the field of applied sociology are found in answer to the queries: First, "Is it sociology?"; second, "Has it a definite practical value?"; and third, "Will it fit naturally into organized or systematized applied sociology?"

Knowledge sought with just as utilitarian a motive and as a

means to the production of social arts, may, however, be an essential and fitting part of the technology of social arts. At present much of this knowledge is fragmentary, scattered and unorganized, but it is on this account no less essential to the attainment of "skill in practice and performance." There is nothing to prevent specific data from belonging to both the field of applied sociology and of the technology of social arts. As shown in chart 2, technology of social arts will be composed of (and contribute to) all arts and sciences, including therefore all the social sciences and their subdivisions. The test of what belongs to the technology of social arts will be found in answer to the query: "Is it an organic part of the knowledge needed to attain skill and practice in the performance of social arts?" The fact of its being sociology is no criterion of its value as a contribution to the science of the technique of social arts. Ability and learned technique applied to the effecting of social change is social art. It may be that the ability has a social history and is thus a part of general sociology. It may be that some of the learned technique is a result of sociological deduction or of inductive sociological thinking and is thus derived from or is a part of applied sociology. But social art is action and performance, and its technology is built for and geared to the requirements of art.

Thus general sociology, including pure, applied and all other suborganic parts, should be a unified result of the search for knowledge whether the search shall have been in the interest of "pure" science, or of ultimate or proximate usefulness. It is just such a sociology that most of the sociologists prefer to develop,—a science of description and of explanation, a science of specific, concrete, as well as of general probabilities, but not encumbered with, nor confused by, the problems of the technique of social arts.

Social arts are activities increasingly dependent upon the scientific development of both general and specific technology of social arts, and upon education and training in these according to the most enlightened educational methods. There may be many applications of applied sociology in the building up of the technology and in the evolving of methods of teaching and training. These applica-

tions will take their fitting place among applications from the entire realm of arts and sciences in the development of the technology of social arts.

In full realization of the dangers incurred in representing in one plane line graphs impinging relationships in which nucleations are more important than boundaries, a venture is made in the following graph to represent in a general way the relationships just described.

The Twofold Application of Sociology. Graphic Representation. In chart 1 an effort has been made to show the twofold application of sociology,—the application of the positive social philosophy to ethics and polity (circle B), and the use of the special science as a basis of social arts (circle C). It is a chart of relationship and not of proportion. It is not a conception of what should be, but an effort to portray a cross-section of what is now generally conceived to be the relationship.

The comprehending circle represents a section of the entire field of arts and sciences. Within it are three smaller circles representing specific organizations of knowledge and function. The smaller circle A represents all of sociology. If space permitted, it might represent all of the social sciences with sociology as a part. The circle B represents social ethics and social polity, with many subnucleations not here specifically represented. The circle C represents the organized social arts.

In circle A, there are represented various nucleations of sociology (S. S.). The number of these is unlimited. Among them would be such divisions as are commonly designated as anthropological, ethnological, historical, descriptive, biological, psychological, inductive, observational and statistical sociology. Among the nucleations and related to many if not all the others a distinct nucleation of "applied" sociology (A. S.) is developing. All of these subdivisions are contributory to and at the same time subsidiary to positive social philosophy (P. S. P.). Whether pure sociology is to be regarded as a subdivision (P. S.) somewhat coordinate with the other subdivisions, or whether this term should be reserved for

something akin to P. S. P. as here represented is a moot question. The answer to this does not seem a necessary part of this discussion.



CHART I.

Inclusive circle—representing the realm of philosophy, special sciences and art.

Smaller circles—representing the respective fields of (A) Sociology, (B) Social Ethics and Polity and (C) Social Art.

Circle A. P. S. P.—Positive Social Philosophy—General Sociology. P. S.—Pure Sociology, a differentiated segregation of general sociology (given a place in the scheme if perchance it may exist). A. S.—Applied Sociology, an organized nucleation of general sociology. S. S.—Specialized Sociology, such as political, historical, anthropological, etc., sociology.

Circle B. Social Ethics and Social Polity (subdivisions not shown) related directly to general sociology.

Circle C. S. A.—Social Art with S. S. A.—Special Social Arts nucleations. See diagram No. 2 for more accurate portrayal of the relations of social art to Applied Sociology.

Note. There has been no attempt to record impingements or to denote proportion. The boundaries are to be regarded as incidental and the foci of the nucleations as of primary importance.

Circle B represents the application of general sociology or of positive social philosophy of ethics and polity which is described in a previous chapter of this work. At present, no special organization of sociology apparently is necessary for this function. Even if such a special organization or nucleation should prove desirable, it is not likely to be the same as that described as applied sociology (A. S.). It would appear in circle A if it were primarily ethical-sociological and in circle B if it were primarily sociological-ethical (similarly with polity).

Circle C represents social art in general (S. A.) and the various specialized social arts as interfunctioning. Social art is related to general sociology through a specially organized general applied sociology. The relationship indicated by a single line between social art, ethics and polity is of course much more complex than is here suggested, but this complexity is not a problem of this dissertation. Other phases of the relationship between sociology and social art are brought out in the second chart.

Social Art: Definition. In accord with the preceding analysis of art, social art may be defined as the combination or modification of human relations or of pluralistic human behavior to a given end or ends. Any skill or special facility in performing such an operation should be comprehended in the term.

Art Includes Technique. The term *art* is also used to apply to organized knowledge or systems of rules and methods used for these performances. This seems to be good usage in the art of building or of engraving, and the art of music or dancing. In line with this rather common practice, the term *social art* might quite properly be expected to include that organized knowledge which relates to the rules and methods of artistic social achievement.

Each social art has its own technique. Most of these techniques have been empirically derived. Some of them have undergone scientific revisions. The techniques of the various social arts, however, have much in common. Their organization in terms of co-ordinating principles is highly desirable. Considering what is termed good usage in other fields, such a treatment of the techniques of the social arts might with propriety be called a technology of social art. The function of this technology should be the facilitation and improvement of skill in social art performance. It should be an organized knowledge of the rules and methods of achievement that prevail in the fields of social art, and it should be regarded as a part of social art. This technology of social arts must not be confused with what Henderson was pleased to call "social technology,"[19] and it is, of course, easily distinguished from what Small has described as "social technique."[20]

Applied Sociology and Technology of Social Art. The greatest confusion of all lies where the boundaries of applied sociology and technology of social art impinge. The usual distinction which has been made between sociology and social art whereby one is designated as a body of knowledge and the other as a mode of activity does not avail at this point, because technology of social art is also a body of knowledge. The fields of applied sociology and of the technology of social art *will* impinge and overlap. In fact, it is very easy to conceive that the areas of impingement may be the most scientifically fruitful and practically important parts of the field of application. For it is well to recall both at this point and elsewhere in this discussion concerning the relation of applied sociology to other subjects the thesis defended by Buckle and restated by

19. Charles R. Henderson, article "The Scope of Social Technology," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1901, vol. vi, pp. 465-486. That which Henderson described as social technology was not unlike that which is now designated as social economy.

20. Albion W. Small, article "Technique as an Approach to Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1922, vol. xxvii, pp. 646-51. Small's "social technique" might well be regarded as "sociological technique" if applied to sociology *cf infra* or as "social science technique" if applied to all of the social sciences.

Beard in his discussion of the economic basis of politics—that the science of any subject is not at its center but at its periphery where it impinges upon all the other sciences.[21]

The problem of terminology is complicated by a diversified use of the term "technique" within the field of sociology. There is a technique of general sociology concerning which much has been written in recent years.[22] There is also a technique of applied sociology. The technique of general sociology, with certain modifications, will of course be the basis of the technique of applied sociology. Suggestions as to some probable modifications of the technique of general sociology for purposes of applied sociology are made in the final chapter. But since sociology and applied sociology are herein conceived as a whole and one of its parts, the technique of the whole must naturally include the technique of the part. Realizing full well that terminology is only a means to an end, and desiring merely to provoke fruitful discussion, this technique will for purposes of such discussion be designated as sociological technique.[23]

Applied sociology, developed by means of a technique which is common to all sociology, will be predominately sociological in content. Even in its specialized forms it will be held together by a sociological terminology and its organization will be at the instance of sociologists. If sociology continues to become a specific concrete science, the distinctly sociological nature of applied sociology will more apparently distinguish it from the technique of social arts.

Technology of social art may or may not be predominated by sociology. In some cases it will very probably be economic, political, medical, psychological, and indeed almost anything except socio-

21. *Cf.* Charles A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics*, p. 14 *et seq.*

22. *Cf.* Franklin H. Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, *passim*.

23. Perhaps there will ultimately be a broad social science technique of which sociological technique will be a part. This term "sociological technique" is taken in preference to Prof. Small's suggestion of "social technique" because the latter term seems naturally to suggest "social arts technique" or "social work technique," although Small did not mean that it should. Perhaps, however, "social technique" may ultimately be used to include all social science technique. Usage must finally decree.

logical. It is likely to be highly diversified with differentiated technologies not only for different arts but for different groups of workers in the same art. It will often be empirical, pragmatic and experimental. It will probably be developed by field workers and in professional schools, or in schools of practical social arts rather than in sociological schools or departments of colleges and universities. Although it will be a body of knowledge in which the error is consistently reduced, it will probably be a more changing body than applied sociology. It is at present impossible, even if desirable, to make any rigid distinctions between applied sociology and the technology of social art. The distinctions just mentioned may serve to characterize the two types of knowledge. Since emphasis and proportion must be considered, doubtless frequent differences of opinion will arise as to where one begins and the other ends. The variety and extent of these technologies of social arts will become more apparent when the scope of social art is more fully comprehended. In fact every legislator, clergyman, teacher, publicist, financier, engineer, or other specially trained worker who is desirous of changing society is a potential social artist. He is likely to develop a technique adapted to his ability, to his training and to the ends which he is desirous to attain.

The Relation of General Sociology, Applied Sociology, Social Art and Technology of Social Art to One Another. Graphic. In chart 2 an effort has been made to portray graphically the relationships discussed in this and preceding chapters. The two circles (fields) of social science and social art are a part of all arts and sciences. In the interest of simplicity they are represented as impinging although it would probably be more accurate to have them overlapping.

Applied sociology is a part of sociology which, as one of the social sciences, impinges upon social art. Technology of social art is represented as composed of applied sociology, other sociology, and other social science. It also includes science that is not social. It belongs in part to art and in part to science, but since it has no justification save as it serves art it is most satisfactorily conceived as art.

In a general way the problem of motivation is brought out by regarding the desire for knowledge as one of the dominating motives on the left (science), and the desire for production as the dominating motive on the right (art), with mixed motives for applied sociology and technology of social art.



CHART 2.

A graph suggestive of the relationships of sociology, applied sociology, technology of social art and social art. It does not imply proportion, impingement or any other relationships than those mentioned.

NOTES

1. Social science and social art are represented parts of what is generally called *the arts and sciences.*

2. Social science and social art are presented as contiguous and would be better represented if they could be made to appear overlapping.

3. Applied sociology is regarded as a part of sociology which in turn is a part of social science (or one of the social sciences).

4. Technology of social art is regarded as a composite of sociology (including applied sociology), and of social art and also of both arts and sciences not generally regarded as social.

5. Motivation is conceived as a gradation from the pure science motive on the extreme left to the arts motive on the right but does not imply that the motives of the sociologists are any different from those of other social scientists.

Sociologists and Social Artists. Sociologists are prone to abstractions and swivel chair theorizing. Social artists are prone to empiricisms and a high regard for technique. Each can learn much from the other. The sociologist can make his sociology intelligible to social artists and organize it for their use. Its organization should at the same time be such as to best absorb the correctives of practice. The social artists can turn their "fields" into laboratories for the sociologists. Their empiricisms will thus undoubtedly be profitably refined, and their activities much better coordinated.

Neither the general sociologist nor the applied sociologist [24] is of necessity a social artist. While either or both of them must develop the finest appreciation of social art in order to develop social science, they must, however, use extreme care if they venture into the field of social art or they will develop an emotional bias which will make accurate, scientific analysis difficult if not impossible. Though their motives may be utilitarian and their findings practically worth while, nevertheless their work may be thoroughly scientific. It is their task to accumulate facts concerning social relations and social behavior as a unity. They must also discriminate between this scientifically obtained knowledge, which may be organized and systematized in the interest of complete knowledge of society, and that *part* of this knowledge which may be organized and

24. No satisfactory title has been found for the sociologist who specializes in the field of applied sociology. The author recognizes various reasons why he should not be called an applied sociologist but is inclined to believe that usage will so decree. He might with propriety be called a sociologist of applications. *Cf. Supra,* p. 207-9.

systematized so as (1) to be more specifically useful and (2) to be the basis of research for other utilitarian truths which may be scientifically ascertained. They must remain scientists, keep their sociological perspective and be ever mindful of the integrating principles of social science and in particular those of sociology. As a result they will establish an applied sociology.

Social artists are not necessarily sociologists. They should know some sociology, and they should be able to apply what they know. If they devote a disproportionate amount of their time and energy to theorizing, they invite from their professional colleagues the opprobrium, "full of theories, interesting, but impractical." However, necessary as it is for them to be grounded in social science, they must also maintain the highest possible professional attitude toward their art or profession. Sociology is one of the social sciences which they should be able to use. But psychology, dietetics, household economics, practical politics are quite as necessary to their scientific equipment. Bookkeeping, filing, indexing, interviewing, short-story writing and a myriad of similar specialized types of knowledge are essential to their technology. It is the exceptional social artist who can have a comprehensive and balanced knowledge of all that is requisite for maintaining the highest professional attitude toward his art and at the same time keeping the scientific attitude essential to the organization of sociology. The artist may put a premium on sociology by using it and giving it such credit as it deserves; he may make invaluable contributions to sociology from his practical experience; and he may offer to the sociologist intelligent and sympathetic cooperation in making use of the field of practice as laboratories for the testing and the evolving of theory.

Sociology and Social Art. In the light of these considerations it seems desirable to use the term *sociology* to describe an organized body of knowledge, partly in the nature of positive social philosophy; partly in the nature of a special social science. *Social art* is used to describe those purposeful changes in human behavior that are a combination of artistic ability and technique. The science, sociology, is useful to the art and the art is corrective of the science. Between

general sociology and social art two other organized bodies of knowledge are developing. The one is a subdivision of sociology,—*applied (or practical) sociology*. It is an organization of all sociology that is practically useful for the social arts around the most useful principles of sociology. The other is an organization of all the finding of all the social sciences (and any others) that are essential to the technique of social arts. The latter will develop into a technology of social arts and may embody much sociology.

Social work is at present the most highly integrated of the social arts. It has developed an extensive technology of social work which has several distinct subdivisions. Its technology has drawn heavily from economics, biology, psychology and sociology. The more comprehensive definitions of social work would include all social arts. It is customary to limit the use of this term to those social arts practiced in the interests of human welfare and in which the profit motive either does not appear or else is a very minor factor. *Business or industrial social arts* in which the profit motive plays a very important role are commencing to develop a technology of industrial social art. Like any other technology of social art this will draw upon all the social sciences but will rest most heavily upon sociology.

Social Art and Societal Engineering. Social art may or may not be telic.[25] Societal and all other social engineering is telic. The societal engineer accepts the principles of sociology as a basis of practice and follows technical methods of applying them. He desires to have the principles and the data of sociology so stated and arranged that they lend themselves readily to the technical use for which he needs them. He wants an applied sociology which will lend itself to the technical procedures of societal engineering. Instead of pursuing vague and remote Utopian goals as objectives, the societal engineer works toward vizualized concepts which in the light of sociology and social economy are practically possible. For sporadic outbursts of sentimental activity he substitutes planning and action, disciplined in accordance with carefully considered principles. Societal engineers

25. *Cf. Supra.* p. 69.

deal primarily with social processes and societal form and action patterns. Their work is built upon applied sociology. Without it, their technique or technology is of little or no avail. Many social artists have commenced to appreciate the possibilities of social and societal engineering. The actual realization of the possibilities of the societal engineer is dependent upon the development of an applied sociology. As soon as some of the possibilities of societal engineering begin to be realized, it will receive attention from business and administration that will speed up its development. Its growth will in turn draw upon applied sociology, demonstrate the value of the science, and doubtless thereby inaugurate a new epoch in the development of sociology.

Summary: Applied sociology in the restricted and specific form in which it is defined in this work is not as yet developed to the stage where it reveals its own field and function. A vast miscellany of social art and social science has been included under "applied sociology" as a sort of blanket term. This practice is not only confusing, but it tends to discredit one of the most important divisions of the field of sociology. A clearer conception of the field and function of applied sociology is essential to the development of the subject. The foremost sociologists agree on the general principles that applied sociology should bear the same relation to social science and to social art as any applied science bears to the science of which it is a part and the arts which it serves. The relations which prevail among the older and better established arts and sciences suggest certain relations that are likely to exist between the various phases of all arts and sciences, including social arts and sciences. The following inferences seem to be in line with these suggestions.

Many of the social arts (including much of social work) are highly socio-economic and require a synthetic statement of various social sciences in terms of social problems. Such a statement would be useful for the determination of objectives and the evaluation of projects. This function may be served by social economy—a science

in which sociology predominates. But social economy is not an applied sociology.

Every art has its technique (its composition) and it may have its technology. In the case of the social arts there may be a basic technology of social art, and even specialized technologies for each of the various social arts. This technology is a body of rules and methods related to skill in performance. It is a part of the art and it is the basis for training for the art. It may be drawn from all the realms of knowledge. It may be the direct result of scientific research, or it may develop empirically subject to the corrections of science. It is organized in terms of the needs and practices of the art or arts of which it is a part. A technology of social art may have relatively little sociological content.

The advent of any science has invariably introduced into the arts most closely associated with the science, programs and practices of engineering. The development of this engineering depends upon the development within the science of an applied science. Even so, the development of socio-economic engineering depends upon the development of applied social sciences. Within the field of socio-economic engineering, and perhaps the most determining phase of it, is societal engineering. The development of societal engineering is almost entirely dependent upon the provision of an adequate applied sociology—a sub-division of general sociology, developed by means of sociological technique and organized according to sociological principles, but in such terms and over such patterns as will make it easily available for societal engineers.

PART III

APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

A BASIS FOR

SOCIETAL ENGINEERING AND SOCIAL ARTS

CHAPTER I

Applied Sociology

To discover the principles or general tendencies in human association is the first task of sociology. To discover within these tendencies natural laws[1] of human association is a second task. These discoveries may be accomplished by a perceptual-conceptual or by a conceptual-perceptual procedure or by both.[2] They may be obtained by the accurate perception of facts of human association, the classification of these facts, and the consequent establishment of generalizations, principles and laws. They may be the result of efforts to verify and correct generalizations, theories, and hypothecated principles and laws. Sociology laboring at these two tasks, by methods of inductive science and of positive philosophy, will develop an increasingly accurate and comprehensive description[3] and explanation of social phenomena.

Sociology has done much to bring a semblance of order out of the hitherto "chaotic turbulence" or "buzzing confusion" of social phenomena. It has assumed that certain "first principles" probably explained human multi-individual as well as other multi-unit phenomena.[4] A convergence of "critically-intellectual" opinion based on extended observation of human association and organized around the generally prevailing principles of natural phenomena has produced comprehensive systematized bodies of sociological knowledge which are being used as a basis for projects of sociological research. These projects range from quantitative studies of multi-individual

1. Franklin H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 128. A law "is nothing more than the accurate description of the way in which . . . . observed facts cohere in an objective series or system of reality." *Cf.* also p. 131.

2. *Ibid.* pp. 129-30. Science depicts concrete perceptions and factorizes abstract conceptions.

3. *Ibid.* "Scientific description discovers the possibilities of interchangeability between perceptions and conceptions." "To forecast from abstract factors or concepts new concrete wholes that turn out to be perceivable, is to predict; and to perceive new concrete wholes that have been predicted is to verify the conceptual theory. Precisely this is what the scientific man means by explanation."

4. *Cf. Supra*, pp 148-151; also Herbert Spencer's *First Principles*.

behavior to qualitative studies of co-individual[5] phenomena. The statistical method now provides a highly developed technique for the quantitative study of multi-individual response to stimulation,[6] by means of counting qualitative resemblances (and differences) of form and action. These countings become the basis of a scientific study of multi-individual behavior in relation[7] to the stimulating or evoking environments, physical or social. The relations of the variable human variegates to one another in a differentiated like response[8] are, however, usually more than casual. In fact, the relations between the members of a group may be persistent, very complex, and highly differentiated. They may not lend themselves to classification for counting, and even if they do these countings may afford but a very small part of the explanation of the relation of the various members of the group to one another and to the group itself. For this purpose sociology requires another methodology. This research method will differ from the counting method quite as much as in biology the methodology of the Mendelians differs from that of the biometricians. It must be a methodology adequate for the description of societal form and action patterns, for the analysis of the reciprocal conditioning of individuals, and for the explanation of modes or types of interstimulation sequences.[9] For want of a better name, this latter methodology will be distinguished from "counting methodology" (statistical technique) by calling it "pattern method-

5. Franklin H. Giddings, "Stimulation Ranges and Reaction Areas," *Psychological Review, vol. 31, No. 6, Nov., 1924, p. 453.* "Conditioned by interstimulation and response, multi-individual behavior becomes co-individual behavior."

6. *Cf.* L. L. Thurstone, *The Nature of Intelligence*, ch. i. Response may be regarded either as action which begins in the environment or in the actor himself. In the latter case the response is said to be "evoked" by the stimulus.

7. *Ibid.* pp. 14, 5. "Physicists and engineers come to look upon the search for relations between variables as the typical task of science." Biologists use the biometric method.

8. However much the responses of a number of individuals are generally alike, the response of the individuals (in the plurel) differ, because no individuals are identical in their response, therefore, the phrase "differentiated like response."

9. *Supra*, pp. 90-94, 196.

ology."[10] The future development of sociology will probably be quite as much dependent upon the development of an adequate "pattern methodology" as upon the development of the "counting methodology." The delayed development of a "pattern methodology" has not only retarded the development of general sociology but it has been one of the principal reasons for the great delay in setting up an applied sociology, for the latter depends quite as much upon the exact knowledge of the nature of specific relations within a plurel as upon a quantitative knowledge of general relations in large social aggregates.[11]

Sociology as outlined in the preceding paragraphs is a description of the nature of human relations and of the process of human association. It includes perceptual descriptions and conceptual derivations. It deals with the past and the historic present. If any part of it deals with data in the field of history or in its production combines historical with sociological technique, such parts are frequently described as historical sociology. Similarly other parts are called anthropological or ethnological sociology. When the nature of human relations and the processes of human association are studied in relation to economic stimulation or conditioning, or when the technique of sociology is combined with that of economics, the findings might be described as economic sociology. But the present custom is to designate them as social economy. All of these phases of descriptive sociology deal primarily with the past, proximate and

10. This methodology might with propriety be called "relations methodology", "attitude methodology", or "association methodology". The word "pattern" is used because the frequently recurrent attitudes of human beings toward one another tend to become persistent relations or arrangements and the configuration of these arrangements may be called patterns. The advocacy of this theory implies no commitment to the *gestalt* theory. It does imply that the *arrangements* of individuals in a *plurel* or *societas* may be quite as important as the number and variety of the individuals.

11. In social work the nearest approaches to this methodology have been in connection with case studies of family relations. Psychiatry has opened an approach through the study of adjustments, especially those of juvenile delinquents. There is also something to be learned from researches concerning teaching and learning, community organization and leadership, businses administration and direction, when these latter are regarded as processes in social adjustment.

remote.[12] They describe in an orderly manner what has taken p'ace and in these descriptions include conceptual inferences. They reveal the laws of nature working in human associations.

To formulate the principles, laws and data of human relations and associations for use in effecting social change (or maintaining social status) is a third task of sociology. The accomplishment of this task will provide an applied sociology.

The primary *function* of applied sociology is to convert descriptions (perceptions and abstractions) of the past into practically useful predictions regarding the possibilities of the future. Applied sociology must not only provide means for predicting the future of present trends and processes; it must also make possible the prediction of the probable consequences of any change in the factors at present effective in specific trends or processes. It must not only describe the social mechanisms of the present so that they may be effectually operated; it must also present sociology in such form as is essential to composition and construction in the creative social arts.[13] The function of applied sociology has not infrequently been described as interpretive.[14] It is a descriptive sociology interpreted for the use of social engineers and social artists. To this end applied sociology must need be written in a terminology that is sociologically accurate

12 Social economy is of course both a descriptive and applied science—the applied science deals with the present and the future. *Cf. Supra,* pp. 188-191.

13. *Supra* pp. 203, 4. The idea of social engineering, splendid as it is for certain purposes, fails to express a marginal something which is almost self-evident in the terms creative social arts. The establishment, modification or operation of any social mechanism or social process is a task of synthesis as well as of arrangement. The achievements of social artists will be more than the arrangement of human beings into stereotyped form and action patterns. The social artist must not only arrange human beings in cooperative schemes so that they can achieve for themselves that which they could not otherwise achieve; he must also blend the associations so that the individuals share social experiences that could not otherwise be attained and so that they become something that they could not otherwise become. Applied sociology must serve the social artists as well as the social engineers.

14. *Supra,* pp. 35, 116, 132, 133, 138.

and at the same time may be used in the collection of data for practical purposes.[15]

Since it is very difficult to describe that which is to be except in terms of that which is, a statement in biological terminology added to the previous description of function may be additionally suggestive. Applied sociology should lend itself readily to practical social diagnosis. This would include socio-analysis[16] and other forms of evaluation of the influence of psychic factors in human relations and in associated human activity. In due time social diagnosticians will develop a societal symptomatology which will deal with such phenomena as juvenile delinquency, sabotage, conspiracy, divorce, disaffection, etc., in all of their various typical forms as symptoms of societal conditions requiring a social or societal therapeutics. Some of these conditions may be in the nature of social or societal syndromes,[17]—symptom complexes indicating specific interstimulation sequences in the social processes. An applied sociology should not only be formulated so as to place sociology at the disposal of those engaged in social diagnosis and social therapeutics, it should also serve to bring to sociology the benefits of their experience.

To attempt to state the nature of applied sociology is almost to attempt to prophecy. Certain persistent tendencies revealed in the preceding chapters and a certain amount of concurrence of sociological opinion expressed in connection with these tendencies suggest at least something of the probable nature of applied sociology. It will of course share the characteristics of general sociology of which it is a part, and it will be differentiated from the other social sciences in all those ways in which sociology is differentiated from the other social sciences. It will also differ from general sociology in the ways that applied sciences generally differ from the general sciences of

15. The agreement upon sociologically significant terminology that can be used interchangeably in various fields of practice will be invaluable both to the theory and to the practice. At the present time many business houses have accumulated a vast amount of human and social data in terms of empirically derived terminology much of which is incomparable and will not lend itself to any significant sociological classification.

16. *Supra*, p. 61. *Cf.* also E. R. Groves, *The Journal of Social Forces*, *vol.* i, p. 117

17. This term was suggested to me in a seminar discussion by Mary Elizabeth Johnson.

which they are a part. It will doubtless be a selected sociology. It will tend to include in great detail whatever lends itself to pragmatic checks or to practical use. And it will tend to omit otherwise excellent sociology that does not serve these ends. It will be a sociology composed of pragmatically verified sociology, and it will include generalized and refined empiricisms derived from the field of practice. It will be a specially organized sociology, laid out to serve the needs of use in achievement rather than for use in obtaining a more complete description of the comprehensive processes of social evolution. The nature of its organization will be to a considerable extent determined by expediency. And it is not unlikely that there will be radical reorganizations during the next twenty years of its development.

In order to fulfill the functions required of applied sociology, its organization must be primarily akin to that of sociology. Social sciences organized very specifically or predominantly in terms of specific achievement are part of the technique of achievement, i. e., of the technology of social art.[18] But although sociology will be used in such organizations of the social sciences, it serves primarily as a mediary between general theory and practical use, and its own organization must be coordinated with the organization of general theory.

Applied sociology, however, will be organized for the purpose of making predictions rather than for completing descriptions. It will, therefore, be pre-eminently a science of practical probability. Since applied sociology must deal with the associated activities of the most complex and indeterminate of variables, human beings, it will differ somewhat in nature from those sciences of probability that deal with units the variability of which is relatively slight and nicely determinable. The extreme complexity of the highly variable relations between human variegates together with the fact that inference must be based upon observation rather than upon scientifically controlled

18. E. g. In recreation and playground activities all of the social sciences are drawn upon but the data is organized in terms of problems, practices and procedures of recreation centers rather than in terms of any of the social sciences.

experiments[19] make a science of exact prediction impossible. Even if the laws of human association should ultimately be worked out to a nicety as yet inconceivable, the application of these laws to practical diagnosis, prognosis and prediction will always eventuate in terms of tendencies and probabilities. According to Professor Giddings, sociology in dealing with these probabilities will be in the nature of a science of ballistics rather than of a machinistic science.[20] It must not only account for the relatively free action of individuals but also for the reciprocal conditioning of the associated individuals.

In scope, applied sociology is evidently limited to a part of the field of sociology. There are those who feel that it should include all sociology dealing with the future and with the present in terms of the future. Such persons have not infrequently regarded it as an applied social philosophy useful for the determination of remote or ultimate social objectives and for the evaluation of conduct in terms of these objectives.[21] Social philosophers and social ethologists will undoubtedly use sociology for such purposes, but they will not require a specific formulation of sociology for this determination of "what" such as is required for discovering "how" social changes are to be brought about. In the light of the preceding chapters there seems to be abundant reason for limiting the scope of applied sociology to questions of "how", i. e., to ways and means of achievement. It is quite probable that there will eventually be another limitation to its scope. As sociology becomes more specifically a science of human association, the tendency will be to emphasize in applied sociology the ways and means of achieving proximate social ends. Such an emphasis, if it persists, will probably relegate to social philosophy the determination of comprehensive policies for the achievement of remote and as yet vaguely conceived ends. In this event, the scope of applied sociology will be limited to that sociology

19. There are now opportunities in business and in various professions for controlling specific social factors within small groups to such an extent as to warrant the drawing of inferences.

20. Franklin H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 135.

21. *Supra*, pp. 29, 162, 170, 1.

which deals with the achievement of specific, definite, proximate social ends by scientific methods.

Social work is not applied sociology.[22] It is one of the social arts. Already it has made and it will continue to make many practical applications of sociological theory. In fact such application should be facilitated and increased by the development of an applied sociology. Applied sociology will not include the technology of social work or of other social arts within its scope. These technologies will draw heavily upon applied sociology as also upon the other social sciences but they are subsidiary to the arts and combine selections from many sciences organized in terms of the problems of the technology of social arts.

Applied sociology is, therefore, a selected and specially organized part of sociology. Its first function is to make sociology available for practical use. Its second function is to provide common denominators by means of which social artists in various fields can put their percepts and their inferences into sociologically sound terminology, and thus turn them to common advantage. Its third function is to enrich and correct general sociology from experience in the field of practice.

In its nature applied sociology differs from the other social sciences in the same way or ways that sociology as a special social science differs from them. It differs from general sociology in the same ways that other applied sciences differ from the general sciences of which they are a part, i. e., it is a sociology selected and organized for use and is a science of practical probability rather than of comprehensive description. It is a sociology composed of pragmatically tested theory and of refined and generalized empiricisms. It serves to unite the progress of sociological knowledge with the practice of empirical science. Applied sociology, therefore, is sociology selected, organized and interpreted so that it is useful for devising ways and means of achieving proximate social ends.

22. *Supra*, pp. 31, 172-5, 182-5.

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Herbert Newhard Shenton was born in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, July 9, 1884. He graduated from the Pottstown High School in 1901 and attended the Hill School 1901-2. He entered Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania in 1902 and graduated with the degree of Ph. B. in 1906, and in 1909 was granted the degree of A. M. From 1906 to 1910 he attended Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey, Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary, New York City. He received the degree B. D. from Drew, 1910. He was appointed University Fellow in Sociology at Columbia University, 1910. On June 27, 1919, he married Edna Mae Logan of Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Since 1911 he has been an associate and instructor in sociology at Columbia University. During this period he served as Director of the Division of Reconstruction Research of the United States Council of National Defense 1919-20 and in 1920 was appointed Director of the Council. From December, 1919, to April, 1920, he served as Executive Secretary of the United State Bituminous Coal Commission and later as Organizing Secretary of the United States Anthracite Coal Commission. He has served as chairman of the Research Committee of the Department of Education and Research of the Federal Council of Churches, and was chairman of the committee responsible for the report on "The Prohibition Situation." He was chairman of the Fact-Finding Commission of the Citizenship Conference, 1923, Washington, D. C. He has supervised and participated in research activities of the Institute for Social and Religious Research, being editor and chairman of the committee which made the Survey of the Religious Education Association. At Columbia University he studied sociology and statistics under Franklin H. Giddings, Henry L. Moore, Samuel McC. Lindsay, Edward T. Devine, Alvan A. Tenney and Robert E. Chaddock; history and anthropology under James T. Shotwell, James Harvey Robinson, Franz Boas and Alexander Goldenweiser; economics under John Bates Clark and Henry R. Seager.

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